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INTRODUCTION

Although the present book never intended to be quite so
timely, Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of
Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia is one book that,
coming so soon after the events of September 11, 2001, and
shortly before President Bush’s Russian summit, should
find a ready audience. The essays in the book were
originally commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center (NPEC) as part of a year-long study on
the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation.
What makes the book different from other studies of
U.S.-Russian cooperation is its reliance on competitive
strategies.1
Originally devised as a business management tool and
subsequently used by the Pentagon to guide its military
planning against the Soviet Union, the analytical approach
based on competitive strategies requires analysts to
evaluate long-term trends, 10 to 20 years out. Rather than
beginning with one’s own aims and strategies, however,
competitive strategies demands that analysts first
understand the objectives, strengths, and weaknesses of
competitors and other key parties. A key objective of
competitive strategies is to detail how best to pit one’s
strengths against a competitor’s enduring weaknesses in a
series of moves and countermoves. The goal is to devise
strategies that force one’s competitor to spend more time
and resources shoring up his weaknesses than in taking
offensive action.
Although businesses and other organizations generally
use competitive strategies analysis to secure advantage
over their challengers, it also can be used to help them
identify beneficial opportunities for cooperation. To date,
this has not been the approach U.S. officials have taken on
nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. Instead, they
have assumed that the specifics of cooperation should be
v

determined by whatever goals and strategies Russia and
the United States share. This book takes a very different
approach. The authors first focus on how Russia’s and
America’s proliferation-related strategies and goals differ.
They then identify each nation’s relevant strengths and
weaknesses and determine where these might best be
mated to produce new forms of cooperation.
An example of what this kind of analysis is capable of
producing can be found in the first chapter, the final report
of the competitive strategies working group on U.S.Russian nonproliferation cooperation. Here the different
goals of each nation regarding medical and health services
are identified. Russia still has a good number of biological
weapons-related experts that it has yet to find civilian
employment for, but a relatively poor level of medical
services. It also has a population whose health is seriously
deteriorating and a Russian president who wants to change
this. Finally, although the availability of medical services is
very low, Russia still has a fairly competent, functioning
public health system.
In contrast, provision of medical services in the United
States is quite high, but America’s public health system is
barely functional. Unlike Russia, it has few, if any,
biological weapons experts, but it is very concerned about
being able to detect the use of biological weapons and the
spread of dangerous diseases and pathogens within
America and from other nations (including Russia).
After reflecting on these issues and the commissioned
research of health demographer Murray Feshbach reported
in Chapter 4 (“The Health and Future of Russia’s
Population”), the working group focused on the prospects for
U.S.-Russian cooperation on health monitoring both to
enhance the health of Russia’s population and to increase
the chances of detecting the spread of dangerous diseases
caused by either nature or the hand of man. One of the
nation’s leading health surveillance experts, Dr. Alan
Zelicoff of Sandia National Laboratory, was brought in to
vi

brief the group about a health monitoring system already
operating in New Mexico known as Rapid Syndrome
Validation Project, or RSVP.
RSVP uses computers, touch-screen entry, and the
Internet to enable physicians to make speedy reports to
public health authorities when they encounter patients who
have a particular set of symptoms. A physician’s report can
be filed in less than a minute, assumes no prior knowledge of
exotic diseases, and can address over 90 percent of the
diseases a biological-weapons attack might spread. The
system is also cheap to deploy—an entire global system of
10,000 reporting stations could be put in place for between
10 and 20 million dollars.
After learning this and more about RSVP, the working
group recommended that the U.S. Government support
RSVP’s deployment in Russia as a cooperative threat
reduction effort and that the United States use biological
weapons experts at Russia’s former biological weapons
research laboratories to set up and run the system. NPEC
staff subsequently briefed this recommendation to U.S.
officials in the Departments of Defense and Energy. As a
result, both departments agreed early in 2002 to fund
deployment of RSVP in Russia and several former Soviet
Republics.
T h e work in g gr oup al so mad e sever al other
recommendations. One set had to do with how best to
account for Russian nuclear weapons materials and to help
pay for reducing the threats they and other Russian
strategic weapons activities present. Discussion of this set
of recommendations, which focused on allowing Russia to
earn money storing U.S.-origin spent fuel from East Asia
and Europe in exchange for better data on its nuclear
inventory and the use of profits to help pay for important
Nunn-Lugar programs, also can be found in Chapter 1. In
making these recommendations, the working group
benefited from the analyses of Army War College researcher
Dr. Stephen Blank (“The Foundations of Russian Strategic
vii

Power and Capabilities,” Chapter 2); of Heritage
Foundation’s Russian Studies Director Dr. Ariel Cohen
(“Russian Rule and the Regional Military Industrial
Complexes,” Chapter 3); and of the Natural Resource
Defense Council’s Dr. Thomas Cochran (“New Metrics for
Denuclearization,” Chapter 5).
F in a lly , th e w or ki ng gr oup mad e a s et of
recommendations regarding the next generation of Russian
strategic weapons workers. This set of recommendations,
which focused on increasing the quantity and quality of
Russian and Western student exchanges, turned heavily on
the analysis found in Chapter 6 by Professor Mark Kramer
of Harvard University (“Demilitarizing Russian Weapons
Scientists: The Challenge”); in Chapter 7 by Centra
Technologies’ Matthew Partan (“Defense Conversion: How
Far Can Russia Expand Small and Medium Enterprises?”);
and Chapter 8 by this book’s coeditor and NPEC’s
Wohlstetter Fellow, Thomas Riisager (“Turning the Next
Generation of Russians Away from Weapons Work”).
None of these chapters makes for breezy reading.
However, given how high the costs of U.S.-Russian
nonproliferation cooperation failure might be—terrorist
access to weapons materials and the further proliferation of
strategic arms to unstable, hostile states—they are all too
timely and deserve to be read with care.

HENRY D. SOKOLSKI
Executive Director
Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center
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ENDNOTE - INTRODUCTION
1. Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000, pp.
1-26.
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CHAPTER 1

BEYOND NUNN-LUGAR:
CURBING THE NEXT WAVE OF
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION THREATS FROM
RUSSIA

Working Group on U.S.-Russian
Nonproliferation Cooperation

Foreword.
W ith so ma n y anal ys es al r ead y avai l abl e of
U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction efforts, it is not
obvious why one should bother with yet another. There are,
however, three good reasons for doing so. First, with the
recent warming in U.S.-Russian relations, it makes sense to
review what is clearly the current mainstay of existing
U.S.-Russian cooperation—the one billion dollars per year
worth of government-funded Nunn-Lugar programs—to see
what can be done better. Certainly, if the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program’s worthy objectives can be better
achieved, this, in turn, should enhance the prospects for
increased U.S.-Russian security cooperation generally. Of
course, the reverse is also true.
Second, although there is broad support to continue
these programs, there is a growing divide between the
programs’ backers and their critics as how best to proceed.
Among the programs’ supporters, the key recommendation
is to spend substantially more on existing projects. Critics of
the programs’ defense conversion efforts, however, insist
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that these projects be made self-sustaining as soon as
possible.
Finally, since September 11, 2001, the inventory of
threats that the United States and Russia need to cooperate
on reducing has clearly grown.
Overview.
The current centerpiece of U.S.-Russian security
collaboration is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program. Costing nearly a billion dollars
annually, this effort and the projects it supports have run
for nearly a decade now and gained the kind of political,
bureaucratic, and budgetary support that has all but
institutionalized them. Indeed, not only are they likely to
continue for many more years, their success or failure has
become identified with the future of U.S.-Russian
cooperation generally.
Looking at the current state of these programs, it is easy
to see why. On the one hand, they have succeeded in helping
Russia pay for the dismantlement and securing of a
significant number of deployed strategic weapons systems
and related research, production, and storage facilities.
What they have yet to extend to, however, are the most
worrisome of Russia’s strategic weapons activities—
Moscow’s continued proliferation of missile and nuclear
technology exports to those nations still at odds with the
United States, e.g., Iran, Iraq, and China.
Thus, at the very time Nunn-Lugar supporters were
trying to secure $316 million more in funding, Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a major security treaty of
friendship with China and a $300 million arms deal with
Iran. Russian nuclear and missile cooperation with Tehran,
moreover, continues. Indeed, some now believe that Iran is
so far along in its nuclear missile efforts that, even if Russia
cut off all further assistance, Tehran could deploy a
long-range nuclear system in the next 5 to 8 years. As for
2

Iraq, Putin recently sent an official delegation to meet with
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to assure Baghdad of
Moscow’s continued interest in resuming arms sales and
military cooperation just as soon as the United Nations
sanctions are lifted.
As U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction efforts
succeed or fail in demilitarizing and controlling the further
spread of U.S. and Russian strategic weapons capabilities,
then, so too does the fate of U.S.-Russian security
cooperation generally rise or fall. Beyond Russia and the
United States backing the goals of Nunn-Lugar and acting
in good faith, though, success in these efforts also requires
sound cooperative programs and proper implementation. In
this regard, congressional hearings, General Accounting
Office studies, and several official reviews have highlighted
a number of concerns. Among these are:

• U.S. assistance to demilitarize Russia’s strategic
weapons production and research institutes has been so
poorly monitored that, in some cases, it could have actually
helped to maintain Russia’s weapons capabilities;
•

The metrics for these programs’ success and failure
are egregiously vague;

•

Despite years of spending to encourage defense
conversion, there is little to show in the way of commercial
Russian venture enterprises;

•

The costs to the U.S. taxpayer for many of the defense
conversion programs are growing despite congressional
calls for the executive branch to devise ways to defederalize
their support.
This listing of worries brings us to the last reason that a
reassessment of the cooperative threat reduction programs
is warranted. After September 11 and a decade of
implementing the current crop of Nunn-Lugar programs,
the list of threats U.S.-Russian threat reduction
3

cooperation must now address has grown. In l991, the
immediate proliferation concern was the likely spread of
Russia’s existing nuclear weapons materials and
long-range missile expertise to Iran or Iraq. Now,
U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction efforts need to
address at least three other longer-term worries:

• As the number of infectious diseases and their ability
to spread quickly increases, insufficient effort will be made
to detect their outbreak early and precisely enough in the
United States and Russia to ascertain whether the epidemic
was natural or the result of terrorist or state action, and to
limit the harm that might otherwise be done to the general
populations.
• Several factors will only increase the risks of nuclear
theft and terrorism: the huge and growing stockpiles of
nuclear weapons materials in the United States and Russia
from dismantled weapons; the significant remaining
uncertainties regarding these and civilian holdings
(particularly in Russia); and the proposed conversion of
surplus weapons plutonium into reactor fuel.
•

Lacking the ability or interest to create private sector
employment opportunities, Russia will again find its best
and brightest drawn to the security and prestige of working
in Russia’s weapons-related facilities and government,
thereby becoming further estranged from the West and
indifferent or hostile to U.S. and allied proliferation
concerns.
None of these longer-term concerns is yet a major focus of
existing U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction
programs. Nor has much been done to explain how currently
supported programs will be able to meet the growing list of
congressional effectiveness criteria, including these
programs’ ultimate defederalization.
The report that follows, which is the result of over 2 years
of planning, some 13 commissioned studies, and the
4

participation of over 30 Russian experts, attempts to
address each of these issues.
What makes this report different from other studies of
U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation is its use of
competitive strategies analysis. Rather than focusing
merely on current events, this methodology encouraged the
study’s participants to concentrate on the security
challenges and opportunities the United States and Russia
would face over the next 10 to 20 years. Use of competitive
strategies analysis also forced the study’s working groups to
consider how differences in U.S. and Russian security
aims an d strategi es mi ght hel p gui d e f utur e
nonproliferation cooperation. Finally, rather than focusing
on ways to shore up the weaknesses in existing cooperative
threat reduction efforts, the use of competitive strategies
helped the working groups to determine how U.S. and
Russian strengths might be pitted against enduring
weak n esses to sugges t new, s ound er p aths of
nonproliferation cooperation. An additional objective of this
study was to suggest leveraged cooperative efforts that
could be paid for within existing or significantly reduced
levels of funding.
The study’s participants and commentators suggested
four specific undertakings:

•

First, the United States and Russia should work
immediately toward the joint deployment of a health
monitoring system to detect outbreaks of infectious
disease. The deployment of such a system would serve two
purposes. First, it would permit timely protective actions to
be taken in the event of biological agent attacks against
civil or military populations. In this regard, establishing
such a system would help support the objectives of the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Also, expanding
such a monitoring system to include other nations is a task
that former Russian biological weapons-related experts
might undertake as a peaceful alternative enterprise.
Second, joint deployment could help the United States and
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Russia determine how best to address Russia’s own growing
health concerns, which if not properly addressed could
jeopardize not only Russia’s future vitality, but the health of
nations that have routine contact with Russia.

• Second, the United States and Russia should
coordinate plans to have Russia receive U.S.-origin
spent reactor fuel from other nations for a fee, for
getting a more accurate inventory of Russia’s
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable
materials holdings, and for jointly forswearing the
chemical separation of plutonium for commercial or
nuclear weapons purposes. U.S. and Russian officials
have already discussed how lucrative commerce in spent
fuel storage (worth as much as 15 billion dollars over the
next decade) could be used to help pay for critical
Nunn-Lugar programs. This business, however, would
require Washington’s approval since it would mainly
involve nuclear fuel of U.S. origin. Before granting such
permission, the United States should secure Russia’s
cooperation to get a more accurate inventory of Russia’s
existing civil and military nuclear holdings. Securing and
sharing such inventory data are essential: without it,
neither Russia nor the United States will be able to learn
how well their other nuclear cooperative threat reduction
efforts are reducing the risk of illicit proliferation and
nuclear theft. In addition, the United States should
condition such commerce on Russia’s willingness to reduce
the flows of nuclear weapons-usable materials (as the
United States has already done) by foreswearing chemical
separation of plutonium for civilian or nuclear weapons
purposes.
• Third, the United States, the European Union,
and Russia need to cooperate much more extensively
to increase the quality and number of student
exchanges. If U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction
efforts are to lead to true lasting defense conversion, it is
essential that Russia’s most talented youth not be drawn to
6

work in Russia’s military-industrial-research sectors
simply because no better alternatives exist. A recent poll of
Russian university students indicates that over a third
would consider working in closed nuclear cities, while over
60 percent of the very best students would choose to work in
one of Russia’s state enterprises. This must change. To
accomplish this, however, requires awareness among
Russia’s youth of civilian private sector alternatives not yet
present in Russia. This can most easily be secured through
exchanges with the United States and Europe where such
alternatives are common. Unfortunately, to date the
numbers of such exchanges have been far, far too low.

•

Finally, to the extent possible, those cooperative nonproliferation programs that cannot be
privatized should be paired with transparent
cooperative defense conversion programs that can.
The idea here is initially to help pay for cooperative
programs that cannot be privatized with profits from those
that can. In time, this approach would also give Russians
and Americans a profit motive to pressure their
governments to complete those cooperative threat reduction
programs that cannot make money. Finally, this approach
might help reduce concerns that monies invested in or
raised by cooperative defense conversion projects might
indirectly end up supporting those Russian weapon-related
activities that the projects are supposed to replace.
Each of these recommendations, along with the analysis
they were based upon, is presented below.
Key Assumptions.
In assessing what should guide U.S.-Russian
nonproliferation cooperation efforts over the next 2 decades,
the study’s working groups tried first to understand in what
relevant ways Russia’s foreign policy and military views
might differ from those of the United States. This analysis
produced three major findings:
7

• Russia’s foreign policy agenda and nonproliferation concerns in the mid- and short-term are
likely to be very different from those of the United
States. Whereas the United States will continue to want to
maintain global order, Russia will see its ability to influence
events in its near abroad (i.e., Central Asia, the Balkans,
and the Baltic states) as being critical to maintaining
national authority over its own diverse populations and
territories. Thus Russia (particularly its military) is very
likely to remain sensitive to expansion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, Moscow will see
strategic cooperation and good relations with Iran, Iraq,
India, and China as being in its short- and mid-term
interest to help it maintain influence over Russia’s
relatively unstable periphery.
• Russia’s long-term foreign policy and nonproliferation concerns, though, are less likely to
clash with those of the United States. There are two
reasons why. First, over the next 2 decades, Russia by itself
will be unable to compete economically (and thus militarily)
with China. It could subordinate itself in some loose alliance
with China against the United States and its European and
Asian allies. Or Russia could cooperate more closely with
the West to gain the economic skills and capital to become a
more vital nation in its own right. Second, Moscow will
naturally have a good deal to lose if states on its periphery
(e.g., Iraq and Iran) increase their military might to a point
where the United States or its allies are compelled to
intervene.
• Russia only partially shares Washington’s
views regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear
power. While the Russian military is willing to reduce the
number of strategic weapons Russia deploys, it sees
continued deployment and enhancement of its theater
nuclear weapons systems as being critical to shore up
inadequacies in Russia’s conventional forces. With regard to
civilian nuclear power, Russia is eager to save (and expand)
8

as much of its current nuclear infrastructure as possible and
believes it can do so through nuclear exports to such nations
as India and Iran (nations to which the United States has
blocked U.S. nuclear exports on nonproliferation grounds).
Russia also hopes to make money providing spent fuel
storage and reprocessing services to other nations even
though the United States has been uneasy about both the
further expansion of civil reprocessing and increased
international commerce in nuclear weapons-usable fuels.
In addition to identifying these differences, the study’s
working groups used competitive strategies analysis to
pinpoint U.S. and Russian strengths and weaknesses
relevant to devising and guiding future cooperative
nonproliferation initiatives. This gave rise to the following
determinations:

•

The United States should continue to tie U.S.
cooperation with Russia to the latter’s ending its
missile and nuclear assistance to Iran but recognize
that doing so may no longer be as rewarding as it
once might have been. As already noted, Iran has
received so much nuclear and missile assistance over the
last decade that some analysts believe that cutting off all
further Russian assistance now may have only a negligible
impact on Iran’s ability to deploy long-range nuclear
systems. This doesn’t mean that the United States should
stop calling on Moscow to end all assistance. The United
States should indeed continue to help slow these programs
down. What Washington must recognize, however, is that
the days when demanding this might keep Iran from
achieving ballistic or nuclear capability may be past.
Indeed, Iran is now so close to development of these
capabilities it may be difficult for the United States and its
allies to know for sure whether Russia had cut off all further
assistance even if it had. In any case, Russia’s good
behavior now would be unlikely to prevent the current
regime in Iran from developing long-range nuclear systems.
Thus it is important that if the United States or Russia
9

proposes any major new forms of nonproliferation
cooperation, they be tied to some more ambitious mutual
nonproliferation goal than preventing Iran from acquiring
the means to deploy long-range nuclear arms.

• The most promising areas for future nonproliferation cooperation are most likely to be in the
health and nuclear waste management fields. In these
two areas, U.S. and Russian strengths and weaknesses
complement one another. In the United States, high quality
medical services are readily available but America’s public
health institutions have fallen into disuse. In contrast, the
health and vitality of Russia’s population are shaky and
projected to get worse. Russia, on the other hand, still has
an extensive public health system left over from the Soviet
era, but it is poorly equipped. As for Russia’s most advanced
medical and pharmaceutical research institutions, too
many in the past have been connected with biological and
chemical weapons work. When one turns to nuclear power,
the U.S. Government is more interested in maintaining its
nuclear infrastructure than expanding it. Russia, on the
other hand, believes it must expand its nuclear exports
simply to keep its nuclear industry alive. With Russia
selling its reactors to a shrinking market for a fraction of the
prices charged by its Western competition, though, it is
unclear how profitable such business will be. This explains
Russia’s interest in getting into the nuclear waste
management business, which is potentially worth many
billions of dollars and for which there clearly is a market.
Indeed, Western demand for spent fuel storage services is
quite high. What Russia lacks, however, is the enabling
authority needed to receive a good portion of the world’s
spent fuel, which, because of its U.S. origin, cannot be
moved without Washington’s consent.
•

Future efforts to convert Russian strategic
weapons expertise and assets into profitable civilian
enterprises will have to rely less on U.S. taxpayer
largesse and reflect less optimism concerning the
10

Russians’ near-term drive or ability to create private
businesses. Although Nunn-Lugar programs remain
popular, draft legislation this fall made it clear that the U.S.
House of Representatives expects the program’s defense
conversion projects to be defederalized within 4 years.
Implicit in this demand is the expectation that after 4 years
of support, defense conversion projects should be
self-sustaining private enterprises. The problem here is the
U.S.-Russian track record: the United States has too often
pushed projects the Russians have not fully supported,
while U.S. and Russian government officials have too
frequently promoted projects that lacked serious business
plans or sound management. The moral of this experience is
basic: if entrepreneurial forces are to be harnessed in Russia
to spur defense conversion, it will not be the result of U.S.
Government decisions or management. Instead, it will
require major reform of Russia’s tax, legal, and financial
systems to make them far friendlier to the creation of small
and medium private enterprises than they are today. In
addition, it will require the creation of many more able
Russian entrepreneurial managers (particularly in the high
technology sectors) to draw Russians (and Russia) away
from their historical attraction to large, command-style
enterprises run by the state. As a practical matter, such
structural changes will take time and will require selective
mutual exposure between the right Russians and the
appropriate Americans and Europeans.
Additional Analysis and Recommendations.
In keeping with this guidance and the previously noted
findings, the study’s working groups made the following
recommendations:
First, the United States and Russia should work
immediately toward the joint deployment of a health
monitoring system to detect outbreaks of infectious
disease. The objects of deploying such a system would be to
enhance enforcement of the BWC, improve the health of
11

Russia’s citizens, and assure early detection in the United
States and Russia of the natural spread of deadly infectious
diseases and of bioterrorist attacks.
The George W. Bush administration recently requested
that the members of the BWC support the World Health
Organization’s health surveillance program. The World
Health Organization has been working to promote
international monitoring of infectious disease for years. The
problem is that, so far, it has only been able to get its
membership to monitor and report on three sicknesses—
yellow fever, plague, and cholera. The reporting, moreover,
is generally limited to information regarding confirmed
outbreaks, rather than the type of preliminary data needed
to contain such outbreaks in a timely fashion.
This sort of reporting conservatism may make sense to
an underdeveloped nation fearful of losing tourism dollars,
but it makes no sense if you need early warning of the
possible outbreak of a vast array of infectious diseases
before they spread out of control.
The U.S. Government understands this. That is why
following the anthrax letter attacks of the fall of 2001, it
supported the expansion of an inexpensive and proven
reporting system already working in New Mexico known as
the Rapid Syndrome Validation Project (RSVP). RSVP uses
computers, touch-screen entry, and the Internet to enable
doctors to make speedy reports to public health authorities
when they encounter patients who have a particular set of
symptoms. A report can be filed in less than a minute. The
system assumes no prior knowledge of exotic diseases and
covers over 90 percent of the diseases a biological weapons
attack might inflict. The program is also cheap. A basic U.S.
national system of 1,000 stations could be set up for
approximately $5 million; a crude global system of 10,000
reporting stations for approximately $20 million.
The immediate benefit of deploying this system beyond
U.S. borders would be to improve public health reporting
internationally. Certainly, anything the United States or
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others do in this respect could support the health
surveillance efforts of the World Health Organization. The
long-term payoff would be to establish a baseline from
which to detect unusual events, such as bioterrorist attacks
or epidemics. These could then be identified early enough to
allow actions to be taken to prevent harm from coming to
any nation’s general population.
In Russia’s case, the benefits of deploying such a system,
though, would be more substantial. Russia’s population is
not healthy, and it is projected to get much, much sicker.
Indeed, Putin highlighted this point last year when he cited
Russia’s declining population (a decrease of 750,000 people
per year) as one of the nation’s most serious problems.
Analysis commissioned by this study forecasts a Russian
population decline by approximately 50 million (i.e., over 30
percent) over the next half-century. The most important
cause for this demographic decline is the deteriorating
health of Russia’s population. The incidence of HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, hepatitis C and B, and syphilis are all on the
rise. This has had and will continue to have a major impact
on the health of all sectors of Russia’s population.
To reverse these trends, it is critical that Russia’s public
health authorities be able to detect and monitor new
outbreaks of infectious diseases early and precisely enough
to locate their sources and take appropriate measures
before they further harm Russia’s population. This
conclusion is one now becoming apparent to both U.S. and
Russian officials. In fact, late in the summer of 2001, after
this study’s working groups recommended joint deployment
of RSVP, several working group participants contacted
senior U.S. and Russian officials who evinced interest in
backing such an undertaking. One idea currently being
considered is using Russian biological research institute
scientists to help deploy the system in Russia. Assuming
they gain the experience they need, these experts could then
provide their services in deploying RSVP to other nations
for a fee. The profits from this activity eventually could be
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used to help support the operation of RSVP within Russia
itself.
Second, the United States and Russia should
coordinate plans to have Russia receive U.S.-origin
spent reactor fuel from other nations for a fee, while
getting a more accurate inventory of Russia’s
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable
materials holdings and jointly forswearing the
chemical separation of plutonium for commercial or
military purposes.
In the late 1990s, a private group of U.S. representatives
from the environmental, business, and national security
communities known as the Nonproliferation Trust, Inc.,
proposed to store foreign (i.e., non-U.S., non-Russian) spent
fuel in Russia and use the revenues thus raised for a variety
of cooperative threat reduction programs and other causes.
Russia’s Duma and Russia’s nuclear industrial
organization, Minatom, have both shown considerable
interest in this proposal. So have German and U.S. officials.
Under the scheme, the United States would have to give
Russia permission to receive U.S.-origin spent reactor fuel
from Europe, Taiwan, and South Korea. These countries’
utilities would then pay Minatom a fee for storing the spent
fuel in dry storage casks for 40 years.
Assuming a proper customer base, this business should
generate as much as 15 billion dollars in revenue. Of this
figure, approximately 3 to 4 billion dollars would be needed
to transport and store the spent fuel. This would leave over
11 billion dollars that could be used to support a variety of
Nu n n -L u g ar progr ams and other c aus es . The
Nonproliferation Trust has already proposed to use this
money to provide for Russian fissile material security (1.5
billion dollars), construction of a Russian spent fuel
repository (2 billion dollars), environmental clean-up (3
billion dollars), salaries for Minatom workers (1.8 billion
dollars), and humanitarian causes and pensions (2 billion
14

dollars). Each of these activities and their funding would be
overseen and audited by a corporate board that would
in clu de promin ent U.S. nati onal sec ur i ty and
environmental experts as well as Russians.
Clearly, implementing this proposal could go a long way
toward paying for some of the more expensive critical
cooperative threat reduction efforts. In addition, these
monies could keep a significant portion of Minatom’s staff
employed and do so without raising proliferation risks.
This last point, however, is not assured. Minatom would
like to get into the business of chemically separating
plutonium from spent reactor fuel and using it to make
mixed oxide uranium-plutonium fuels for power reactor use.
Such a business is so unprofitable, though, that no private
investor has offered to fund it. More important, such fuel
services would initiate the transit of thousands of nuclear
weapons’ worth of nuclear weapons-usable materials all
over Russia and much of the world. Certainly, if the United
States and Russia are serious about reducing the threat of
nuclear terrorism and theft, this is not a business their
cooperative threat reduction efforts should promote. At a
minimum, none of the monies that might be raised through
implementation of the Nonproliferation Trust idea should
help finance such activities.
But there is more cause for concern. Russia is still
produ cin g n u cle ar weap ons - usabl e mater i al s.
Compounding this nuclear threat is the dearth of
knowledge regarding Russia’s current nuclear weapons
material holdings. Although Russia has declared 50 tons of
weapons-grade plutonium to be in surplus, very little is
known about Russia’s total military inventory of nuclear
weapons materials. Thus, in 1999, senior U.S. Department
of Energy officials privately conceded that the United States
knew only to within 30 percent (plus or minus) what this
figure might be. That’s a big number, one equivalent to
approximately 23,000 advanced thermonuclear weapons’
worth of material, i.e., nearly four times the amount of
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material contained in all of the strategic nuclear warheads
the United States has deployed.
Again, if the United States and Russia are serious about
reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, nuclear theft, and
nuclear proliferation generally, these uncertainties about
Russia’s nuclear holdings are unacceptable. Certainly, it
makes no sense to pay for and focus so much on the storage
and disposition of 50 tons of surplus nuclear weapons
material if well over ten times as much may exist
unaccounted for. Just as implementation of the
Nonproliferation Trust proposal should be conditioned upon
Russia’s offering a pledge to forgo nuclear weapons or
civilian reprocessing, implementation should not proceed
unless the United States and Russia first reach some
understanding about what their nuclear weapons materials
holdings actually are.
This understanding ought to be more than an oral
a g reemen t. Speci f i c al l y, i mp l ementati on of the
Nonproliferation Trust proposal should be tied to clarifying
and reducing existing uncertainties. This means that both
the United States and Russia will have to be more
forthcoming about sharing nuclear inventory information
and opening up facilities to mutual or international
inspection than they have been to date. These conditions are
a price worth paying. Indeed, the potential financial and
nonproliferation benefits of proceeding with the
Nonproliferation Trust proposal are too great not to insist
that these conditions be met.
Third, the United States, the European Union, and
Russia need to cooperate much more extensively to
increase the quality and number of student
exchanges.
As already noted, many of Russia’s best and brightest
university students find the prospect of working in the
government’s military research industrial complex more
attractive than facing the obstacles and risks associated
with seeking private employment or starting private
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civilian businesses of their own. Clearly, no lasting defense
conversion can occur so long as this is the case. These
Russian students’ current attraction to working for state
enterprises is partly due to the impressive number of legal
and financial obstacles erected by the state against private
entrepreneurs. They also are aware of the risks and costs
imposed on such ventures by state-supported corruption
that preys upon the profitable. By contrast, employment in
state enterprises seems to offer a far more certain and
attractive future. Wages may be low, but the social benefits
of such employment—e.g., free housing, access to quality
health care and education, daycare, and subsidized food,
etc.—are still substantial.
Finally, and perhaps most important, most Russians
have developed a work ethic that is ill-suited for private
enterprise. The top-down directive style of management, so
common during the Soviet years, is still popular and all too
effective in stifling the kind of initiative and responsibility
private businesses require of their employees. Also, there is
the matter of Russian tolerance of and cultural sympathy
for cheating, which makes accountability and sound
accounting—both essential to any private enterprise—
nearly impossible.
These and other anti-business cultural traits, of course,
are learned and can be undone. To do so, however, Russia’s
best and brightest youth need relevant, first-hand exposure
to the West. Conversely, those American and European
students most interested in Russia need to understand how
Western business practices, the rule of law, management
techniques, etc., can be introduced into Russia without
being stymied by ingrained cultural norms. This dictates
vigorous student and youth leadership exchanges.
The numbers of Russian students (high school students,
undergraduates, and post-graduates) currently enrolled
each year in the United States (over 5,000), the United
Kingdom (approximately 2,500), Germany (approximately
900), and Australia (approximately 800) are not
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insignificant. Still, they are paltry in comparison to the
number of visiting Chinese students, who last year
exceeded 100,000 in the United States alone. In fact, the
per-capita rate of visiting Russian students is far below that
of many lesser nations. Also, only a small percentage of
advanced Russian students that attend U.S. schools and
return to Russia get an opportunity to work in serious
career-related jobs while they are in the United States.
More important, roughly 85 percent of these visiting
Russian students are 19 years or older, i.e., well beyond the
age of adolescence when one’s social habits are still very
much being formed.
There are a variety of reasons why the number of
Russian students enrolled in universities in Europe and the
United States is so low, and why the number of Russian high
school students enrolled in these countries is lower still.
Russian students must first learn English (or German) to
make their visits worthwhile. It has often been difficult for
Russians to get Russian academic credit for the work they
do overseas (particularly if they attend less rigorous
American high schools). Outside Moscow, Russian students
have less knowledge of the benefits of becoming an exchange
student.
But perhaps the most important impediment to
increasing the number of Russian high school students
visiting the West is the appalling insufficiency of
U.S.-Russian student exchange programs. In l992 when the
United States Congress passed the “Freedom Support Act”
for Russia, it authorized 20 million dollars to fund what it
hoped would be over 15,000 U.S.-Russian high school
exchange students a year. In addition, it provided another
3 0 million dolla r s to f und a si mi l ar number of
undergraduate and graduate exchanges. After nearly a
decade of promoting these programs, though, the number of
U.S.-Russian exchange students is still woefully shy of
these targets.
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In l999, for example, there were only some 5,300 Russian
exchange students (of all ages) enrolled in the United
States, and fewer than 500 American exchange students (of
all ages) enrolled in Russian schools and universities.
Almost all of the American students and a large majority of
the Russian students (85 percent or more) were over 19
years of age.
Clearly, the numbers here are far too small. Among the
key obstacles to increasing the number of American
students enrolled in Russian schools and universities is that
not enough American students are sufficiently fluent in
Russian, and that parents are rightfully concerned about
their children’s health and well-being while in Russia. As a
result, there are likely to be more American undergraduate
and graduate students interested and equipped to visit
Russia than there will be high school students. If the
number of American and European student visits to Russia
were higher, the number of Russian visits to Europe and the
United States would increase as a matter of course.
The question is how to make this happen. The study’s
participants had several ideas:

• Expanding current European Union and U.S.-funded
student exchange programs to support Russian exchanges
with the United States, European Union nations, and
Australia. The idea here would be to encourage Russian
exchanges with the United States and nations friendly to
the United States rather than the United States alone.
•

Creating a joint U.S.-European Union-Russian
commission that would work to identify and eliminate as
many of the current obstacles as possible to increasing
Russian, European, and U.S. student exchanges.

• Treating American high school, undergraduate, and
graduate exchange students as a single category so as to
increase the numbers from which Russian high school
exchange students might be paired.
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• Creating more mentoring and internship programs
for Russian exchange students visiting Europe and the
United States so that their academic work in their chosen
careers would be complemented by exposure to the Western
work ethic prevalent in the appropriate professions. Such
programs, in turn, could be created for U.S. and European
exchange students visiting Russia as well. Certainly, these
and other ideas need to be examined on a priority basis.
Finally, to the extent possible, those cooperative
nonproliferation programs that cannot be privatized
should be paired with transparent cooperative
defense conversion programs that can.
As already noted, Congress has increased its scrutiny
over the defense conversion projects that the Nunn-Lugar
program funds. As a result of this oversight, Congress has
generated an impressive list of desirable attributes for these
projects. Just a sampling drawn from the most prominent
analyses demonstrates how detailed the list has become.
These criteria include making sure that the projects:

•

avoid enhancing Russian strategic weapons
capabilities;

• avoid the reinvestment of project profits and startup
capital in weapons institutes;
• offer work that draws Russian weapons workers as
far away from the activities of their weapons or nuclear
institutes as possible;
• operate with transparent management and
accounting procedures;
• create jobs for weapon scientists rather than
employment for others at the weapons sites (e.g., spending
on day care centers at the weapons institutes);
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• draw future generations away from work in the
military complex;
•

encourage private sector employment as much as
possible over public sector employment;

• promote nonproliferation results, e.g., quantifiable
weapons reductions, increased monitoring of adherence to
existing nonproliferation agreements, reduction in the
threat of strategic weapons capabilities leaking to others
outside of Russia, reduction of the chances for terrorist
seizures, etc.;
•

are designed to eventually be sustainable without
congressional funding; and,

•

have clear objectives and deadlines for completion.

It would be desirable, of course, if all U.S.-Russian
cooperative threat reduction efforts met all of these
requirements. As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely
that any project has or ever could. Still, failing to meet these
criteria could defeat the purpose of the projects. Certainly,
no one in Congress wants to fund defense conversion efforts
that might help Russia to sustain its weapons capabilities.
Nor should the United States and Russia cooperate on
programs that can never get done or that produce negligible
nonproliferation benefits.
These realizations rightly troubled several of this
study’s working group members who, after several weeks of
additional consideration, hit upon the idea of pairing. They
recognized that many of the Nunn-Lugar program projects
could operate only if they receive congressional funding,
while others could not be initiated without such money.
They also recognized, however, that frequent U.S. and
Russian government support and involvement in these
projects reduce the likelihood that they will ever make it
commercially on their own.
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There are, of course, exceptions. One example of a
defense conversion effort that became self-sustaining
recently is a small software company that was set up in the
early 1990s to capitalize on the mathematics expertise of
seven scientists from the All-Russian Research Institute in
Sarov. Since then, the firm has created permanent civilian
employment for about 100 former weapon scientists. These
scientists now make three times what they made in the
weapons institutes.
As significant as this success might be, however, it has
done nothing to support the other cooperative threat
reduction efforts that cannot make money. Could such
profitable endeavors that are capitalized with U.S. funding
be paired with necessary but unprofitable cooperative
threat projects? This was the question several working
group members raised. What inspired their question was
the Nonproliferation Trust’s business concept whereby
profits from one activity—the storage of spent reactor
fuel—would go to support other cooperative threat
reduction activities that are incapable of generating
revenue. It was this proposal that also suggested this
report’s recommended approach to deploying RSVP—
getting the Russians to be the purveyors of health
monitoring to other nations and using the monies raised to
help maintain RSVP within Russia.
Members of this study’s working groups learned from
inquiries in the fall of 2001 that although such pairing has
not yet been used in U.S.-Russian cooperative threat
reduction efforts, it was attractive to U.S. officials on at
least three counts:

• First, it could help defray the costs to the United
States taxpayer of supporting cooperative threat reduction
efforts generally, i.e., help defederalize them;
• Second, it would give both Russian and American
officials an even greater incentive to develop defense
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conversion programs that could succeed commercially on
their own;

•

Third, it would give both Russian and American
entrepreneurs a profit motive to ensure that their
governments concluded (with a date certain) the
unprofitable cooperative threat reduction programs that
their business profits were being used to support.
The apparent advantages of this approach, of course,
have to be tempered by reality: not all cooperative threat
reduction programs will be profitable, nor will those that are
be able to pay for all those that are not. That said, to the
extent possible, this pairing approach should be tried and
applied.
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CHAPTER 2

THE FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC
POWER AND CAPABILITIES

Stephen J. Blank

INTRODUCTION
Will the availability and quality of Russian strategic
capabilities increase or decline over the next 2 decades and,
whichever result, why? Conventional wisdom has it that
Russia’s strategic capabilities will either grow or remain
intolerably high over the next 2 decades, yet there are some
reasons to believe that the human expertise and capital
assets related to strategic weapons may decline. Given
current economic trends, Russia’s military forces and
production surge capabilities should be able to approach the
quality and quantity enjoyed by the Soviets during the late
1980s. Moscow, however, would like to modernize its
nuclear forces, dual-use information systems, and advanced
conventional weapons and also invest in new weapon
systems such as direct energy weapons, lasers, microwave
radiation emitters, particle beam generators, and mass
plasma weapons. The problem is how to pay for this.
Certainly, Russia’s military budget will not be able to carry
these programs, even if Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
recently proposed economic and defense reforms are
successful.1 Thus the only way Russia can achieve its
military ambitions is to secure and maintain substantial
new sources of foreign financial investment and technical
cooperation.
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This chapter has three sections. The first describes how
the Russian military plans to modernize its existing nuclear
forces and acquire new strategic weapons capabilities by
increasing central control over the defense industry and
expanding Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union.
The second section identifies the two major obstacles to that
plan—the economic crisis and the steady decline in the
numbers of Russian scientists. Section three illustrates that
the Russian elite understand these problems and are trying
to overcome them by relying on arms sales, space launches,
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), and
other foreign capital flows to fund Russia’s acquisition of
strategic capabilities. This chapter concludes that Russia’s
current path can only lead to failure, and how far they
progress is dependent on how far other countries are willing
to finance them.
WHAT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES RUSSIA
WANTS AND HOW IT PLANS TO ACQUIRE THEM
Russia’s Wish List.
To understand what strategic weapons capabilities the
Russian military wants to acquire over the next 20 years, we
must first understand what the Russian military defines as
strategic. When one thinks of strategic weapons, the first
thing that comes to mind is submarine- or land-launched
long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons.
But the writings of many Russian observers plus evidence
from Russian exercises such as ZAPAD-99 indicate that, in
the Russian view, tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) can do
strategic duty by bringing about Russian control of any
intra-war escalation, thus forcing the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to negotiate on the basis of the status
quo ante and cease military operations. Since Kosovo, the
volume of official writing endorsing heavier reliance on such
nuclear weapons has only increased.2
Similarly, many leading Russian military thinkers
argue that information weapons and information warfare
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(IW) can achieve strategic outcomes. They see IW as a
strategic threat comparable to nuclear weapons in their
functional outcome.3 Here IW and/or various forms of
electromagnetic warfare in general become a potentially
self-sufficient operation in their own right. For example,
retired General M. A. Gareyev, President of the Academy of
Military Sciences and the dean of Russian military thought,
believes IW capabilities could by themselves achieve a
definite strategic goal.
Future wars could be fought without even resorting to
force, purely by informational and electronic means. In fact,
the cataclysm culminating in the collapse of the Soviet
empire and the Soviet Union illustrates that states and
coalitions can disintegrate as a result of confrontation on
the international arena without the direct application of
force.4
Another nonnuclear capability that could have strategic
impact is advanced conventional weapons (ACW). These,
according to many Russian thinkers, if targeted on key
strategic targets like command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) systems, nuclear power plants, or nuclear weapons
silos can, by purely conventional means, effectuate decisive
strategic outcomes. Consequently, such ACW attacks upon
conventional targets might justify a first-strike nuclear
response.5 That guidance was expanded to lower the
threshold for nuclear use and apparently remains operative
in the 2000 defense doctrine, largely due to NATO’s
campaign in Kosovo.6
Russian military thinkers also believe that integrated
space technologies relevant to projecting power for naval
and land operations constitute a strategic weapons
capability that Russia must acquire. 7 These writers
optimistically emphasize that Russian submarines and
aircraft can already launch global monitoring satellites.
Space will become the high ground whose possession offers
potentially decisive strategic benefits and advantages. They
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also point out that recent technological trends plus the
revenues accruing to Russia from projects like the
International Space Station (ISS) indicate that funding for
at least some of those capabilities is available as long as
Russia participates in foreign operations like the
ISS.8 On the other hand, these writers are concerned that
U.S. missile defenses will trigger an arms race whereby
control of space and thus anti-space weapons from nonspace
platforms, e.g., land-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs),
become weapons endowed with potential strategic
significance.
How Russian Military Planners Intend to Acquire
Capabilities.
Although a new cycle of reforms has just been announced
in military policy, we cannot categorically state that they
can or will be implemented or that they will seriously
address Russia’s basic strategic dilemmas. Indeed, for the
last 3 or 4 years, it has been almost impossible to discern any
consistently implemented threat assessment and defense
policy. As a reporter for Segodnya observed in August 2000,
The blatant incompatibility of the defense minister and the Chief of the
General Staff confirms that we have no united military leadership and that
none of the key defense documents (military doctrine, national security
concept) has any practical value, because they do not express a
consolidated view on military organizational development.9

What is more important to understanding Russia’s
military future, however, is not how coherent its military
planning might be, but that it no longer has the means to
unilaterally provide for its own defense. In fact, it cannot
support its military industrial structure without large-scale
foreign subsidies and transfers. In this sense, Russian
security depends quite literally on the kindness of
strangers. Whether these transfers originate in arms sales,
foreign subsidies through programs like the Nunn-Lugar
CTR, foreign fees for space launches using Russian and
Soviet missiles, or joint production with foreign producers,
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they alone allow Moscow to supplement its budgeted and
extra-budgetary defense programs and maintain the
current defense economy.
The paucity of available domestic resources and the
absence of a state capacity rule out a Stalinist-like autarkic
defense sector. Given available resources, Russia can only
be “a great power” or global power on the basis of other
states’ sufferance. Therefore, to compete militarily and
politically Russia must find allies and friends on each
individual issue in international security.10 This search for
alliances is as true for defense economic policy, weapons
sales in Asia and Europe, and the search for joint projects in
aerospace and defense procurement contracts with the
West, as it is for foreign and national security policy.
Russia therefore openly seeks to generate maximum
foreign collaboration to develop its strategic capabilities. Its
objectives are transparent. It aims to win contracts to create
a basis to solidify its position abroad while creating a basis
for joint production of conventional or strategic systems.
Moscow also seeks political leverage within those areas and
access to higher levels of technological capability,
particularly in Western Europe, through either the rather
nebulous proposal for a “nonstrategic” European-Russian
missile defense or joint ventures with European defense
firms.11
Russia also pursues an exclusive sphere of influence
within Confederation of Independent States (CIS)
economies through defense-economic integration, e.g., with
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan. Reintegrating the
former Soviet defense industrial network offers Moscow
access to capabilities that had been lost with the breakup of
the Soviet Union. Foreign subsidy and arms sales programs
also let the government circumvent unwelcome scrutiny of
the true extent of military spending and the defense
economy. That scrutiny would likely force further
retrenchment and result in less foreign subsidization in an
effort to make the government accountable to the people
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and force it to live within its real means. Earlier trends to
reduce the opacity of the budget to the Duma have been
reversed, and Putin’s recent call to reduce the budget
approval process to a formality and establish an
authoritarian police state in Russia have become quite
evident.12
The excessively large defense industrial complex
testifies to the authorities’ failure to properly align Russia’s
threat assessment with available strategic resources.
Retention of this excessively large sector demonstrates the
continuing failure of defense and economic reform, a
continuing flight from strategic reality that jeopardizes the
military and any hope for a true democratic future.
Meanwhile, its perpetuation ensures Russia’s continuing
poverty and isolation abroad despite the terrifying
socio-economic challenges confronting it. Speaking about
prospective nuclear forces, Dr. Nikolai Sokov observed that,
Essentially, today only economic constraints continue to operate, and they
appear a relatively weak variable. There is strong belief that a stronger
government which is oriented toward national interest rather than more
universal goals of democracy, market, and integration into the
international community, could generate economic growth and yield
resources, including for defense spending. Whether this belief is correct
or not does not matter much under the current conditions. The powerful
mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, has already demonstrated that there is
at least a theoretical possibility to combine market with an authoritarian
regime and that such a combination could generate money. The fact that
he was able to spend some money from the city budget to finance arms
acquisition serves as proof in the eyes of the military leadership and the
defense industry that economic constraints are not insurmountable.13

This neo-Soviet approach also suggests that arms sales
are surrogates for reform in order to keep this system afloat.
Putin’s defense of this neo-Soviet outlook and policy implied
as much:
The unique peculiarity of military-technical cooperation is that it lies
where several important areas meet international activities in general,
military-political work both inside the country and abroad, and trade and
economy. . . . Judging from the volumes that military-technical
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cooperation gives to the country’s budget, this is one of the most
important areas for us. . . . It is common knowledge that the export of
weapons and military hardware earns the budget considerable sums in
currency. These means allow us to maintain cooperation between
science and industry in the country, preserve the scientific and industrial
potential, and keep personnel at defense enterprises.14

Although General Thomas Wilson, Director of the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that, absent a total
collapse of state power, he cannot imagine a non-nuclear
Russia in 2015, several Russian and even foreign analysts
fear just such a collapse.15 Yet Russia still spends far too
much on its armed forces, and the return on the investment
appears to be quite low relative to other peer competitors.
One thing is thus clear: if Russia attempts to acquire the
strategic capabilities it wants, it will need help from other
nations.
THE OBSTACLES TO RUSSIA’S REALIZING ITS
STRATEGIC WEAPONS ACQUISITION AMBITIONS
Russia’s Lack of Money.
Not only is economic growth slowing amidst widespread
predictions of a crunch by or in 2003 as foreign debt rises,
but capital outflow remains an estimated $20 billion a year,
indicating a continuing lack of domestic confidence in
Russia’s prospects. That outflow and lack of confidence
severely impede efforts toward civilian or military scientific
and technological progress through 2020. The economy’s
high-tech component is severely stressed from the lack of
investment and accelerating decline since the time of former
Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. There also are
serious dysfunctional trends throughout the high-tech and
electronic sectors of civilian and defense industry. Finally,
beyond Russian science’s structural defects, the state, too
strong to permit autonomous market-driven change in
defense industry and too weak to implement effective statist
controls, has increased its presence in the defense industry
and will likely be overwhelmed by its incapacity to make its
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policies work. Absent a coherent growth strategy, plus
military and defense spending reforms, Russia cannot
produce the desired increases in quality, quantity, and
availability of all forms of military power.
Apart from its heavy defense burden, Russia has $48
billion in foreign debts coming due between now and 2003.
Moreover, it must spend enormous sums to retrieve the
health, ecology, and demographic potential of the country in
order to be a major regional power, let alone a global player.
Putin understands some of this dilemma and recently
observed that the foreign debt burden makes it unclear
whether Russia can find “enough money for education,
defense, health care, space, and science under such gloomy
conditions.”16 However, those are precisely the areas that
must be built up under conditions of fiscal and capital
shortage in an economy, 40 percent of whose state revenues
apparently come from “rents” on oil and gas exports, even as
production of those commodities declines.17 Nor are the
resources to reverse that decline to be available soon. The
cumulative decline of the infrastructure and capital stock,
as well as the shortage of domestic and foreign investment
capital, cripples efforts to develop an autonomous civilian
high-tech sector.18 Though Russia largely retains the Soviet
capital stock, it is usable only autarkically, not as part of a
world economy despite favorable exchange rates since 1998.
Therefore Russian exports remain uncompetitive except for
energy and some defense sectors. Since this lopsided, even
neo-colonial structure of trade goes back years, it is not
surprising that the defense industry and its spokesmen
quickly realized that, in post-Soviet conditions, arms
exports were their only salvation as well as an obstacle to
the true marketization of the economy which would force
them to reform and become even more competitive.19
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Russia’s Shrinking Pool of Scientifically Trained
Personnel.
In addition to not having enough money to develop the
strategic weapons capabilities it wants, Russia’s pool of
scientifically trained personnel is shrinking. The
decades-long decline, lack of opportunity, and paucity of
investment have put Russian science on the brink of a
cata stroph e. A s of Febr uar y 2001, about 4,000
organizations deal with scientific research but obtain only
about 16 percent of the financing available in 1990. Russia
spends on researchers 4 percent of other developed nations’
expenditures. The average life expectancy for a Russian
male is 59. The average age of a Russian researcher is
approaching 60, and few young people join scientific
organizations because of the poor pay. Such younger people
make up only 11 percent of those engaged in fundamental
scientific research.20
Meanwhile a brain drain steadily erodes Russian
science. This drain takes many forms: 75 percent of
world-class mathematicians and 50 percent of physicists
have emigrated; many scientists now work on foreign
contracts or for foreign-owned firms; many sell patents and
designs, including those for sophisticated military systems,
abroad. Indeed, this huge outflow and diversion of scientists
threaten Russia’s security and independence. In all, 85
percent of Russian doctors of science are working abroad.21
The number of scientists as of 1997 had fallen to 1.3 million,
and by 2000 to 910,000, with at least 10 percent of those
actively seeking to go abroad. Although Russian scientists,
especially programmers, are in demand abroad, their
activity in Russia is limited by obstructions facing business
and science which must be removed for science to flourish.22
These trends also exist in key military installations like
the closed missile cities. Although the desire to emigrate is
not as high as was feared, demoralization is widespread and
high enough to be alarming. Ever more scientists make ends
meet primarily from moonlighting for other organizations
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that can pay. Fewer and fewer specialists are being
educated at the best centers in Moscow. As opportunities
decline and assignment to closed cities is no longer feasible,
those cities can replenish their labor force only from within.
All these trends point to a decreasing capability to provide
ever more sophisticated future missile and nuclear
systems.23
Although Putin has announced measures to promote
and retain scientists, especially in the defense sector, the
trends are not promising.24 Neither are they encouraging
for the future due to shortages of funding for education and
a decade or more of misplaced priorities. The “internal and
external brain drain” obstructs Russia’s full exploitation of
the current technological revolution.25
Barring a major reversal of trends, Russia, between
2010 and 2020, could lose the capability to keep pace with
advanced Western and Asian countries (Japan, India, and
China) in defense technologies. This does not mean Russia
will be unable to field a reasonably robust strategic force
consisting of weapons based on new physical principles,
space and informational weapons, chemical and biological
weapons, and a large tactical and strategic nuclear
deterrent, the latter consisting primarily of some 750-1,000
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Nor
does it preclude an ability to wage at least some forms of IW.
What it does mean is that the ability to produce
sufficient ACWs; precision-guided munitions (PGM); and
space, informational, and high-tech systems using
advanced information, bio-technology, and electronics will
be severely though not totally constricted. Russia’s
mobilization base will remain severely inhibited relative to
past capabilities. Hence Russia’s capacity to wage sustained
war in any of these domains could fall below its current
level. Still, Russia retains a strong capacity for waging IW
against American targets.26
This analysis suggests that, despite high military
spending, the unlikelihood of major structural reform in the
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government, economy, and military, and the continuing war
in Chechnya will prevent Russia from soon deploying what
its rulers believe are sufficient conventional forces to defend
and advance its interests. Given the concurrent
demographic challenge, the reliance on both strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons and/or on a relatively small
number of ACWs and information systems comparable to
them could continue to dominate defense policy in practice,
despite official proclamations and even spending to the
contrary.
Russian military thinkers recognize these difficulties
and discuss three different possibilities for surmounting
them. The first is a massive increase in foreign support
through arms purchases or subsidies. The second is a major
domestic economic-technological breakthrough resulting
from broad economic-political reform. The third is a major,
albeit limited, breakthrough in the defense industrial sector
that will generate tremendous returns in the civilian sector
over time. Each of these possibilities is unlikely to succeed.
Trying to secure a massive increase in foreign support
through arms purchases or subsidies ignores how difficult it
will be to upgrade Russia’s decrepit infrastructure without
Western and American support. But some officials now
advocate an openly anti-American policy of military sales to
America’s enemies, a policy whose overtness can only
increase external economic pressures on funding sources,
while not appreciably increasing arms sales revenues.27
So far as a major domestic economic-technological
breakthrough due to broad economic-political reform is
concerned, this, too, seems unlikely to succeed because the
government is retreating from democratization and
transparency, restricting the free exchange of information
and taking control of the Internet. The various moves
towards police-state repression, like legislation to control
the Internet, argue against a decisive breakthrough to an
information society and information-era military.28 These
actions also herald an autarkic development pattern that is
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quite contradictory to contemporary requirements and will
produce further obstacles to reform.
Finally, there is the third alternative, a major but
limited breakthrough in the defense industrial sector that
will generate enormous returns in the civilian sector over
time. This appears to be the preferred path of the current
government and fits with its statist outlook, to include
economic planning and control. Unfortunately, this is a
move backwards, because today’s revolution in military
affairs, contrary to Russian elite thinking, has been largely
spawned by new civilian technologies and companies.
Therefore, this line of action seems wrongheaded from the
start and will not produce lasting benefit.
HOW RUSSIA THINKS IT CAN SQUARE
THE CIRCLE
Spend More.
Faced with all these challenges, Russia’s military
planners have reverted to old solutions. One is to increase
funding to a more centralized defense industry, and the
other is to increase foreign capital flows by exporting more
arms.
Russia’s defense sector is still too large. In 1999 the
government exceeded the annual budgetary figures on
defense and spent another 56.8 million rubles on domestic
security. That figure also exceeded the stipulated budget.
This suggests the extent of the burden on state finances
wherein defense spending already consumes between 20
and 25 percent of the official budget, not counting the
extra-budgetary spending defense receives.
Yet, even with these measures there is never enough.
The related military and industrial constituencies are now
actually getting 5 percent of the annual gross domestic
product (GDP), not just the 3.5 percent that Boris Yeltsin
had promised when he was president. This percentage will
likely increase as the economy grows, and the Chechen war
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continues. Stated military requests continue to exist in the
realm of illusion. To sustain future programs, the
government has indulged in its own fantasies by raising the
defense budgets annually since 1998. For 2001 it raised
official spending on research and development (R&D) by 43
percent and cut procurement by 13 percent. This reflects the
commitment to rely temporarily on nuclear deterrence,
even as missiles go gradually out of service and are replaced
at the rate of 10 ICBMs (mobile SS-27s or Topol-Ms) per
year.29 All the military spending in 2000-2001 added to the
original draft budget for 2001 totals over 50 percent of the
original draft.30
Hence, there is a direct linkage to the crisis in science
and technology. Science Minister Alexander Dondukov
observed that most of the industrial growth in 2000, about
10 percent, was due to high-tech branches.
In March 2001, Alexander Roubtsov observed that the
defense industry still includes about 1,700 plants and a
labor force of 3.5 million. With families, this comprises
about 10 percent of Russia’s total population and embraces
all of Russia’s territory. There are still over 70 factory cities
and restricted administrative-territorial entities totally
dependent on the defense industry. Since these institutions
remit taxes to regional and provincial leaders, they worry
that any marketization will lead many of them, which are
generally noncompetitive, to close down, face high
unemployment, or lose revenues. Those factories placed
under central control will now pay taxes to Moscow, not to
the regions. Thus the projected reform of defense industry is
also part of Putin’s overall centralization plan.31 Meanwhile
defense production is about 6 percent of the 1991 level.32 Therefore,
Dondukov et al. push arms sales and technology transfer
wherever possible regardless of international agreements.
Yet, while policy now focuses on upgrading existing
equipment, some firms either want to produce utterly new
weapons that cannot be bought, or are simply waiting for
orders from Moscow without any conception of a market
system.33
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This suggests that if Russia follows Putin’s course
through 2020, it can, given the preservation of the Soviet
capital stock and possible added value from the CIS and
foreign subsidies, approach the Soviet level of conventional
weapons. But given the attrition and qualitative decline of
capital and labor assets in the scientific and military
sectors, that is the best that can be hoped for from the
surviving shell of Russia’s nonmarketized defense
economy.34 Despite higher investment due to moderate
growth and high energy prices, Russia will probably remain
30 years behind the West in applied technology. There will
be pockets of excellence but not a truly competitive military
machine.35
Use Budgetary Tricks.
To fund this program, more extra-budgetary tricks will
be used.36 The goals of such strategems in helping the
defense and science sector are quite transparent. Deputy
Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, who supervises defense
industry and arms sales, stated that the government will
spend 135 percent of what it did in 2000 on defense contracts
through 2010 and give priority to new fifth-generation
aircraft and air defenses, tanks, and ships. These systems
include new sea-launched strategic missiles, cruise
missiles, a fifth-generation fighter jet, and new infantry
fighting vehicles, tanks, and armored personnel carriers.
Until these “wonder weapons” are ready (and bearing in
mind that this funding excludes weapons based on new
physical principles, information weapons, command,
control, and communication and intelligence [C3I] systems,
nuclear weapons, etc.), the armed forces will have to rely on
upgrades to existing equipment.37
Obtaining all these new capabilities would entail
recentralizing state power and unifying defense industries
under virtually monopolistic state ownership. Animating
this program is the key players’ neo-Stalinist ideology that
defense industry is the locomotive of recovery. This is hardly
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surprising since most high-tech research originates there.
Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Mikhailov stated that
since the military are regular consumers of science and
technology (S&T) products, they can fulfill any combat
mission using those systems “only in the event of the
maximum and effective use of the potential of domestic
science, engineering, and economy. I emphasize
domestic.”38 Accordingly, this sector is the permanently
operating catalyst of technological recovery whose role in
the development of new technologies is worldwide. This
utterly false and misleading idea is belied by global
economic reality.39 Since Russia globally lags in computers
and technology exports, and risks falling even further
behind, Mikhailov outlined a comprehensive program of
military-technological modernization designed to bring
Russia back to a competitive level in 5-7 years.40
Mikhailov outlined key areas for Russia in which it must
compete given the rising American threat. These include
space and missile engineering to build Topol-Ms, missile
defenses, a new generation of space apparatuses “for
various targeting procedures,” aeronautical engineering for
new fighter planes, antiair and air defense engineering, 4th
and 5th generation submarine missile cruisers, heavy
aircraft-carrying cruisers, precision guided missiles, tanks,
command and control systems for ground forces,
domestically built highly integrated microprocessors,
super-computers, and neuroprocessors, etc.
To obtain these systems, Putin has reconcentrated arms
sales and defense industry under his control, supposedly to
maximize revenues. To raise exports he has merged
Russia’s arms exporters into one group under his direct
authority. That group will also force central control of all
intergovernmental military-technical commissions, except
those for China and India which Klebanov controls, and will
issue licenses for foreign exports. This will supposedly force
many smaller or noncompetitive plants to concentrate
resources and production and create truly marketable
products. Putin also decreed cuts of over 600,000 mostly
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administrative jobs in defense industry through 2006,
possibly closing factories and even whole design groups. The
aerospace and shipbuilding industries in particular are
supposed to be drastically concentrated into statecontrolled holding companies.41
By August 2000, observers had already seen that this
plan essentially returned to the Soviet model.42 Vitaly
Shlykov, one of Russia’s foremost experts in defense
economics and a scathing critic of the system, noted that the
arms sales program is a Ponzi scheme, since Russia is
selling weapons it cannot yet produce and using revenues
obtained from preliminary agreements on them to finance
that production.43 The system is so broken that, at best, it
produced only 10 percent of Soviet defense output in 1991.
Ninety percent of the 1,700 defense firms have no orders
and could not fulfill them if they received them, and
subcontractors have lost interest in dealing with the
system. Whereas 800,000 people work in aviation and
aerospace in Russia, compared with 98,000 in Europe,
Europe’s production is more efficient, and its volume is
greater. Russian military hardware’s real costs are so high
that they approach Western costs. Given the low quality of
production and workmanship, Russia is actually at a
disadvantage. While the few producers and exporters who
have been privatized are profiting and finding a way in the
market, Klebanov and Putin are nationalizing the defense
industry. By restoring the Soviet model, Moscow almost
certainly ensures the system’s ultimate failure.
Conventional and nuclear missile branches (since the latter
are to be severely cut) will break down and the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MOD) will have to finance the entire
rearmament out of its own budget.44
The Poverty of Budgetary Tricks and Selling Arms.
Spending and budgetary tricks and foreign arms sales
will not be able to fully fund Russia’s strategic weapons
acquisition ambitions. The key reason is that they currently
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are spending more than they can afford, and their plans
would have them spending even more. We can estimate the
extent of defense spending and its likely direction to 2020.
First, assumptions of massive reductions in Russian
defense spending since 1991 are unduly optimistic. At least
some analysts believe that total current Russian spending
on its armed forces, including spending by regional and local
governments to maintain the military (which is much
g reater th an th e p ubl i s hed bud getar y f i gur es ) ,
approximates (as of 2000) the expense burden of the
military upon the economy during Soviet times.45
Second, the armed forces and defense industry survive
on the basis of hidden or unreported noncash and/or
extrabudgetary subsidies. This opacity extends as well to
the armed forces which cannot even keep track of their own
expenses. Spending by the armed forces, therefore, includes
not just the debts owed to the MOD since 1992, but also the
debts owed by the armed forces for procurement that is not
paid for.
Third, military spending remains much greater than
assumed in the West. Christopher Hill of the United
Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence estimates that actual
spending in 2000 was 143 billion rubles, rising significantly
from 1999, with the official defense budget amounting to
little more than half of true defense spending.46 Based upon
computations in constant 2000 prices, he and MOD argue
that defense spending fell from $130 billion in 1992 to $42
billion in 1998. In 2000, however, Putin increased the
official budget outlays by 50 percent, and at least some
aspects of R&D by 80 percent. 47 Since then, defense
spending has risen to $50 billion in constant 2000 prices.
Also in 2000, the trend towards increased funding for
strategic forces, influenced by then Minister of Defense Igor
Sergeyev, apparently gave way under pressure from Chief
of Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin and others to more
funding of the regular conventional forces, procurement,
and R&D on new higher-tech systems. Recently it was
announced that the government intends to impose an even
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50-50 ratio by 2011. Hill’s figures are roughly confirmed by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London, which assumes total defense spending of $57
billion.48
Notwithstanding continued growth, the most likely
major sources of underwriting for those rising outlays are
arms sales and joint projects with other states. Many
industry insiders and observers believe that only this
“transnational” integration with foreign clients keeps this
industry going.49
Hill argues that, however one slices this cake, it cannot
lead to a massive resurgence of military power. Indeed, the
numbers of troops will be slashed, and demography is
pushing Moscow towards a professional army though its
officers v iscerally r ejec t the i d ea and show no
understanding of what that means.50 Force structures will
be transformed, too, with armored vehicles, tanks, combat
aircraft, and major naval platforms likely to be cut by a
third.51 Furthermore, spending on current procurement is
largely restricted to upgrading existing weapons and
reorienting R&D funds toward the next generation of
systems or entirely new kinds of weapons, while squeezing
every drop of deterrence out of the existing nuclear
systems.52 New systems are going abroad, not to Russian
forces, to sustain defense industry until a reduced military
can actually buy enough weapons.
These figures entail a reduced nuclear force and lower
rates of production of new generations of nuclear weapons.
They also suggest that Moscow is stressing current R&D of
high-tech combat aircraft and electronic, control, and
information systems, and weapons based on new physical
principles and the use of TNWs in conventional conflicts.
Though estimates of the future size of the nuclear forces
vary greatly, undoubtedly Moscow can sustain a land and
sea dyad, or perhaps a triad with a small aerial leg of
750-1,000 missiles as a minimum, more than enough to
guarantee a second-strike capability by 2015. General Staff
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analysts also say that, as of 2007, Russia will still have some
3,000 tactical nuclear warheads. So Russia should be able to
field about 1,000 TNWs by 2020 if it starts building them
now.53 Given the external linkages that Moscow is forming
and the expectation of economic growth through 2020,
Russia could probably also sustain several pockets of
excellence regarding space, ASAT, information, and
perhaps new weapons.
But since a concealed capability for surge production
exists within Russian industry, Russia could produce and
export these weapons provided there is sustained growth
and a robust technology sector. Russia needs sufficient
financial resources to generate those capabilities, although
it would remain qualitatively behind the most advanced
leaders in defense production. However, the issues of
growth and a robust technological sector present more
problems than are commonly realized.
Securing Foreign Technical Cooperation.
What kind of inputs into Russian technological and
military capabilities will provide Moscow with security,
deterrence, and a strategic warfighting capability by 2020?
Clearly the leadership wants to invest in modernized
nuclear weapons, dual-use information systems, and
ACWs. Russia also is pouring large funds into research on
directed energy weapons: lasers, microwave radiation
emitters, and particle-beam generators using subatomic
particles to destroy targets at the speed of light, a new mass
plasma weapon that could ionize the atmosphere and
destroy incoming missiles and enemy aircraft, anti-stealth
radar, stealthy air-launched cruise missiles, newly tested
anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, and a plasma
coating to make fifth-generation Russian aircraft invisible.
These programs broadly comport with policy directives from
the top to make Russia a competitive player in advanced,
conventional, high-tech platforms and systems, including
informational and perhaps biogenetic technologies.54
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These enormous programs are probably being financed
by foreign capital flows. As James Oberg recently observed,
the government in 2000 earned $800 million from sales of
space services, two-thirds of which was profit, besides
receiving several hundred million more from the Russian
government.55 Space launches and other foreign sources
that fund programs like the Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) Program and related efforts to manage Russia’s
nuclear arsenal, perform their stated mission, and let
Moscow fund systems that would otherwise not be available
for defense modernization. Other sources could also become
available for that purpose.
For instance, Russia’s state-owned domestic oil and gas
industries currently operate at 50 percent of capacity. If
energy prices remain high and Russia’s productive capacity
grows, the government can then reap $50-100 billion
annually. Obviously much of that funding could go into
defense production. Russian weapons production rose 60
percent in 1999-2000, suggesting the depth of available
surge capability for conventional and nuclear weapons, not
to mention new forms of biological and chemical warfare.
Therefore, Russian defense industry possesses a great
deal of unused production and even surge capability,
especially if it can be augmented by linkages to CIS plants
and new sources of capital. Those revenue sources would
allow Russia to modernize nuclear, information, chemical,
and biological weapons by easing the burden on the
government to finance exclusively the demobilization of
obsolete systems. Another source of funding is expanded
arms sales abroad, mainly to China, India, and perhaps
Iran. Putin and the defense industry share the Soviet
delusion that arms sales are a, if not the, locomotive of
general industrial recovery.56 Consequently, Putin aims to
reorganize defense industry and arms sales programs to
ensure greater state control and profitability of both these
instruments of policy.
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The surprising tenacity of this delusion and the
consequent political strength of Russia’s defense industry
are a major explanation of that lobby’s ability to obtain a
continuing, though smaller, high level of funding from an
exhausted economy and society, even though an
uncontrolled defense industry is now seen as one of the
major causes of the Soviet collapse.
Meanwhile, Moscow views the expansion of military
sales abroad in a long-term context. For example, China is
Moscow’s biggest client, online to buy an estimated $15
billion worth of weapons through 2004-2005. Actually their
agreement is for 15 years and contemplates ultimate joint
production of both conventional and strategic
systems. Russian sources claim that bilateral military
contacts have doubled or tripled since 1999, thus
corroborating Alexander Nemets and John Scherer’s
assertion that the total of all known Russo-Chinese
military-technological exchanges approximates $5 billion a
year through 2004, doubling the rate for 1996-99 and
quadrupling the rate of annual arms sales for 1991-96.57
Moreover, these figures omit “black” or classified programs
and the extensive scientific-technological exchanges among
Russian and Chinese scientists whose scope, extent, and
parameters cannot be determined.
Russian analysts describe such military exchanges,
which they claim will give Russian factories abundant
orders for at least 5 to 7 years, as “primitive forms of
mediation in military trade.” They want the next phase of
Sino-Russian military bilateralism to focus on a
relationship that goes beyond Russia selling and China
buying to more “advanced” forms, e.g., joint development
and manufacture of munitions and weapons.58 This outlook
harmonizes with the idea of the 15-year cooperation plan
and focuses on the perspective of increasing jointness.
During the first 5 years (2000-05), China would
purchase from Russia up to $15 billion of new generation
weaponry in the form of either manufactured items or
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production licenses. Meanwhile, joint exercises and
military training would be expanded across all branches.
Perhaps the most important aspects of the Sino-Russian
military cooperation would be in the areas of joint research
and development for the next generation of airplanes,
missiles, and laser-based and other high-tech weapon
systems. Joint efforts in developing these systems would be
the focus for the second and longer-term phase of the plan
(2005-15).59
Russian officials have also indicated that if the United
States builds missile defenses, Russia and China will
cooperate jointly to resist or penetrate them.60 That
cooperation would undoubtedly involve some of the
technologies and weapons contemplated in the 15-year
plan. Joint production could entail some fungibility of
strategic systems between Russia and China, further
complicating an assessment of either state’s future
capabilities. We may also assert that it is likely that the next
major advance in Russian space and/or satellite technology
will occur in behalf of either Iran or China, which are both
obtaining or being solicited to buy Russian models of
spacecraft and satellites.61
Russia’s new agreement with Europe on the European
Air Defense System (EADS) also offers major contracts to
sustain the aerospace and air defense industries while
providing access to European funding, technologies, and
defense decisionmaking.62
The Need to Reform.
Moscow’s remedies clearly regress to an autarkic,
state-controlled system based on restricting the flow of
information and attempts at preferential treatment for the
military and future scientists. They also are based on
Mikhailov’s and Putin’s Stalinistic fantasies concerning
defense industry. Although high-ranking officials have laid
out high-tech objectives, a neo-Stalinist defense economy
based on raw materials exports and a shrinking base of
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competitive military production, as well as the crushing
demographic and infrastructural problems, cannot provide
those systems and still manage to compete with other major
powers. But the size of the Soviet nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons complexes, Moscow’s abiding reticence
about these programs, and repeated claims that it cannot
afford to destroy some 40,000 tons of chemical weapons (the
largest program in the world), make it likely that either
those weapons stocks will continue, be preserved, or be
ready for quick reconstitution.63
The precise number of nuclear weapons also depends on
foreign developments, particularly the fate of the American
missile defense program and Chinese modernization, as
well as on the success of economic reforms and conventional
modernization. Putin’s approach entails considerable
structural remilitarization and coincides nicely with his
overall progress towards a neo-imperial authoritarianism.
On one hand, if we are wrong and Russia can prevail in
its war with Chechnya and successfully deal with other
conventional threats by restoring some measure of its
former conventional weapons power, Russia can
successfully reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons and
continue to follow the long-term trend towards fewer but
more survivable and precise nuclear weapons, including
tactical nuclear weapons. While the nuclear deterrent will
be smaller, Russia’s high-tech, IW, and space capabilities
will be greater. On the other hand, if defense and economic
reforms fail by 2020, as this chapter projects, then Russia
will have to stop cutting nuclear weapons, including TNWs,
and instead rely more on them as well as on chemical and
biological systems, given the defects of its conventional
defense systems and war economy. Space and IW
capabilities will become even more prominent and unstable
precisely because of Russia’s overall instability.
Indeed, if reform fails or the external environment
becomes truly menacing, Russia might even become unable
to cope. Then some of the nightmare scenarios of state
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decomposition feared by the Russian elite might come to
pass. While Moscow undoubtedly can retain usable
“strategic” capabilities—nuclear, biological, chemical,
informational, and space weapons—until 2020 or develop
some new ones, the faster it tries to develop those weapons
by the means currently employed, the fewer it will develop,
the harder it will be to develop them, the worse their quality
or sustainability will be, and the greater the likelihood of
Russia’s continuing military decline. In this connection, the
Russian armed forces’ ability to stonewall its own and
foreign governments regarding the reduction of its huge
chemical and biological warfare stocks is of great concern
and must be overcome.64 For today’s Russian elites that is
an unacceptable conclusion. Yet to avoid these nightmare
scenarios, they continue to run on the treadmill of reform to
recapture the past, not to keep up with the present.65
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CHAPTER 3

RUSSIAN RULE AND THE REGIONAL
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES

Ariel Cohen

Introduction.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.
Government and the West in general have been concerned
about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) stemming from the far-flung Soviet/Russian
military-industrial complex. Beneficiaries of weapons
proliferation may include rogue states and terrorist
organizations acquiring nuclear WMD, e.g., warheads and
missiles; chemical and bacteriological weapons, such as
toxins and bacteria/virus cultures; and ready-made
technology to produce all of these. In addition, the U.S.
Government and the American expert community have
raised concerns about the safety and accountability of
materiel, such as weapons grade uranium and plutonium.
The unsafe storage of radioactive materials in civilian use,
ranging from fuel for nuclear power stations to
trans-uranium substances used in medicine and research,
represent a proliferation threat, as it is possible to acquire
and enrich such materials to weapons-grade levels, or use
them in dirty, sub-critical devices. A separate but related
issue is the availability of experts capable of developing
strategic systems who are for hire by rogue states, whether
the projects the experts contract for are completed abroad or
while they continue to reside in Russia.
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Problems with control over strategic weapons and
nuclear materials in the regions have been widely reported
on all levels: at the federal center, in the military, in
security/law enforcement, and in the national economy.
This chapter will examine the factors affecting
proliferation, and will draw conclusions regarding the
interaction between proliferation and questions of
center-periphery relations.
Conventional wisdom holds that the decline in resource
allocation to maintain Russia’s far-flung military-related
facilities is encouraging the scientists and managers of
these facilities to sell their goods abroad. Yet some believe
that local economic and environmental concerns have also
encouraged local authorities to contain and restrict the
activities of these facilities. This chapter will identify the
factors determining which of these trends is likely to be
prevalent.
The conclusions are far from hopeful. In view of the
overwhelming evidence that the military and the Russian
military-industrial complex are the leading proliferators,
there is little reason to believe that local authorities have
either the motivation or the power to act as efficient
inhibitors of proliferation.
The pervasive corruption among national and local
authorities; inadequate and corrupt law enforcement;
powerful criminal organizations with links to global
organized crime; severe problems of budgeting insufficiency
and irresponsibility in Moscow and at the regional (oblast)
levels; lack of interaction between nationally owned
facilities and local governments; and turf battles between
the center and the local governments, all combine to make
the Russian military-industrial complex and the civilian
facilities of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) leaky
and dangerous vessels bearing some of the most deadly
weapons systems and technologies on the planet. As these
vessels sink, WMD technologies are being sold and
smuggled out of Russia.
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At the time of this writing, evidence abounds that
proliferation of strategic weapons is under way, with the
complicity of Russia’s central and regional authorities. It
seems that the government of Russia, the U.S. Government
specifically, and Western allies as a group failed to develop a
comprehensive strategy to address this issue, and a quick
and comprehensive solution to the problem may not be
achieved in the near future.
The Russian Military and The Military-Industrial
Complex: Primary Agents of Proliferation.
As the Soviet Union collapsed in the wake of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s rule, a taste for personal enrichment spread
within the ruling communist bureaucracy. During the
period 1 9 8 8 -90 , ec onomi c l i ber al i zati on und er
“self-sufficient accounting” (khozraschet), and the Law on
State Enterprises, promulgated in 1988, allowed
state-owned economic units to sell their production at state
prices to small commercial firms set up by their managers,
which could in turn sell the goods abroad at international
market rates. For the first time since Lenin’s New Economic
Policy of the 1920s, the outlook of Russia’s industrial
managers began to change, as profit once again became the
main motivating force behind economic activities. The call
was, “Get it while you can.” Unfortunately, the pursuit of
profit in the absence of the rule of law and adequate
mechanisms of control opened the Pandora’s box of weapons
proliferation.
The Economic Roots of Proliferation.
By 1990, assets were being transferred from the state
pocket to a vast number of companies set up by the Central
Committee of the Communist party with the participation
of its most trusted agents, usually from among Committee
for State Security (KGB) officers and others. These “red
directors” were joined by military and security generals in
gigantic asset-stripping schemes. During this period,
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in du strial en terpr i s es , i nc l ud i ng thos e i n the
military-industrial sector, began selling strategic stockpiles
of raw materials, an activity that was previously punishable
by death.
For the first time in Soviet history, unprecedented
events in the area of licit and illicit foreign trade in
military-related goods were noted by Russian and Western
observers. For example, ANT, a company with ties to Prime
Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and other senior Soviet officials,
was caught trying to sell and ship modern Soviet tanks
(T-80s) and other military equipment out of the port of
Novorossiysk.
In 1990-92, while serving on the Board of the
California-Russia Trade Association (CARTA), a small
non-profit organization, I witnessed a flurry of faxed
business offers from the Soviet Union (and later Russia)
containing proposals to sell anything from rare metals used
in military production to military equipment, helicopters,
and aircraft. The floodgates of the Soviet economy, bottled
up for 60 years, had suddenly burst.
This General Went to Market.
As Gorbachev negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from East Germany, the Soviet generals launched
“economic” activities, selling off military materiel and
equipment worth billions of U.S. dollars. For example, the
Western Group of Forces (Zapadnaya Gruppa Voisk, or
ZGV) entered frenetic economic activities, selling vast
supplies of the fuel that had been stored in East Germany
for the Soviet Army’s future thrust into Western Europe and
the conduct of World War III.
General Pavel Grachev, who later became President
Boris Yeltsin’s Minister of Defense, and General Matvei
Burlakov were often mentioned in the Russian news media
as being leading culprits of this sell-off. Grachev even
earned the nickname “Pasha-Mercedes” for allegedly using
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Russian transport aviation to import luxury cars, such as
Mercedes Benzes and Volvos, into Russia. Both Grachev
and Burlakov were linked to the murder of investigative
journalist Dmitrii Kholodov, who was assassinated by an
exploding briefcase after publishing allegations of
high-level corruption in the military. The head of an
intelligence unit with the Russian air assault troops was
convicted of the Kholodov murder years later.
The 1990s yielded a bumper crop of accusations of and
indictments for corruption in the post-Soviet military. In
addition to Grachev, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov, the last
Soviet Minister of Defense, was fingered in the news media
as being deeply involved in corruption. Colonel-General
Konstantin Kobets, one-time acting Minister of Defense of
the Russian Federation and a hero of resistance to the 1991
putsch, was sentenced to a relatively short jail term. A
Pacific fleet commander, an Air Force Major-General in the
Far East Military District,1 as well as a number of general
officers in the strategic rocket forces were accused of
corruption. Some were dismissed, but very few were
actually convicted. Generals also in a few cases used
conscript labor to build villas and to farm out labor to
civilians for construction and other projects—an activity
both corrupt and harmful to the morale of their troops.
Russia’s junior officers were not far behind their leaders.
In Murmansk, headquarters of the Northern Fleet, five
naval officers were arrested and charged with attempts to
sell radioactive rods from a number of nuclear submarine
reactors anchored in the bay. In a particularly notorious
case, the former head of Pacific Fleet counter-intelligence
became an operations officer for one of the organized crime
gangs in Vladivostok, headquarters of the Pacific Fleet.
Thus, towards the end of the Gorbachev era and throughout
Yeltsin’s rule, the Russian military demonstrated pervasive
corruption, often at the highest levels. Moreover, with the
beginning of the war in Chechnya (December 1994), reports
began to surface alleging sales of weapons to the Chechen
rebels seeking independence. Some cases of officers selling
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conscripts to the Chechens as slaves or to be ransomed later
by their families were also reported in the news media.
Unauthorized sales of Russian and Ukrainian weapons
were publicized, as wars raged in the former Yugoslavia and
Africa.
It was only a matter of time before the trade would begin
in WMD systems, components, and technology. In one of the
more notorious of such cases, General Anatoly Kuntsevich,
former head of the Russian chemical weapons program and
later adviser to Yeltsin on chemical disarmament, was
caught selling chemical precursors to binary weapons to
Syria. In 1995, he was charged by the Federal Security
Service with selling 800 kilograms of chemicals in 1993 and
five and half tons in 1994.2 Still, Kuntsevich did not serve
out his jail term.
Even more disturbing are reports that Aum Shinrikio, a
Japanese doomsday cult, reportedly obtained chemical
weapons from Russia. It used the deadly nerve gas Sarin
during its 1995 attack on a Tokyo subway station. There
were reports that Aum was also negotiating for the
purchase of a nuclear warhead from Russian sources. An
even greater cause for concern is reports that Osama bin
Laden’s Al-Quaeda terrorist organization, harbored by the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, attempted to acquire
nuclear capabilities. Bin Laden may have the means, the
dedication, and the motive to do so.3
An American researcher and former Pentagon official,
Phil Petersen, claimed that while visiting Russia on a
research project in 1992, a missile base commander offered
to sell him a decommissioned SS-20 missile. Although
Russia was supposed to have destroyed all of its SS-20s
under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF),
several apparently were stored “for instruction purposes.”
The Clinton administration refused to go ahead with a sting
operation to catch the culprit.4
Not only missiles but also submarines were available for
sale. U.S. law enforcement authorities thwarted an attempt
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to sell a Russian submarine to a Colombian drug cartel,
complete with a crew and a vice admiral to command the
vessel. Senior officials in the Ministry of Defense in Moscow
were supposed to clear the submarine sale. An almost
completed sub, along with blueprints in Russian and
various components, was discovered in the Colombian
jungle—yet another attempt to sell a sensitive weapons
platform to a drug cartel.
As James Woolsey, former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, testified,
If Russia either follows the path of Weimar Germany’s collapse into
fascism or breaks apart, our problems in this regard will become far
more severe. At the heart of the matter is Russia’s failure, in the
aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, to establish the rule of law.5

Woolsey pointed out another important phenomenon which
U.S. authorities dealing with Russian proliferation were
slow to understand—the nexus and inter-penetration
between Russia’s security services, organized crime, and
Russian firms, which regularly do business with the two
other segments of the corrupt Russian society.6
The Russian government often tolerated and sometimes
even facilitated these transactions. For example, Evgeny
Primakov, in his capacity as chief of the foreign intelligence
service (SVR), foreign minister, and prime minister, was
interested in these sales as a means to curry favor with his
su pporters in t he ar med ser vi c es and the
military-industrial complex. Primakov scored points with
the political “red-brown” coalition, which supported both his
foreign policy and his prime ministership.7 In addition,
Primakov, who cultivated high-level contacts among most
radical and anti-American Middle Eastern leaders, could
easily facilitate weapons sales. Another politician who
developed expertise in promoting arms sales, particularly to
Iraq, is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the rabble-rousing,
ultra-nationalist leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party.
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People living in the relatively orderly Western world,
ruled by laws and lawyers, have a difficult time fully
grasping the dire significance of the phenomenon described
by Woolsey. This was a merger between a sophisticated and
ruthless global intelligence service, criminal organizations
with world-wide reach, and a decaying and corrupt military
possessing sufficient resources, including WMD, to wage an
intensive nuclear world war. As of 1990, there were no
government, no laws, and no legal mechanisms to stand in
the way of the unprecedented opportunity to proliferate
strategic weapons.
Regions in Chaos: From Decentralization to
“Strengthening the Vertical Flow of Power.”
The dynamics of center-periphery relations affected
Russia’s proliferation of WMD in the 1990s, and will
continue to do so in the new millennium. During 1992-99,
the executive power in Russia’s federal government rested
with an erratic and increasingly ill Boris Yeltsin. While not
a dissident, Yeltsin had at least some inclination toward
promoting a “Russia of regions,” and experimented with a
federal structure that delegated some authority to regional
governors and the presidents of ethnic constituent republics
of the Russian Federation.
Weak Center and Feeble Control: The Yeltsin Years.
In the beginning of Yeltsin’s tenure (1991-92), governors
were nominated, but after the adoption of the Russian
Constitution in 1993, they were elected. Yeltsin’s political
advisers included a number of academics who sought to
build a federal structure different from the rigid Soviet
system. These included Leonid Smirniagin, a Moscow State
University political geographer who was Yeltsin’s adviser
on federal affairs; Georgy Satarov, a liberal political
scientist who became Yeltsin’s political aide; and Emil Pain,
an expert on ethnic affairs who advised on nationality
issues. The period of the early 1990s is best summarized by
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Yeltsin’s famous call to the regions, “Take as much
sovereignty as you can carry away.”
In some cases, that dictum was taken too far, too fast.
Moscow could not stomach the attempts of Chechen
president General Jokhar Dudaev to declare independence.
A long and bloody war ensued, which continues to this day.
Tatarstan had negotiated a more autonomous status for
itself than other ethnic republics, which were somewhat
more independent from Moscow than the regular regions.
However, the loosening of Moscow’s grip on the provinces,
and the poor leadership of the armed forces, which tolerated
corruption and the sell-off of military hardware, resulted in
more emboldened governors, local military commanders,
and others pursuing risky deals which involved
increasingly sophisticated weapons.
While dozens of incidents of nuclear smuggling were
reported during the 1990s, security experts believe that
only 10-15 percent of these activities were uncovered. While
in most cases the amounts of intercepted radioactive
materials were too small to produce even a single nuclear
weapon, some experts believe that these were samples, and
that larger amounts of uranium and plutonium may have
been shipped to customers. Moreover, the higher the rank of
the officials involved, the better their capabilities to cover
up the smuggling and the smaller the chances of their being
apprehended.
In any event, during this period most of the military and
military-industrial facilities with the potential to
proliferate were under federal control—that of the armed
services, the Ministry of Defense, and the ministries in
charge of military production. What facilitated smuggling
in the 1990s were loose border controls, corrupt customs
officials, and ill defined (and sometimes, nonexistent) laws.
Local generals were sometimes dependent on the governor’s
largesse, while Federal Security Service (FSB) commanders
in the regions were either in the local oligarchs’ pockets or
engaged in business themselves. Federal prosecutors’
65

offices in the region did not function well, to put it mildly.
Thus, the bureaucratic structures that were supposed to
prevent proliferation by investigating, apprehending, and
prosecuting the culprits were corrupt and inefficient.
Russia was dizzy with its newfound freedom, and often
put it to ill use. Still, WMD smuggling was an activity that
carried a high risk and uncertain reward. Many other
commercial ventures, such as trade in oil, gas, and metals,
were both safer and more lucrative. Still, regional leaders in
the government, business, the military, and organized
crime were minor league players in comparison with their
Moscow betters. The center, on one hand, led the way in
proliferation activities, while on the other, it lacked the tools
to effectively prevent such activities when undertaken in
the regions.
Recentralization under Putin.
The rise of Vladimir Putin and the allied group of St.
Petersburg FSB officials, businessmen, and government
bureaucrats changed the tone, but not the substance, of
proliferation as related to federal control over the regions,
and center-periphery relations. By appointing seven
presidential plenipotentiary representatives (governorsgeneral), five out of seven of them former KGB and military
generals, to oversee the regions, Putin changed the
constitutional make-up of Russia without changing the
Constitution. These presidential envoys have already been
nicknamed “sovereign’s eyes.” They will obviously report to
the Kremlin about any suspicious activities undertaken in
their region, including anything as politically lucrative and
sensitive as sales of WMD and related technology.
Through this latest reform, Moscow is attempting to
reassert its control and to diminish the power of the elected
governors. As part of Putin’s new order, the regional
governors will cease to be ex officio members of the Council
of the Federation (the upper house of the Parliament).
Instead, they will appoint “senators” to represent the
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regions in Moscow. By diluting the prerogatives of the
governors, the Kremlin is attempting to consolidate its
authority. Rumors abound that constitutional reforms will
be introduced, cutting down the number of Russian regions
from 89 to 30-40. Thus, at least theoretically, it will be more
difficult to engage in proliferation activities under Putin’s
rule without the Kremlin’s approval and financial
“participation” in the profits. However, this does not
necessarily mean that proliferation will become more
difficult—just more orderly.
While reports of corruption continue unabated, a survey
of those named indicates that the Prosecutor General’s
office has been used as a political battering ram against
hostile oligarchs, not as an institutional tool to fight official
graft and organized crime. Few, if any, high profile
corruption trials have taken place under Putin thus far. No
prominent criminal “godfathers” have been jailed. The only
public investigation focusing on Ministry of Defense
generals who allegedly committed embezzlement involves
former Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Yulia
Timoshenko and former Russian Deputy Minister of
Finance Sergei Vavilov, and their alleged offense was
purely financial fraud, not corrupt proliferation activities.
This investigation may have been a part of a political
struggle to bring the Ministry of Defense under control of
Putin’s political appointees. No trials of high-level generals
from the military or the FSB have taken place so far—for
proliferation or otherwise.
On Putin’s watch, as under Yeltsin, the most crooked
officials are either quietly dismissed or pushed out, often
being given prestigious jobs. For example, after being
dismissed, Governor Evgeny Nazdratenko was appointed
Chairman of the State Committee (Minister) of Fisheries,
while Governor Nikolai Kondratenko of Krasnodar was
approved for appointment to the upper house (the Council of
the Federation) by his handpicked successor.
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Putin himself has admitted that the Customs Service is
beyond repair, and that he cannot see a way to clean it up.
Governors and presidents of the autonomous republics are
learning to coexist with Putin’s viceroys, sometimes
publicly trading barbs, as in the case of the young and brash
former Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, special envoy for
the Volga area, and Tatarstan’s erstwhile President
Minitmer Shaimiev and Bashkortostan authoritarian
Murtaza Rakhimov. However, in most cases, the regional
leaders cooperate in business areas, rather than conduct
open political warfare.
Two areas of concern have emerged to date under Putin’s
rule: first, with a more pliant mass news media, Russia is
becoming less transparent. If, under Yeltsin, reports of
high-level corruption in the military and arms exports,
including WMD proliferation, were relatively numerous,
today little on the subject reaches the newspaper pages, let
alone the television screens.
Secondly, under Putin, powerful state structures such as
Minatom began to openly proliferate, primarily to China,
Iran, and North Korea. These activities are well covered
elsewhere.8 While high officials usually are behind such
activities, they are instances of the blurring of lines between
state and private interests, not the outright contraband
that many feared during the period of lax controls over
regions under Yeltsin.
Some experts have expressed the hope that a more
centralized or even authoritarian Russia will deal with
proliferation more effectively. However, such an
undemocratic Russia could take anti-Western stands and
find its ideological soul mates among rogue states. Such a
Russia would be more likely to conduct an orderly,
government-sponsored proliferation that could be even
more difficult to contain than the semi-clandestine, black
market variety, which is at least subject to law enforcement
activities both domestically and internationally.
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The Scope of the Proliferation Threat.
An examination of the sources of proliferation in the
Russian regions highlights the multiple sources of danger:

•

Nuclear weapons in active service in the hands of the
military, primarily the Strategic Rocket Forces. During the
Soviet era, 45,000 nuclear bombs and warheads were
produced;9

• Decommissioned nuclear weapons in storage by the
Minatom;
• Stockpile of nuclear materials, such as highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (altogether 1,200
tons, enough to produce thousands of nuclear devices),
stored by Minatom;10
•

Stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) and
plutonium for nuclear power stations, which can be
enriched into weapons-grade materials, also stored by
Minatom;

• Nuclear substances used in medicine, civilian
research, and other fields, which could be used in fission
bombs after enrichment, or in “dirty” radioactive devices
powered by regular explosives. These nuclear substances
are widely dispersed, mostly unprotected, and difficult to
control and inventory;
•

Nuclear warhead and missile factories and research
facilities, often located in closed or highly restricted
“nuclear” and “missile” cities;

•

Chemical weapons deployed in the field and in
storage;

•

Precursors for binary chemical weapons;

•

Technology to produce chemical weapons;
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• Biological weapons (toxins, bacteria, viruses, and
other micro-organisms) stored in research labs in Russia
and countries of the former Soviet Union, such as
Kazakhstan;
• Technologies to build biological and chemical
weapons; and,
• Scientists, engineers, and other experts necessary to
build the WMD arsenals.
Since the Soviet Union did not have a military
industrial complex, but rather was one, these sources of
proliferation are widely scattered from Moscow to Eastern
Siberia. Dispersed throughout eleven time zones, Russia’s
WMD “crown jewels” are hard to count and harder to keep.
Table 1 indicates closed cities which, in some cases, are
not even shown on the map. In other cases, severe
restrictions apply to foreigners wishing to visit them.
CITY
Sarov
Snezhinsk
Trekhgorny
Lesony
Zarechny
Zelenogorsk
Ozersk
Novoural’sk
Zhelznogorsk
Seversk
Miass
Votkinsk
Korolev

SPECIALITY
Nuclear weapons development; the
Federal Nuclear Center
Nuclear weapons development; the
Federal Nuclear Center
Serial production of nuclear weapons
Serial production of nuclear weapons
Chemical industry complex
Chemical industry complex
Chemical industry complex
Chemical industry complex
Chemical industry complex
Chemical industry complex
Rocket Center: Makeev Design Bureau
(submarine-launched missiles)
Votkinsk machine building plant (SS-27
Topol ICBMs)
Outer space systems and orbiting
stations

11

Table 1. Specialization of Closed Cities.
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As the Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War rationale for
huge defense budgets and gigantic strategic stockpiles
became a legacy of the past and Russian military production
plummeted. In 1992, military procurement budgets were
slashed by 67 percent.12 While many Russian towns and
regions were dependent upon the military-industrial
complex for their welfare, healthcare, and education, since
the early 1990s the federal government in Moscow began
cutting corners and budgets. The military-industrial
complex was told to fund its research and development
through raising export revenue. The situation did not
change until 1999, when a 50 percent increase in the
military budget was announced.
The regional governments never felt ownership over
these federally owned and controlled enterprises and closed
cities. Regional jurisdiction over these areas was extremely
restricted in the Soviet era and remains quite limited today.
Still, enterprising and corrupt former governors, such as
Leonid Gorbenko in Kaliningrad, Evgeny Nazrdatenko in
the Maritime Province (Primorskii Krai), and others, are
capable of pillaging the resources of the military-industrial
facilities and closed cities to generate a cash flow for their
own needs.
Masses of scientists and technical experts—between
60,000 and 70,000 in the Russian nuclear complex alone,
according to one U.S. estimate—remained stranded in the
closed cities with salaries below Russia’s poverty line, or
unemployed.13 Severe unemployment—up to 50 percent or
higher—has devastated many of these towns. Prominent
scientists, such as the scientific director of one of the nuclear
research centers (Arzamas-16/Sarov nuclear research
facility) have even committed suicide.
Living standards have fallen precipitously in those
geographical areas that are most capable of spawning
proliferation. The national government is often months
behind in paying salaries in the military-industrial
factories on which whole towns depend. The majority of
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scientists and engineers with master’s degrees in technical
disciplines are paid $50-$100 a month. According to a recent
study, only 3 percent of technical experts are paid $100$125 a month.14 Many residents in the military-industrial
factory towns have become depressed and desperate, taking
to drinking and suffering from other social ills such as drug
addiction. The residents in nuclear and missile towns are
hobbled by the residency registration (the infamous—and
unconstitutional— propiska system), which in many cases
prevents them from leaving and seeking employment
elsewhere.
Even with massive aid from the U.S. Government,
sensitive weapons, enriched uranium, and technology are
not safe from illicit acquisitions by rogue states or terrorists.
According to a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office
in February 2001, after spending $2.2 billion over almost 10
years, only 14 percent of Russia’s weapons grade material
has been fully secured.15 Obviously, nuclear safety is not a
priority for the Russian government, which, with its
increasing anti-Americanism, makes cooperation by
Minatom and other official Russian agencies with
American-funded programs sponsored by the Departments
of Defense and Energy (and with some American
nongovernment organizations [NGOs] in Russia),
particularly difficult.16 This is unfortunate, as the Russian
federal government has partially abandoned responsibility
for maintaining the social infrastructure of the closed cities,
leaving it to the regional governments to provide social
services, including schools, healthcare, subsidized heat, and
housing.
It comes as little surprise that under these conditions of
extreme hardship, Russians find ways to cash in on their
expertise. For example, the Reutov Mashinostroyenie
Science and Production Association in the Moscow oblast,
and Aksion, a firm from the highly militarized city of
Izhevsk (Udmurt Autonomous Republic), are participating
in selling to Iran a national satellite communications
system with numerous defense capabilities. Other firms
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from the regions are participating in transferring SS-4
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) technology
and cooperating with Iran on developing its Shihab series
IRBMs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).17
Russian government agencies, led by Minatom,
facilitated the transfer to Iran of 500 technicians and
engineers who work on the Bushehr nuclear reactor project,
and cooperated with Iran in bringing other Russian
scientists to develop less innocuous nuclear projects.
Employment of Russian specialists abroad alleviates the
domestic employment situation in closed cities and
money-starved military-industrial facilities; earns hard
currency for the state; and lines the pockets of corrupt
government officials who facilitate such projects.
Russia’s Regions: First in Production, First
in Commerce.
Since the late 1990s, the Russian regions realized the
naivete of passively waiting for handouts from the center.
Instead, they are actively seeking markets abroad for the
conventional weapons systems they manufacture. For
example, firms from cities with strong military-industrial
capabilities such as Per’m, Sverdlovsk, Tula, and Izhevsk
regularly participate in a huge weapons show in the United
Arab Emirates. Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the
Duma Defense Committee, stated recently that Russian
weapons exports to China, India, and Iran are equal to
one-half of the Russian military acquisition budget.18 It is
only logical to assume that players from the regions with
business and technical expertise are being approached to
sell more sensitive systems, including WMD.
Sometimes, cases of outright violation of applicable laws
occur, but these are hushed up by the proliferators’ friends
and associates who work for the security services and other
influential branches of the government—often in exchange
for a percentage of the profits or an agreed-upon sum of
money. Thus, a prominent businessman from Siberia
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admitted in an interview with a credible, well-known
Russian sociologist, whom the author knows personally,
that a large part of his wealth comes from sales of
weapons-grade enriched radioactive materials from
Krasnoyarsk-26, a well-known closed city, to Middle
Eastern countries. FSB, the Russian secret police and
successor to the KGB, summoned the researcher and
requested that he not publish the story, effectively playing
the role of “roof” (criminal protection) for the businessman
who admitted violating Russian laws.19
Instead of participating in proliferation, it has been
suggested by American experts that nonproliferation and
arms control centers can be created in Russian nuclear
cities. Such centers, employing some of the scientists and
engineers, could be given the status and authority of
proliferation monitors responsible for keeping tabs on
Russia’s sensitive exports. Western advisers further
suggested that these centers be granted a more prominent
role by the Russian government in export control and
evaluation, similar to that of U.S. government labs, which
are routinely consulted by the U.S. Department of Energy in
export control decisions. The center in Snezhinsk already
performs such a role.20 However, Moscow has been slow to
delegate its controlling authority over sensitive exports to
regional players.
Russia’s Regional Rationale for WMD Proliferation.
As time goes by, the Russian regions, military districts,
and industrial enterprises are developing direct relations
with countries around them. No longer do all economic ties,
including those in the military sector, have to be approved
by Moscow. Thus, the Russian Far East oblasts have
developed particularly strong connections with the People’s
Republic of China. Tatarstan has made a point of developing
bilateral economic ties with foreign countries while paying
little attention to Moscow’s wishes. Iran has developed ties
to research and academic institutions in Moscow and St.
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Petersburg, where the bulk of Iranian students study
nuclear physics, military engineering, and space-related
disciplines.21
Moscow actively pursues high profile contacts with the
leaders of rogue states, such as the visit of President
Khatami of Iran to Moscow in the spring of 2001, and the
“historic” train ride through Russia in August of 2001 by
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. While in Russia, these
leaders visit Russian aerospace and nuclear facilities in
highly publicized media events. These contacts send a clear
message to the Russian regions that rogue countries are
respectable military-industrial partners of the Russian
Federation.
It is only a matter of time before these foreign parties
request their Russian counterparts to provide sensitive
technologies, either dual-use or WMD. At the same time,
export and customs controls have been rendered ineffective
due to pervasive corruption, which allows Russian regional
players with pecuniary interest in military-related sales to
serve as intermediaries and facilitators in such sensitive
transactions. Civilian officials, such as governors,
military-industrial “red directors,” and senior military
officers have their networks of contacts and patronage.
They are in a position to bribe customs officials, obtain
export control exceptions and necessary export licenses, or
arrange for items to be exported using the ubiquitous
Russian military-transport aviation. This air transport
system often flies around the world, sometimes on missions
having little to do with ferrying Russian troops, such as
transporting illegally trafficked arms and drugs.22
Brain Drain or Brain Upgrade?
The employment situation in the military-industrial
complexes in the regions is desperate, and an absolute
majority (80 percent) among Russian technical experts in
the closed cities would be willing emigrate and work for the
military industries of other states.23 It is worth mentioning
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that 64 percent of those prepared to emigrate would be
willing to work with “any” organization to achieve their
goal, while 24 percent would like to cooperate with a “special
state-run agency.”24 This is a strategic threat in itself, and
will be treated separately in Chapter 6 of the present
volume.25 However, there is another clear and present
danger—Russia still boasts an impressive array of colleges
and universities which can prepare competent scientists
and engineers capable of producing WMD arsenals. These
institutions of higher learning, which specialize in nuclear
physics and chemistry, ballistics, and rocketry, are located
not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in
provincial towns, often those which boast advanced military
industrial facilities, as well as in the closed cities.
One of the more prominent among such institutions is
the Baltic State Technical University in St. Petersburg,
which specializes in ballistic missile design and space
technology. Together with ten other institutions, the
University was selected for sanctions by the U.S.
Government for educating Iranian students. While a
professor at the University claimed that he earned 83 cents
a day in Russia, Iranians were willing to pay salaries in
excess of $2,500 a month—a fortune for a Russian academic
who is close to retirement. Some of the faculty, such as
Baltic Technical University Rector Yurii Saveliev, do not
hide their anti-American animus.26 The authorities in these
institutions of higher learning not only tolerate, but even
approve education for students from India, Iran, Iraq, and
other problematic states. They also authorize faculty travel
to rogue states to teach in technical institutions there.
While, during the Soviet era foreign students from the
Third World were provided free education, lodging, and
stipends, today these students or their governments pay for
their education.27 Thus, the “export of higher education” not
only keeps Russian professors employed, it earns otherwise
scarce funds for colleges and universities.
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There is no unified authority in Russia monitoring the
education of foreign students in sensitive fields. When the
author recently raised this issue with Russian security
experts and government officials, the answer was that the
West is educating even more Iranian and other students in
physics and sensitive technological fields, and that Russia is
no more to blame than the West. According to the Russian
Foreign Ministry, “hundreds” of Iranians and Iraqis
received advanced degrees in physics and other disciplines
in Great Britain, France, and the United States in the 1980s
and 1990s. Moreover, according to the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, when Moscow raised this issue with the
United States, the answer allegedly was that the United
States was a free country, and no academic censorship was
tolerated.28 The government of Russia thus refuses to take
responsibility for the proliferation of sensitive knowledge
from its colleges. This is yet another aspect of proliferation
which allows often unstable regimes in developing countries
to build up their WMD arsenals.
Conclusions.
The role of Russia’s regions in this process is important,
but still secondary when compared to that of Minatom, the
Ministry of Defense, and Moscow-based aerospace firms. It
is Moscow that sets the pace for sabotaging international
efforts against proliferation. While the Russian government
maintains that it adheres to international export controls,
such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Australia Group, the
reality is different. Russia is exporting sensitive systems
and technologies to countries hostile to the United States
and her allies, such as China, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. It
is likely that Russia’s military exports of conventional,
dual-use, and WMD systems and technology to clients in the
Indian subcontinent, East Asia, and the Middle East will
grow in the future. These technologies cover the whole
spectrum of nuclear, missile, chemical, and elements of
biological weapons.
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The gap between rhetoric and performance is yawning,
while American protests encounter a range of responses
which are totally inadequate, from marginal attempts to
bring illegal and sensitive military exports under control to
outright sabotage and denial.
Russia’s regions cannot fail to notice the double
standard, which Moscow promotes, rhetorically denying
proliferation while pursuing it in practice. It can only be
expected that the regions will follow Moscow’s lead in the
dangerous proliferation game the Russian government is
playing. And as long as the regional players keep Moscow’s
gatekeepers happy by sharing the proceeds, the deadly
exports will continue.
It would be in U.S. interests if the Russian government
were to offer alternatives to proliferation to the militaryindustrial enterprises and the military units possessing
strategic systems and technology. Military conversion and
civilian economic development, possibly involving U.S.
firms, would provide an alternative source of revenue to
potential and actual proliferators. However, the degree of
transparency and reliability of Russian partners has been a
problem in past U.S. efforts, and must be held to the highest
standard. Safeguards designed to prevent proliferation
activities by beneficiaries of U.S. conversion and
investment programs must be designed and adhered to.
Finally, information is the key to monitoring and
preventing proliferation. While Moscow and St. Petersburg
boast ample contingents of American diplomats and
consultants, the situation is different outside the capital
areas. Thus, the United States might consider increasing its
presence and developing contacts in the regions. This could
include official U.S. Government representatives and
American NGOs. Even more importantly, contacts have to
be expanded with potential Russian allies in the
government and the NGO communities, who may play a role
in curtailing proliferation activities. The official institutions
could include governors’ offices, the FSB, the General Staff,
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military district commanders and staff, and customs
officials. The nongovernment community could include the
environmentalist movement, the news media, and
authorities in higher education.
Only through broad cooperation with Russian
institutions can U.S. efforts to stem the flow of proliferation
have a chance at succeeding.
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CHAPTER 4

THE HEALTH AND FUTURE OF RUSSIA’S
POPULATION

Murray Feshbach

Demographic Trends.
The dynamics of Russian demographic trends will
reduce the number of persons born. They will also increase
the death rate because of the deteriorating health of the
population stemming from major increases in unhealthy
children born and subsequent illness and mortality
patterns. They portend a decline in the new labor supply.
They portend a decline in the number of 18-year-olds
available for the draft, and of this declining number, they
portend a greater proportion who are poorer and thus
unhealthier. Finally, they will affect family formation and
dissolution, bringing about declines in total fertility rates
through a reduced number of women in the prime fertile
ages, which in turn will lessen the potential numbers of
births now and into the future. By the year 2050, these
dynamics will result in the decline of perhaps one-third (or
more) in the population of 144.8 million persons existing at
the beginning of 2001.
Sometimes even more apocalyptic projections are found
in Russian government and legislative reports or speeches.
Russian Labor Minister Aleksandr Pochinok, Russia’s
current Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, and others
speak of sharp declines in the labor supply in the immediate
future or several years from now. These trends, combined
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with the poor health of newborns, will adversely affect
future productivity gains and other economic possibilities.
Huge impending increases in mortality from Human
Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) or associated opportunistic illnesses
(including tuberculosis [TB], on its own or as a cofactor with
HIV/AIDS and others) likely will make for major shifts in
the prevailing causes of death. They will also increase
mortality while concomitantly lowering average life span.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hope for the
immigration to Russia of 500,000 persons per year will not
fulfill the requirement of at least 750,000 new births per
year simply to sustain the population, let alone provide for
growth.
Moreover, cultural impediments to assimilation
encountered even by Russians returning from the near
abroad (i.e., the former Soviet territories plus the Baltic
states) as well as by emigrants from other nationality
populations, will be difficult to resolve because of, among
other issues, the lack of facilitative funding by federal and
local authorities. Such impediments further reduce the
potential for a solution through immigration. My projection
of 100 million people in Russia by the year 2050 may well be
optimistic.
Putin, in his first State of the Union message in June
2000, listed 16 major problems facing the country.
Remarkably, and without precedent for a national leader,
he cited the demographic problem first. He underscored the
net decline in the population (births minus deaths plus or
minus net migration) of some 750,000 per year as the basis
for his anticipation of the problem. However, he stipulated
that economic growth depended on an increase in the
number of people. Of importance is not only the gross
number, but also the numbers surviving for future fertility
(which affect future labor force numbers and the future
recruit pool for the military) and the morbidity and
mortality patterns existing currently and in the future. My
projection of some 100 million by the year 2050 is eclipsed in
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terms of apocalyptic magnitude by Nikolay Gerasimenko,
the head of the Duma Committee on Health and Physical
Fitness, who projects a population of 50 to 75 million by the
year 2075. (It is a bit heroic to go out this far into the future.)
Russian demographer Sergey Yermakov and a colleague
have projected a figure of 70 to 90 million for the year 2050,
and the higher figure may be quite reasonable. Projecting
the bare numbers, however, is not truly to the point. What is
to the point are the implications of these projections for the
society, the economy, the military, social stability, and the
like.
Official Russian governmental projections for the 20- to
29-year-old female population indicate that the
demographic echoes of the decline in the number of births
which had begun in 1987 will continue to be felt. This
decline will have a dramatic impact on the numbers of
women at the prime fertile ages beginning in 2007. The
numbers are expected to decline from 12.7 million women at
these ages to 7.2 million by the year 2022, and decline even
further by 2050 to 6.4 million. Unless fertility increases
dramatically, by these numbers alone the likelihood of an
increase in population is very, very small. Moreover, as we
shall see from the health of the population in general and of
females in particular, the negative health trends will clearly
affect future fertility in a manner depressing potential
growth even further.
Mortality will increase markedly without a doubt as the
impact of HIV/AIDS and TB hit in full force beginning in
about 2005 and continuing until major breakthroughs
occur in prevention and treatment, and the necessary
funding becomes available. These conditions are not easily
met. The numbers of TB deaths alone have increased by 33
and 30 percent in 1999 and 2000, respectively, and promise
to increase even more as the amnesty of prisoners with TB,
especially multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB), continues
apace. In this instance, the authorities are damned if they
do—for releasing pathogenic individuals—and damned if
they don’t—by the human rights community because of
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incredibly bad conditions in Russian detention centers and
prisons. If people were not sick before they entered in jail, it
is almost guaranteed they will be sick with TB or other
diseases upon release.
The leadership, as one possible solution to the
population problem, is currently considering migration
possibilities, which also have important military
implications for the long run. With net in-migration having
peaked at some 800,000 plus in the early 1990s, the net
in-migration totaled only about 140,000 in 1999. The first 11
months of 2000 saw a total of 338,000 in-migrants
(excluding out-migration), which is one-third of the 1994
figure of 1,140,000. Putin and others have expressed the
hope and desire that the number will increase to some
500,000 (on a net basis) from the near abroad. On one hand,
a major influx is very unlikely to occur at the desired level in
the near term without the push of major economic, ethnic,
ecological, or other disasters in these areas. While the
Taliban threat to the southern tier is a consideration for
these policymakers, it may not come quite to the level of
actual war. Emigrants from Afghanistan number about
150,000, but only 500 have formal refugee status.1 An
Armenian earthquake or another Chernobyl event in
Ukraine might lead to a large number of migrants, but
would likely be only one-time events.
Of greater help would be the improvement in conditions
for legal, let alone illegal, migrants already in Russia. Many
of these legal migrants have not been supported in the
manner promised, nor is it likely that sufficient monies will
be forthcoming from the federal or local governments to
handle a large increase. Nor will the indigenous populations
be so welcoming, given their own problems of resource
availability for housing, health care, and jobs. The
lebensraum of southern Siberia and the Far East might be a
draw for large numbers of Chinese. Currently, estimates of
the number migrants there, including Chinese, vary from
700,000 to 1.5 million legals and from 500,000 to 4-5 million
illegals.
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While China could spare several hundred million (out of
a current total population of 1.3 billion), it is doubtful that
numbers of this magnitude are realistic. A large number,
say 50 million, undoubtedly would be seen as a threat to the
national security of the Russian state. Moreover, on the
assumption that even a smaller number (perhaps tens of
thousands) of young Chinese move into Russia under legal
regulation and passports to become permanent residents,
would they be subject to conscription? Would they serve?
Would they be in sufficient numbers to worry the General
Staff about their loyalty? Would they be assigned to
sensitive strategic combat arms? Would a professional army
(if the government can afford it) obviate large numbers of
such citizens for a conscriptee pool? These are all relevant
questions, albeit not yet much talked about in the public
domain.
While China expert Steven Mosher points out that there
are some 5 million permanent Chinese workers and their
families resident in the area, it would appear from other
evidence that this number is too high.2 In January 2001,
experts from several Russian government agencies,
including the Federal Border Guard Service, estimated that
the number of illegal migrants in the previous 5 years from
all countries had increased by 10 times. According to their
figures, the total number of illegal Chinese migrants
approached 750,000, while some 250,000 additional
Chinese citizens were officially registered.3 These figures
are much lower than Mosher and some others estimate. But
the military input continued to warn of the potential for
large numbers of “residents” (read the Chinese in
particular) to eventually demand “establishment of
national autonomies.” Nothing is said in the agency experts’
report about what might be done about it, but the warning is
clear.
Such concerns are valid. Valentina Matviyenko, a
Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues, noted the Chinese
emigration problem in a speech in the Far East, declaring it
a national security threat. Mosher quotes former Russian
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Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who warned as long ago as
1995 that “the Chinese are in the process of making a
peaceful conquest of the Russian Far East.”4 So have others
since, but the recent rapprochement with China may lead to
further regularized influxes of aid to the regional economy
and perhaps limit the Chinese to this area. Whether it will
lead in the future to territorial claims is unclear, but such is
not impossible. Will this be another Chechnya? National
patriots and various strategic policymakers worry about the
loss of territory in Chechnya and its precedent for other
regions of the Federation. James Billington, the Librarian
of Congress and a renowned Russian historian, in a speech
given at the U.S. Institute of Peace in May 1999, is quoted by
Mosher as predicting a likely Chinese intervention in
“Siberia in the next 10 to 15 years.” The potential is high for
this to ensue, but as yet still uncertain.
Russian policy seems to be one of trying to head off a
large influx at least. Putin has ordered the formation of a
working group to prepare proposals on the regulation of
immigration. Their report was due on March 20, 2001. The
report’s actual contents are not yet known, but likely will
pay much attention (even if not spelled out in any public
announcement) to the “Yellow Peril,” to cite a historical and
cultural expression of the Russian fear of the Chinese. The
potential influx does not appear to have been factored into
the migration projections of the State Statistical Agency. In
its official report, it projected a figure of 132,000 net
in-migrants in 2000 and only 60,600 in 2015.5 This figure is
very different from the desired figure, according to the Putin
policy initiative. Within the regions the Chinese are
expected to “occupy,” the Goskomstat projects a decline of
20,600 net in-migrants in the West Siberian Region, 26,900
in the East Siberian Region, and 33,900 in the Far East
Region—a decline totaling 81,400, rather than the millions
being anticipated. Interesting. One awaits the next year’s
Statistical Bulletin on population projections to see if this
issue has impacted the technical authorities rather than
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simply those political and military operatives concerned
with the future of the region.
Health Trends.
Perhaps the most important factor that will affect
Russian national security will be the impact of the numbers
of deaths projected by Russia’s leading epidemiologist on
HIV/AIDS. Vadim Pokrovskiy, head of the Federal
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment Center of the Russian
Ministry of Health, predicts that 10 million or so
predominantly 15- to 29-year-old males will begin to die by
2005, definitely by 2010. I fully anticipate that this
eventuality, in combination with the deaths and illnesses
from other causes, will seriously affect not only the overall
demographic trends, but future labor supply and quality,
the armed forces’ combat capability, family formation,
family stability, international status, and on and on. When
combined with the very major increases in deaths from TB
mentioned previously, the numbers of people affected and
concomitant economic costs become staggering. Such costs,
when added to other costs to the economy from illness due to
poor water, solid particulates in the air, past overuse of
pesticides, and chromosomal aberrations causing
spontaneous abortions/miscarriages in the so-called
military chemical cities such as Dzerzhinsk and
Chapayevsk, may become well-nigh intolerable. The growth
of drug abuse, the spread of syphilis both in itself and as a
precursor to the transition to HIV/AIDS, and the spread of
hepatitis C as a cause of death and as another precursor to
HIV/AIDS, add even more detriments to the declining
health of the population.
The global infectious disease threat emanating from
Russia and the region is part and parcel of the strategic
implications for other countries, with TB, syphilis (due to
the export of women for the sex trade), HIV/AIDS, and
possibly malaria affecting near and far distant countries in
the future, if not already. Sweden has seen a large,
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unexpected growth in syphilis, for example, and a strain of
TB is spreading to other countries like that found in Russia,
especially MDR-TB. The U.S. National Intelligence
Council’s report titled Global Infectious Disease Threats
and Their Implications for the United States issued in 2000,
reveals the tip of the likely large iceberg of threats to other
countries posed by Russia unless the Russian (and
Ukrainian, one can add) health situation improves
dramatically. It may be too late to head off these threats, but
much can be done to mitigate the regrettable impact.
Where to begin? How will Russian health authorities
deal with the simultaneous increases in drug and substance
abuse plus the spectacular increase in sexually transmitted
diseases, especially syphilis, HIV/AIDS, TB, hepatitis C,
and hepatitis B? How will they deal with the low survival
rate of 16-year-old males (only two-thirds of the rate of
16-year-old males in the United States who reach age 60),
and the increasing proportion of children born unhealthy,
who have chronic conditions leaving them impaired for the
rest of their lives, especially at age 18, the draft age?
Another alarming trend is the declining reproductive health
of women and the consequent adverse impact on the health
of newborn children. If the leading pediatricians (Tabolin
and Baranov, as well as other public health authorities) are
correct, only 10 or perhaps 15 percent of children under age
15 are healthy.
Stunting (that is, lower height by age, based on world
health standards) and wasting (lower weight by age) are
increasing among the young, which of course also leads to
ineligibility of 18-year-old males for the draft. The national
health indicator averages projected by Tabolin and Baranov
need to be supplemented by information on regional health
status differentials, with particular attention to the
regional sources of recruits for the military. Efforts can then
be targeted to improve the overall health status of young
persons in the least healthy regions.
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The need to improve health conditions is certainly
manifest when the head of the Moscow Military District,
Mikhail Sorokin, can declare that only one in ten Muscovite
males will be available for the spring 2001 draft in his
district, a main reason being that 40 percent cannot be
drafted because they are too ill and 10-20 percent are draft
dodgers (many of whom have “acquired” a certificate
affirming mental problems). At the same time, he notes that
a whole army company stationed in the Caucasus, 80
persons in all, “really do have mental and psychiatric
problems.” Of those actually drafted, many are drug addicts
and HIV-carriers, which does not bode well for their active
duty performance.
The problem of conscript health can be readily
demonstrated by tracking the pattern of syphilis rates, drug
abuse, and substance abuse in the last decade. From 1989 to
1998, for example, the rate per 100,000 population of new
incidence of syphilis has increased by over thirtyfold, drug
abuse by over tenfold, and substance abuse by over 20
percent. Due to changes in legislation which made new
syphilis sufferers subject to legal penalties beginning in
1998, the actual number of new syphilis incidence is
undoubtedly higher among the conscript age cohort.
Especially given the putative major reduction in
conscription for the armed forces by 2010, why then does the
military not press the Putin government to do more? Given
the military’s opposition to a nonconscript force, is the
military’s expressed concern strictly for the record? Putin
asserted on March 21, 2001, that (as quoted by ITAR-TASS
the next day) “the navy, air force, missile forces, and some
other arms and branches of service are 80 to 90 percent
staffed by professionals.” These figures seem high compared
to other information and surprising, given demographic and
health constraints. Where the funding to pay for an entirely
voluntary military would come from is far from clear.
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The Educational System.
Disarray in the educational system continues in Russia.
Though educational reforms have been implemented, the
results are quite uncertain and could negatively affect
human capital formation in the future.6 This threat to
training of current and future generations is due not only to
the professional fields that students individually decide to
study or not to study, but also the debatable quality of many
so-called private schools and college-level institutions. In
addition, the health of students as a reflection of society in
general and of the youth culture in drug abuse and other
socially aberrant behavior, has led to many discussions
about the impact on the student population and students’
participation in society, if and when they graduate. For
example, several reports indicate that St. Petersburg’s
Education Department, as of March 2001, was worried
about the further worsening of school children’s health over
the previous 3 years, and noted that this generation’s health
was becoming “significantly worse.” In addition, they found
that only one of every ten children 10 years of age and under
was healthy, and only one in 20 above age 10 was healthy.7 If
this situation continues, and it likely will, then what does
this do to the students’ ability to study as well as function in
society? Not to be outdone, in a regrettable kind of
competition, Leonid Ivanov on the same date indicated that
in Tyumen city (located in West Siberia) the city’s medical
community held a special session to discuss the significant
rise in tuberculosis among students of higher educational
institutions.8 The report asserts that the main reasons for
such increases in TB are the “socially aberrant behavior”
cited a b ov e, as wel l as “p oor nutr i ti on, a p oor
epidemiological situation, and a genetic predisposition to
illness.” I do not know how the latter point could be proved,
but the other possible underlying causes are widespread
and germane to such situations.
Shortages of funding for salaries, for computerization,
and the like, which led to strikes by about 300,000 teachers
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in 39 regions of the country on February 27, 2001, could well
lead to further deterioration of this sector and adversely
affect the economy as well.9 The potential for economic
discrimination is being realized as the shortage of money for
education has led not only to the growth of private higher
educational institutions, but also to high tuition, leaving
behind many who are at the lower end of the economic
ladder. Moreover, the share of tuition-paying students has
increased markedly since 1995. In 1995, one of every 5
rubles (20 percent) for the sector was paid by so-called
“commercial” students; in the 2000-01 school year, 56
percent is derived from private payments. Will talented
students be excluded?
Much has been accurately written on the growth of
educational achievement by the Russian population, but the
future is more tenuous because of the recent volatile and
uncertain educational climate. The demographic downturn
in the number of births by 50 percent over the past 13 years
(1987 to 2000) will provide a much smaller college
population beginning in 2015 as students reach 18 years of
age. The number of graduates could be too small for the
needs of the country, both in absolute terms and in numbers
of high-quality students.10 The past is thus no longer
prologue in terms of quantity, and perhaps even in quality,
as the confusion in the educational system continues to
grow. Attempting to make projections of the number of
future scientists in all sectors of the economy is frustrated
not only by the declining numbers of potential students, but
also by the unknown pattern of fields of study they will
choose; ignorance of whether they will join the public or the
growing private sector; and lack of certainty as to whether
they will reside in Russia, given the alarming trends in the
permanent and temporary brain drain. In addition, one
would need to know whether graduates will actually do the
work they trained for or work in other job slots (for example,
many engineers now work in business or finance); what the
relative shares of civilian versus military employment will
be; and whether students will be subsidized with adequate
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stipends in their training (e.g., with college or university
fellowships). Such uncertainties make any projection very
tentative and likely wrong.
During a talk given by a former Russian Minister of
Science, Boris Saltykov, at Georgetown University in
1997—well before much had changed in population
numbers, enrollment, expansion of the private educational
sector, and announcement of major reforms in the Russian
military—he asserted that only about 100,000 scientists
were actually active in their science specialties. As reported
by Dr. Harley Balzer, head of the Center for Eurasian,
Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown
University, Saltykov stated that roughly half of the
scientists were employed in civilian research and half in
military-related work.
At the same time, the number of researchers among
scientific workers (nauchnyye rabotniki) was reported by
the State Statistical Agency as having dropped sharply over
the period 1992-98 (from 804,000 in 1992 to 417,0000 in
1998).11 At the same time, the number of admissions to
graduate studies and enrollment in their physicalmathematical, chemical, biological, and technical studies
programs increased from 6,606 students in 1992 to 14,350
in 1998.12 This rise in science enrollments is quite contrary
to the trend of the overall number of scientists. Graduations
over the same period, however, declined from 8,102 to
7,798.13 All disciplinary fields cited above declined, except
for those students who finished graduate schooling in the
biological sciences. This is an interesting development, but
too imprecise to indicate anything about where they ended
up working.
In sum, then, I do not consider it possible to prepare any
serious projections related to science graduates until the
educational, employment, military reforms, and/or budget
allocations become realistic. This is especially true when
these factors are combined with the future demographic and
health dynamics. In addition, the difference to date between
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words and reality leave too large a gap to hazard anything
more than completely untenable estimates and projections.
What is reappearing from the past is a growing
“demand” for a return to the system of obligatory
assignment upon graduation from a higher educational
institution. Putin noted in a speech at Novosibirsk State
University in November 2000 that he did not believe in such
obligatory assignments because “people have to learn to be
self-sufficient.” However, he went on to explicitly exempt
state-owned defense enterprises. Since there is a system of
government contracts, and it includes a specific table of
organization and types of specialists needed to perform the
work, free choice allowed since the early 1990s will change.
Within 12 to 18 months, the former personnel distribution
system for training engineers for the defense industry
throughout Russia will be restored.14 This action would
appear to be closely linked to the discussion at a conference
held in the Kremlin Palace on December 14, 2000, under the
rubric “Professional Engineering-Technical Education and
Military Education in the Twenty-First Century.” The title
of an article appearing in the military newspaper Krasnaya
Zvezda on February 16, 2001, is “Engineers Are the Golden
Reserve of Russia.” Clearly, the military sector has had
trouble retaining young engineer lieutenants and/or
recruiting the quantity, and likely the quality, of engineers
it needs to fill its national security role. Thus, freedom of
choice for college and university engineering graduates will
be restricted. The pre-1990 rule for a 3-year period of
obligatory time in the assigned job is not specified in the
source, but likely will be at least that amount of time when
the details emerge from this initiative.
Implications for the Future: A Brief Summary.
The relation between demography and health trends is
not very positive for productivity gains leading to economic
growth or for enhanced national security of the state
because the limits engendered by an unhealthy and much
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smaller population impact the following generations.
Denial by some members of the establishment in Russia
continues to this day. Coming out of a meeting of the Board
of Directors of the Ministry of Health of the Russian
Federation on March 20, 2001, Minister of Health
Shevchenko is reported to have affirmed that the health
concept adopted 3 years earlier had been “basically
realized.” Yet, contradictorily, he is then said to have added,
“But the health situation has worsened.” I would have
thought these two statements are at odds with one
another—but he apparently did not. However, according to
the same report, during an unscheduled visit, Vice Minister
for Social Affairs Valentina Matviyenko issued a “short
unplanned statement” to the effect that the “budget
allocation for the health sector is declining, and this affects
the situation as a whole.”15 Moreover, she went on to say
th a t “tu bercu losis i s gr owi ng as a thr eat, and
HIV-infections are threatening to grow out of control.” How
then could Shevchenko affirm that the “health component is
insignificantly small in the demographic problem.” He
suggested that only “war, repression, and prisons” are
affected by the “demographic crisis.” Prisons are crucial,
obviously, but certainly TB, HIV and its trends, and
reproductive and child health remain vital considerations
in any discussion of the demographic crisis, to use his term.
As to which of the two trends—demographic or
economic—will become ascendant, it is impossible to predict
with certainty, but I expect the demographic (read health
and educational problems, as well) to nullify any potential
economic progress.
I have not addressed the casualty threats from
remaining nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, or
from terrorism, or from thefts of associated materials for use
by individuals internally or externally, by organizations,
and/or by governments, because they are beyond the scope
of the present chapter. However, they should not be omitted
from a full analysis of health hazards as well as security
issues facing Russia.
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CHAPTER 5

NEW METRICS FOR DENUCLEARIZATION

Thomas B. Cochran

Introduction.
The legacy of Cold War nuclear weapons programs in the
United States and Russia represents serious continuing
threats to each country’s national security. Today, the
primary danger to the United States from Russia’s
possession of nuclear weapons is not from a deliberate
attack, but from a mistaken, unauthorized, or accidental
missile launch. In addition, the Russian nuclear weapons
prog ram—more so than that of the Uni ted
States—represents a continuing global proliferation threat
as well as a public health and environmental hazard. The
proliferation threat stems from the facts that Russia (1) is
still producing and separating plutonium; (2) has some
15,000 to 20,000 assembled nuclear weapons and about
1,700 metric tons of separated nuclear weapon-usable
fissile materials (much of it under inadequate security); and
(3) lacks alternative jobs to offer the 67,000 workers who
live in ten closed nuclear cities. Russia suffers from the most
severe environmental pollution of any country and lacks the
funds to clean it up. A failing economy and widespread
corruption compound these problems. To reduce these risks,
the United States and Russia have been engaged in a
variety of programs that can be loosely described as a
program of “denuclearization.”
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In the first part of this chapter, I examine a new
approach for establishing priorities and measuring
progress in denuclearization and nonproliferation. The
second part addresses a new method of funding a portion of
the denuclearization effort.
The Denuclearization Metric.
“Denuclearize” can be defined as either removing
nuclear arms from an area or prohibiting the presence/use
of nuclear weapons/arms within an area. It is the first of
these two definitions that will mainly concern us here. A
limitation of our definition, of course, is that it does not
reflect the threats represented by partially assembled
nuclear warheads, stockpiles of nuclear materials, or
nuclear weapon production technologies and nuclear
weapon expertise.
A useful, albeit narrow, technical metric for measuring
progress in denuclearization would be a curve plotted
relative to two axes, displaying the cumulative number of
nuclear weapons that a state could launch or use as a
function of the time it would take to use them (setting aside
employment policy considerations). By this metric (see
Figure 1), denuclearization is the process of reducing the
area under the curve and shifting the curve and the area
under it to the right. This is tantamount to reducing the
number of nuclear warheads, reducing warhead potential,
and increasing the time to achieve “use ready” status (e.g.,
to render strategic weapons ready for launch), or
operational status of nonstrategic weapons. One can
compare various denuclearization strategies by examining
how the curve shifts over time under various proposals.
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Figure 1. Notional representation of the number of
nuclear warheads that can be brought to launch
ready or use ready status as a function of time.
Now look at Figure 2. The same metric can be used to
describe the status of nonweapon states in terms of how long
it takes each state to acquire nuclear weapons and the
state’s capabilities to produce and field nuclear weapon
arsenals. By definition, these states have no nuclear
weapons at present, so the curves representing their
respective weapon potential intersect the horizontal axis
(representing number of days) rather than the vertical axis
(representing number of nuclear warheads). But the
nonproliferation objective is the same as for weapon states,
that is, to shift the curves to the right. In Figure 2 the
international safeguards “timely warning criterion” is met
for a given country only if the time period represented by the
distance from the origin to the horizontal axis intercept is
sufficiently long for the international community, through
diplomatic pressure and sanctions, to prevent the state from
acquiring nuclear weapons should the state seek such a an
option. In a non-nuclear world, all states would be
represented by curves similar to those depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Notional representation of the number of
nuclear warheads that can be produced and brought
to launch ready or use ready status as a function of
time.
To avoid having to determine and address a state’s
capability to fabricate nuclear warheads and delivery
vehicles, the nonproliferation metric in Figure 2 can be
usefully simplified by changing the vertical axis so as to
portray “quantity of weapon-usable fissile material” in
place of “nuclear weapons ready for use.” Or an agency like
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might plot
“Significant Quantities of Fissile Material,” to use a
different example.
Returning to Figure 1, to accurately plot such a curve one
needs to know the number of warheads and the amounts of
fissile materials in various categories of warheads, warhead
components, and fissile materials. For example, today the
United States has over 2,600 warheads on “launch ready”
alert that can be launched in a matter of minutes. Within a
few days the United State could bring its strategic forces to
“Generated I” alert status by moving some five or so
additional submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
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on station, thereby adding another 960 or so warheads to
use ready status.
One can continue this exercise by including the strategic
bomber force, nonstrategic bomber weapons, and hedge
weapons, some of which would take progressively longer to
bring to launch ready status. It would take even longer to
activate inactive warheads, still longer to reassemble pits
and canned subassemblies into usable warheads, and even
longer still to manufacture new warheads from fissile and
other materials.
Table 1 ranks various categories of warheads, warhead
components, and fissile materials in terms of how long it
would take to attain use ready status. As seen from the
table, denuclearization is more complicated than just
eliminating nuclear weapons. Denuclearization is the
process of moving warheads and materials from categories
high on the Table 1 list to categories lower on the list.
Moreover, movements between any two categories are not of
equal worth. For example, when there are numerous
warheads in the higher-ranked categories, as is the case
today in the United States and Russia, then progress in
moving fissile materials down through the lower ranks will
not substantially alter the risks associated with a state’s use
of nuclear weapons. In general, the “worth” of each step
becomes progressively less as one moves down through the
list of categories in Table 1. In order to make the area under
the curve more representative of the “worth” of the weapons
and weapon materials, I have selected a logarithmic scale
for the horizonal axis in Figures 1 and 2, meaning that the
number of days increases exponentially with each
incremental move to the right.
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RELATIVE EMPLOYMENT PREPARATION TIME
Launch Ready Alert Level Warheads
Warheads Added by Bringing Forces to Generated Alert
Status
Other Deployed Warheads
Non-Deployed Warheads in the Active Stockpile
Inactive Stockpiled Warheads
Warheads Awaiting Disassembly
Stored Pits and Canned Subassemblies
Plutonium (Pu) and High-Enriched Uranium (HEU) in
Metallic Form
Pu and HEU Oxides and Other Chemical Forms
Pu and HEU in Fresh Fuel Assemblies
Pu and HEU in Spent Fuel Assemblies
Low-Enriched and Natural Uranium
Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories
Uranium Ore
Table 1. Warheads, Warhead Components, and Fissile
Material Stocks Ranked Approximately According to
the Time It Takes to Achieve Launch Ready Warhead
Status.
Thus far we have discussed denuclearization in the
context of reducing the risks associated with a weapons
state’s use of nuclear weapons, either deliberately or
accidentally. We also want to reduce the risk of nonweapon
states and nonstate entities acquiring nuclear weapons, for
example, by diverting nuclear weapons, weapon-usable
materials, or expertise from a weapon state. The
proliferation risks associated with a weapon state’s nuclear
weapons program can be reduced by the following
measures:

• Reducing the total stocks of weapon-usable nuclear
materials available for diversion;
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• Improving the security of existing stocks of fissile
materials; and/or
•

Reducing the likelihood of transfer of nuclear
expertise for unauthorized purposes.
Note that reducing the total stocks of nuclear weapons
and weapon-usable nuclear materials reduces both the
weapon state threat and the nonweapon state threat
associated with these materials. The denuclearization
metric therefore has utility in measuring progress in
reducing the risk of diversion. The denuclearization metric,
however, is less useful for establishing priorities for
measuring progress in improving security of fissile material
or reducing the likelihood of transfer of nuclear expertise,
except that taking steps to move the curve down and to the
right does lessen the prospect of readily available warheads
and materials and it potentially leads to a lessening of
expertise.
U.S. Denuclearization Priorities.
The United States is pursuing several somewhat
independent denuclearization and nonproliferation efforts
in cooperation with Russia: (1) nuclear arms reduction
negotiations—the START II/III treaty negotiation process,
which the Bush administration may replace by unilateral
actions; (2) the START I verification program; (3) the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (so-called
“Nunn-Lugar”), under which launch vehicles are
dismantled; (4) the 500 metric tons highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) purchase agreement, under which HEU
from weapons is blended down into nonweapon-use fuel for
power reactors; (5) the joint U.S.-Russian plutonium
disposition program; and (6) various efforts to improve the
security of existing stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile
materials.
In broad terms, there are several shortcomings with
these efforts. First, the six program elements were not
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developed as part of a comprehensive integrated package.
The United States has neither a comprehensive nor an
in teg rated stra tegy f or ac hi evi ng p r ogr ess i n
denuclearization. The United States attaches high priority
to efforts that have the lower worth, e.g., the plutonium
disposition program, and little priority to some efforts that
have a higher worth, e.g., removing warheads from launch
ready status (“de-alerting”), and dismantling canned
subassemblies. Moreover, the United States attaches little
priority to achieving a data exchange with Russia in order to
ascertain the number of nuclear warheads, warhead
components, and fissile material stocks in the various
categories in Table 1. The United States does not know,
within plus or minus a few thousand, how many tactical
nuclear warheads Russia has retained in its arsenal.
Without a reliable data exchange, the United States cannot
measure or verify progress in denuclearization.
Let us now turn to an analysis of some of the specific
ongoing U.S.-funded denuclearization and nonproliferation
initiatives in Russia.
U.S. Nonproliferation Initiatives in Russia.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union almost a decade
ago, the U.S. Government has initiated a variety of
Russian-based programs with the following objectives:

• Improve the security of existing stocks of fissile
materials in Russia to reduce the likelihood of theft and
unauthorized use;
• Reduce the total stocks of weapon-usable nuclear
materials; and,
•

Provide alternative employment opportunities to
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons experts to reduce
the likelihood that they would sell their expertise abroad.
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In addition, the ongoing programs provide transparency
with respect to nuclear weapon and other activities in
Russia.
The United States has been spending about $500 million
a year on the Russian safeguarding effort. The Bush
administration has initiated a “comprehensive review” of
these programs. I do the same here, beginning with a brief
summary of the principal ongoing initiatives.
Improving the Security of Fissile Materials.
There are several ongoing efforts, the main ones being as
follows:

•

Russian Fissile Material Storage Facility at
Ozersk. Provides assistance in the construction of a large
storage facility at Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65) and
construction of 10,000 special fissile material containers for
use in this facility. The construction of the first of two wings
is almost complete, and loading of this wing is scheduled to
commence in FY2002. When both wings are complete, the
facility will hold the fissile materials from approximately
12,500 warheads. Construction costs of the first wing were
capped by Congress at $460 million. Funded by DOD’s
Defense Threat Reduction Agency under the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) budget (FY2001, $57.4 million);
International Materials Protection, Control, and
Accounting (MPC&A). This is a program to install
improved security systems at civilian nuclear sites, naval
fuel and weapon sites, and nuclear weapon laboratory sites,
and to consolidate nuclear materials at fewer sites. Founded
by Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration (FY2001, $169.7 million; FY2002, $138.8
million);
Improve Security at 12 GUMO Nuclear Weapon
Storage Sites. Provides assistance to the Russian Ministry
of Defense’s 12th Main Directorate (12th GUMO) to
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improve security at nuclear weapon storage sites (other
than Russian Navy sites). Funded by DOD under the CTR
budget (FY2001, $89.7 million);
Improve Nuclear Weapon Transportation
Security. Provides assistance to the Russian Ministry of
Defense’s 12th GUMO to improve nuclear weapon
transportation security. Funded by DOD under the CTR
budget (FY2001, $14 million); and,
Pit Conversion and Fissile Material Packaging.
Provides assistance to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s
12th GUMO to facilitate packaging of fissile materials from
dismantled warheads for subsequent shipment to and
storage at the storage facility at Ozersk now under
construction. Funded by DOD under the CTR budget
(FY2001, $9.3 million).
These five initiatives all deserve support. A problem,
however, with respect to all of them is that the United
States (and possibly Russia) does not know how many
nuclear weapons and how much fissile material exist in
Russia, and the United States does not know where much of
it is stored. The United States has failed to make a high
priority effort to secure a bilateral data exchange on weapon
and fissile material inventories.
Referring back to the categories in Table 1, we see that
the United States has placed relatively high priority on
storage of plutonium and HEU in metallic form (i.e., at
Ozersk), but there is no joint program associated with some
efforts described in Table 1 that are of higher worth, e.g.,
accelerating disassembly of the warheads.
Reducing Stocks of Weapon-Usable Nuclear
Materials.
The principal ongoing efforts here are as follows:

•

Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase
Agreement. A U.S.-Russian agreement whereby 500
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metric tons of HEU from Russian weapons are to be
blended down into low-enriched uranium (LEU) for
use as power reactor fuel, and the purchase by the
United States of the separative work unit (SWU), or
enrichment values, of the LEU. To date, just over 100
metric tons of the 500 have been sold and delivered to
the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the
government appointed executive agent for the HEU
purchase agreement. DOE provides funds for
implementation of transparency agreements
associated with the blend-down of HEU into LEU in
Russia (FY2001, $14.6 million; FY2002, $14.0
million);

• Plutonium Disposition. Under this program, 34
metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium are to be eliminated
by both Russia and the United States by first converting it to
mixed plutonium oxide and uranium oxide (MOX) fuel and
then using the MOX fuel in nuclear power reactors, thereby
converting it into spent reactor fuel. Funded by
DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration (FY2001,
$56.5 million; FY2002, $62.0 million; less use of prior years’
balances, the totals are reduced to: FY2001, $41.5 million;
FY2002, $20.0 million); and,
• Pl ut o ni um Produ ction R e actor Core
Conversion. An effort designed to assist Russia in
converting the three remaining dual-purpose (plutonium
and energy production) reactors to reduce or eliminate
weapon-grade plutonium production. There are three
options under consideration: converting the reactor cores to
LEU fuel; converting them to HEU fuel; and replacement of
the reactors with non-nuclear power plants. Funded by
DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency under the CTR
budget (FY2001, $32.1 million).
There are two problems with the HEU Purchase
Agreement that should be rectified. First, the U.S.
Government has turned this program over to what is now a
private company, the U.S. Enrichment Corporation
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(USEC), which serves as the Government’s executive agent
for implementing the program. Under this arrangement, to
the detriment of the program, the profit motive of USEC has
become a higher priority than the denuclearization
objective of the United States. Second, the United States
does not know the quantity and disposition of Russian HEU,
so the worth of this effort is difficult to gauge.
The plutonium disposition program is an example of
misplaced priorities. It would be far more productive for the
United States to spend its diplomatic capital and taxpayer
funds on converting plutonium pits into plutonium “pucks”
(unclassified shapes) and putting the plutonium pucks
under international safeguards, certainly more productive
than trying to fund and construct a Russian MOX fuel
fabrication plant. The proposed MOX plant will not even
keep up with the current rate at which Russia is separating
new plutonium from dual-purpose plutonium production
reactors and from commercial power reactors. Moreover,
Russia has so few VVER-1000 reactors, it cannot convert
more than a few metric tons of plutonium into spent fuel
annually, even if a MOX fabrication plant were built in
Russia. Finally, a Russian MOX program will likely
increase proliferation risks in the long run.
The Plutonium Production Reactor Core Conversion
program has been stymied by the failure of Russia and the
United States to reach agreement on what the end point of
the conversion effort should be—use of LEU or HEU fuel, or
replacement of the three reactors. The proposal to convert
the reactor to HEU fuel is ill-conceived in that the
proliferation risks associated with the HEU fresh fuel are no
less than the risks associated with the separated
plutonium.
Alternative Employment Opportunities for Nuclear
Workers.
The principal ongoing efforts here are as follows:

110

• International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC). This is an intergovernmental organization
established in 1992 by agreement between the European
Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United
States. Headquartered in Moscow, ISTC provides weapons
scientists from CIS countries with opportunities for
redirecting their scientific talents to peaceful science. In
1999 there were 201 projects covering 17,815 participants
funded at $42.6 million, with the United States contributing
$13.2 million. The participants worked an average of 63
days on the ISTC funded projects, so the participation was
more like 4,800 full-time equivalents. The ISTC paid the
17,815 project participants $22.6 million in grant money,
which works out to an average salary of about $4,700 per
year ($20 per day).
• Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (or IPP,
formerly called the Industrial Partnering Program).
This is a program to facilitate and promote employment and
economic development opportunities for displaced nuclear
weapon scientists and engineers. Efforts focus on
cooperative projects involving DOE laboratories and
research institutes in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus. Every dollar the U.S. Government provides for a
project is matched by industry. The federal contribution is
funded by DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration
(FY2001, $24.1 million; FY2002, $22.1 million);
•

Nuclear Cities Initiatives (NCI). This is a program
of cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
(Minatom), commercial entities, and local and state
governments to create civilian ventures in one of the ten
closed nuclear cities. Funded by DOE/National Nuclear
Security Administration (FY2001, $26.6 million; FY2002,
$6.6 million).
While these three initiatives have not prevented senior
Minatom and Russian Institute officials from providing
nuclear weapon related assistance to Iran, they are
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nevertheless useful and cost effective. This is particularly
the case with respect to the ISTC and IPP programs. The
NCI initiative is too new to have established a track record,
but it will likely suffer from the facts that (1) DOE and the
national laboratories have very limited expertise in
commerce, and therefore will have difficulty in identifying
potential commercial markets; and (2) the business must be
successful, particularly in Russia. All three programs,
ISTC, IPP and NCI, have effective measures in place to
prevent the misallocation of funds, and all provide useful
transparency at institutes where funded research is
conducted. Looking beyond the next few years, there are
better ways to accomplish the objectives of these programs.
As an alternative, the United States should consider
financing a program that encourages early retirement of
Russian workers.
All three ongoing programs cited above require the
identification of a scientific project, or alternative
employment opportunity, before the Russian participant
can receive financial support. None provide an incentive for
Min atom or its wor ker s to shut d own enti r e
weapons-related facilities, e.g., a fuel reprocessing or
chemical separation plant. To provide such an incentive, the
United States should consider establishing a trust fund to
pay for the early retirement of Russian nuclear workers.
The workers at targeted facilities would take early
retirement and be permitted to pursue other nonweapons
employment. The trust would not be required to provide
alternative employment projects as a condition for shifting
from weapons work.
The ten closed cities1 that host most of the Russian
nuclear weapons program have a total population of about
one million people. The total number of weapons workers in
these cities in 2000 was some 60,000-67,000, a number that
is projected to drop by about 50 percent over the next 5 years
as Minatom downsizes its nuclear weapon work force.2 If the
32,000 person projected work force (or projected work force
reductions) were to be underwritten at the rate the ISTC
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paid project participants in 1999 ($4,700 per year), the total
cost would be $150 million per year. Comparatively, this
represents 2.8 percent of the FY2002 DOE Stockpile
Stewardship Program budget.
Funding Denuclearization.
In January 2001, a DOE-appointed nonproliferation
task force co-chaired by Lloyd Cutler and former Senator
Howard Baker, Jr., concluded that:
Current nonproliferation programs of the Department of
Energy, the Department of Defense, and related agencies have
achieved impressive results thus far, but their limited
mandate and funding fall short of what is required to fully
address the threat. . . . The current budget levels are
inadequate and the management of the U.S. government’s
involvement is too diffuse.

A private initiative called the Nonproliferation Trust,
Inc. (NPT) offers an alternative source of substantial
funding to augment U.S. Government-funded security
efforts. Since Western governments have demonstrated
they are unwilling to invest the necessary resources to
adequately address the security problems in Russia, NPT’s
goal is to step into the breach by augmenting government
funds with private capital associated with nuclear spent
fuel management.
The Non-Proliferation Trust is a Delaware corporation
whose purpose is to foster global nuclear nonproliferation
plus environmental and humanitarian initiatives. NPT
proposes to raise $15 billion by taking title to 10,000 metric
tons of foreign (non-U.S. and non-Russian) nuclear spent
fuel and storing it in Russia. The project would require
$3.45 billion to safely manage the spent fuel, an amount
which could cover purchasing spent fuel storage casks,
constructing and managing a dry cask storage facility, and
transporting the fuel. The project would allocate more than
75 percent of the revenues—the remaining $11.55
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billion—to nonproliferation, environmental, and
humanitarian causes in Russia.
Environmental Cleanup
Fissile Material Security
Geologic Repository Siting
and Construction
Spent Fuel Escrow/Repository
Alternative Jobs for Nuclear
Weapon Workers
Regional Economic Support
Humanitarian (pensioners and orphans)

$ 3.0 billion
1.5
1.8
0.5
2.0
0.5
2.25

Total : $11.55 billion
NPT currently plans to allocate the $11.55 billion as
follows:
To prevent the misuse of these funds, the monies would
be managed by three U.S.-based charitable trusts: the
Minatom Development Trust, the Russian Environmental
Trust, and the Russian Humanitarian Trust.
The NPT project is still in the conceptual stage. Much
work and additional negotiations are required to develop it
more fully. Moreover, the project cannot go forward unless
there is an agreement for cooperation on nuclear matters
between the United States and Russia.
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CHAPTER 6

DEMILITARIZING RUSSIAN WEAPONS
SCIENTISTS: THE CHALLENGE

Mark Kramer

The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to explore the
threat of strategic proliferation posed by former Soviet
scientists, engineers, and technicians who design, build,
and maintain weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and (2)
to consider whether large-scale immigration of such
workers to the United States over the next 10 to 15 years
could help diminish that threat.
The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first
reviews the size of the Russian nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons complexes and the approximate number
of scientists and engineers employed by each. The second
discusses the actual and potential brain drain from the
Russian scientific community and defense complex to
foreign countries after 1991. The third analyzes trends
regarding the entry of former Soviet scientists into the
United States in the 1990s. Whereas only a relatively small
number were admitted as immigrants, a larger, though still
not huge, number were allowed in for temporary work or
exchanges. The fourth briefly explains why U.S.
Governmental and private efforts to employ Russian WMD
scientists and engineers on civilian research projects within
Russia are likely to have only a negligible impact on the
longer-term threat of strategic proliferation. (In an
Appendix to this chapter, I have prepared a detailed
analysis supporting this conclusion.) The efficacy of these
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prog rams is li mi ted not by any i nher ent
shortcomings—though these have clearly played some
role—but rather by the sheer magnitude of the problem.
Even if the programs were perfectly designed and
implemented, their net contribution in all likelihood would
be meager.
The fifth shows why the private sector in Russia has not
been able to absorb more than a relatively small proportion
of former WMD personnel, a situation that is likely to
continue indefinitely unless much more drastic economic
changes take hold. The findings in this section reinforce the
conclusions of Matthew Partan in Chapter 7 of this book.
The sixth discusses the Russian government’s recent efforts
to curtail the brain drain from scientific research institutes
and defense enterprises, particularly the WMD complexes.
On one hand, the government has provided increased
funding for science and has taken other steps to improve the
conditions for research on nuclear weapons and other
military-related technologies as well as civilian scientific
projects. These measures have been designed to retain
existing personnel and to attract new talent, especially
younger scientists and engineers. On the other hand, the
government has sought to tighten laws and decrees that
severely restrict foreign travel by individuals who have had
access to “state secrets” and to restore Soviet-era curbs on
contacts between Russian and foreign scientists. Such
restrictions, though not yet fully implemented, will
inevitably hinder prospective attempts by Russian WMD
personnel to immigrate to the United States.
The concluding section of the chapter considers whether
the threat of strategic proliferation can be countered over
the long term by encouraging the immigration of thousands
of Russian WMD scientists and engineers to the West. A
solution of this sort would be highly desirable, but the
feasibility of it is open to serious doubt. Rather than
pursuing what would likely be a futile quest, the United
States would benefit most by promoting large-scale
exchange programs for Russian high school students. Such
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exchanges would be eminently feasible and would have a
positive long-term effect on the human dimension of the
strategic proliferation challenge.
For reasons of space, documentation for this chapter has
been omitted from the published version. An expanded and
fully documented version of the chapter is available from
the author upon request.
RUSSIAN WMD EXPERTS
This section discusses the size of the Russian nuclear
weapons complex and then does the same for Russia’s
chemical and biological weapons industries.
Nuclear Weapons Complex.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it left
behind an enormous infrastructure for the development,
design, and construction of nuclear weapons. The Soviet
Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry had overseen more
than 150 enterprises and 1.1 million employees. From the
1940s through 1991, the weapons complex produced a total
of more than 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium
and 150 metric tons of plutonium for use in some
55,000-60,000 nuclear warheads and bombs. The design
and construction of nuclear weapons had long centered
around ten “closed cities” (known in Russian as zakrytye
administrativno-territorial’nye obrazovaniya—closed
administrative-territorial entities) that were completely
off-limits to the public, geographically isolated (in most
cases), and omitted from public maps: Sarov (Arzamas-16),
Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70), Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65),
Seversk (Tomsk-7), Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26),
Nov ou ralsk
(Sver d l ovs k- 44) ,
Zel enogor s k
(Krasnoyarsk-45), Lesnoi (Sverdlovsk-45), Trekhgornyi
(Zlatoust-36), and Zarechnyi (Penza-19). Different areas of
defense-related research were explored at the ten cities,
which employed a total work force of some 750,000. Roughly
150,000 to 160,000 of these workers were involved in the
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design, manufacture, and testing of nuclear explosives.
Sarov and Snezhinsk were the sites of the main weapons
design bureaus, and Sarov also contained the Avangard
weapons assembly plant. Other key weapons assembly
facilities were located in Lesnoi, Trekhgornyi, and
Zarechnyi. The remaining closed cities were responsible for
producing weapons components and fissile material.
The Russian nuclear weapons complex continued to
function at a robust level after 1991, despite a sharp
reduction in the operating budget of the Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy (Minatom). As of early 2001, the nuclear
weapons research institutes and manufacturing facilities
still employed 125,000 to 130,000 people, a work force only
slightly smaller than during the Communist period. Of
these, at least 75,000 were working full-time on weapons
design, production, and testing, and the remainder were
responsible for support and administrative tasks. Even
though precipitous cuts were made in the procurement of
Russia’s conventional military hardware (85-90 percent),
the nuclear weapons industry was accorded a relatively
privileged status. The continued presence of many
thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons specialists in
the ten closed cities impeded Minatom’s faltering attempts
to restructure and scale back the nuclear complex. The
ministry reported in the summer of 1999 that some 30,000
to 50,000 excess employees could not find alternative jobs if
they were laid off. Although Minatom has claimed that it
wants to reduce its current work force by almost two-thirds
as of 2004, there is as yet little reason to believe that tens of
thousands of excess employees will simply be laid off.
Overall, then, the nuclear weapons complex has
experienced less disruption than one might have expected.
The two key nuclear weapons design centers—the
Scientific-Research Institute of Experimental Physics
(VNIIEF) at Sarov and the Scientific-Research Institute of
Technical Physics (VNIITF) at Snezhinsk—have
maintained large staffs of scientists, engineers, and
technicians. According to official figures, VNIIEF as of 1999
118

still employed as many as 24,000 people, while VNIITF still
employed 11,000, nearly the same number who worked
there during the 1980s. (The institutes were formally
designated “federal nuclear centers” in 1995.)
The relatively modest personnel cuts in the former
Soviet nuclear weapons complex have failed to mirror the
huge reductions in the conventional forces and defense
industries of Russia and other former Soviet republics. In
that sense, as both private and governmental organizations
in the West have stressed, Russia has been notably
reluctant to scale back its nuclear weapons industry from
the Cold War period. Scientists in the Russian nuclear
weapons complex continue to refine existing weapons and
components and to conduct research on new technologies for
future weapons.
The precise number of nuclear weapons employees in
Russia who possess specialized knowledge of critical
weapons designs or technologies is unknown, but the most
reliable evidence suggests that some 2,000 to 4,000 senior
nuclear scientists and engineers have been directly involved
in bomb design, production, and disassembly, and another
10,000 to 15,000 senior experts have been performing vital
ancillary functions connected with nuclear weapons
production. In January 1992 then director of the Russian
nuclear weapons program Viktor Mikhailov declared that
2,000 to 3,000 of the roughly 15,000 senior nuclear weapons
scientists in Russia were engaged in activities “of
paramou n t impor tanc e i nvol vi ng s op hi sti c ated
technologies.” He repeated these statistics in numerous
other interviews over the next several years. The same
figures were cited in mid-1996 by Vladislav Mokhov, a
senior official at the Sarov federal nuclear center. Estimates
by the U.S. Department of Energy (which oversees contacts
with the former Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories) and
other U.S. Government agencies are very similar to
Mikhailov’s and Mokhov’s figures. A classified National
Intelligence Estimate prepared by the U.S. intelligence
community in the early 1990s indicated that around 2,000
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senior specialists throughout the former Soviet Union
possess “intimate knowledge of nuclear weapons design.”
Likewise, a report issued by the U.S. Congressional Budget
Office in mid-1999 noted that, although 20,000 senior
“nuclear scientists and workers” in Russia pose
“proliferation risks,” only a relatively small fraction of these
(perhaps 15 to 20 percent) are involved in the most sensitive
work.
These various estimates confirm that the number of
senior nuclear weapons experts possessing truly sensitive
information is a much smaller subset of the total population
of scientists and engineers in the former Soviet nuclear
weapons complex. The number of employees who pose a
significant, but less acute, secondary threat is considerably
larger, but still meager in comparison with the size of the
post-Soviet defense complex, which employs at least a few
million workers. Hence, the number of Russian nuclear
weapons experts who could be recruited by Third World
countries for help on a fledgling weapons program is far
smaller than some Western observers had originally feared.
At the same time, the pool of senior weapons scientists is
large enough to keep Russia’s nuclear complex operating
indefinitely, provided that adequate resources are
available.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes.
The Soviet Union amassed a stockpile of 40,000 metric
tons of chemical munitions, the largest in the world. These
weapons were developed and manufactured at 24 separate
facilities, including key production centers in Dzerzhinsk,
Novocheboksarsk, Slavgorod, Volgograd, and Zaporozh’e.
At the end of 1991, Russia inherited these facilities along
with thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians
employed by the Soviet chemical weapons complex. A study
released in September 2000 by Republicans in the U.S.
House of Representatives claimed that “tens of thousands of
scientists and technicians” were working in Russian
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chemical weapons facilities, but this estimate seems too
high. Although the precise number is not known, most
ev iden ce
su g g ests
that
s ever al
thous and
scientists—perhaps ten thousand in total—are still
working in Russia’s chemical weapons complex. This figure
is very large by world standards, but it is much smaller than
the number of scientists and technicians employed in the
Russian nuclear and biological weapons complexes.
The Soviet biological weapons program, code-named
Enzyme, was shrouded in secrecy from the time it was
launched in 1973. The Soviet Politburo, headed by Leonid
Brezhnev, issued a highly classified decree establishing
Biopreparat, a state pharmaceutical agency, which oversaw
the development of weapons using germs and viral agents.
The program continued to function (albeit at a reduced
capacity) after the Soviet Union collapsed, contrary to
initial assurances that it would be closed. Russian research
on biological weapons has been conducted at massive
facilities both close to and far from large urban centers.
Among the institutes responsible for the development of
weapons based on natural and genetically engineered
strains of bacteria and viruses are the State Research
Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VEKTOR) in
Koltsovo, the State Research Center for Applied
Microbiology at Obolensk, the State Research Center for
Toxicology and Hygienic Regulation of Biopreparations in
Serpukhov, and the Institute of Molecular Biology in
Moscow.
At their height, the Soviet chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) programs collectively employed over
70,000 scientists and technicians. In the early 1990s, after
the Russian government made limited cuts in the program,
the CBW complex continued to employ over 60,000 people,
though only about one-third of these possessed truly
sensitive knowledge. By the mid- to-late 1990s, after more of
the Soviet WMD infrastructure had been dismantled, up to
10,000 CBW scientists still posed a proliferation threat
according to a detailed study by Glenn Schweitzer of the
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National Academy of Sciences. Schweitzer’s estimate is
compatible with figures provided in an April 2000 report by
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which notes that
5,000 senior CBW scientists in Russia could pose
“significant proliferation risks,” and that an additional
10,000 Russian workers possess skills relevant for weapons
development and production. Similar data can be found in a
recent report by Amy Smithson of the Henry L. Stimson
Center, who argues that 7,000 biological weapons scientists
and another 3,500 chemical weapons experts in Russia pose
a “high-risk proliferation concern.”
These figures for the Russian CBW industries, combined
with the estimates for Russia’s nuclear weapons complex,
give an idea of the potential for strategic proliferation. The
figures bear out estimates made in 1998 that at least 15,000
senior scientists and engineers in Russia are directly
involved in “production, delivery systems, and other aspects
of weapons of mass destruction,” beyond the 2,000-3,000
nuclear weapons design specialists who pose the greatest
threat of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, as Schweitzer’s
study shows, if other tasks of clear “proliferation concern”
are taken into account, the total number of Russian
scientists and engineers with valuable WMD expertise is
three to four times larger than the core 15,000-18,000.
Schweitzer maintains that a total of around 60,000 former
Soviet aerospace, nuclear, and chemical/biological weapons
specialists “developed and designed weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems”—thereby posing
the greatest threat of proliferation—from 1992 to 1996. This
figure, he argues, is largely unchanged today.
Identical estimates can be found in two recent GAO
reports and in the latest annual report from the Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), a program sponsored by
the U.S. Department of Energy that seeks to provide
employment for former Soviet WMD experts. The first of the
two GAO reports notes that roughly 60,000 of the one
million scientists, engineers, and technicians at Russia’s
4,000 scientific research institutes can be regarded as
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high-level WMD personnel, a figure that is also cited (with
breakdowns by WMD category) in the IPP document. The
other GAO report, released in May 2001, cites a range of
estimates by U.S. officials in Russia who believe that Soviet
WMD programs as of 1991 were crucially dependent on as
many as 75,000 highly-trained scientists and engineers,
most of whom continue to serve in those posts.
Thus, although the risk of WMD proliferation in the
former Soviet Union depends on the definitions used, it is
safe to conclude that the greatest danger is posed by some
60,000 to 75,000 specially trained scientists, engineers, and
technicians, nearly all of whom now reside and work in
Russia. Even if the upper end of this range is used, Western
countries could potentially absorb 75,000 experts and their
families without extreme difficulty. The emigration of these
personnel from Russia will be limited not by the West’s
absorptive capacity, but by obstacles within Russia itself.
RUSSIA’S SCIENTIFIC BRAIN DRAIN
The civilian side of Russian science and technology was
hit hard by the economic and political turmoil that engulfed
the former Soviet Union from the late 1980s through the
mid-1990s. Spending on science programs dropped by
nearly 45 percent in real terms during the final 2 years of
the Soviet regime, and it continued sharply downward in
1992. Soaring inflation, large budget deficits, and persistent
shortages of funding at scientific research institutes led to
sharp declines in researchers’ salaries (after adjusting for
inflation), delays in wage payments, poor upkeep of
facilities, and increasing obsolescence of laboratory
equipment.
The severity of financial constraints and the
deterioration of research facilities prompted a growing
number of scientists in Russia to pursue opportunities
outside their institutes, either at home (particularly in the
newly emerging private sector) or abroad (at universities,
resea rch cen ters, and p r i vate c omp ani es) . Thi s
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development was not entirely unprecedented. Although
Soviet citizens normally were forbidden to travel abroad
(except to the Communist countries of Eastern Europe), the
USSR experienced a scientific brain drain in the 1970s
when a significant number of Jewish and Armenian
scientists were allowed to emigrate. This earlier brain
drain, however, was greatly eclipsed by the exodus that
began at the end of the Soviet era, when most of the
restrictions on foreign travel were lifted. Russia’s brain
drain in the 1990s was both external (with the departure of
scientists to overseas jobs) and internal (as scientists
abandoned their research and shifted into other sectors of
the economy). The depletion of scientific talent was
especially acute during the first 2 years after the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
Data on the post-Soviet brain drain are often unreliable,
but the scale and basic patterns of the phenomenon can be
gauged reasonably accurately from a number of recent
reports and surveys. All of these studies suggest that the
scientists who moved abroad during the last few years of the
Soviet regime included a disproportionate number of Jews,
ethnic Germans, and Armenians. Many of the scientists
were prominent researchers, and some were leaders in their
fields. Nearly three-quarters of those who left during this
initial wave continued their scientific research abroad at
either universities or research institutes. The large
majority (at least 80 percent) of the departing scientists
went to either Israel or Germany, though a significant
number subsequently moved to the United States. The
initial wave of migration accelerated in 1990, when nearly
800 scientists and 8,000 engineers from the Soviet Union
(many of whom had moved abroad in earlier years) came to
the United States. Another 2,200 scientists left the Soviet
Union in 1991. It is important to note, however, that only a
relatively small proportion of these scientists—no more
than 15 to 20 percent—applied for permanent residence
abroad. Most of those who left Russia at this point were
intending to return.
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The exodus of Russian scientists increased after the
Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. In May 1992, as
public concern about the external brain drain mounted,
Russian president Boris Yeltsin issued a decree authorizing
“emergency measures to preserve the scientific and
technological potential of the Russian Federation.” This
decree proved largely ineffective, however. The measures
proposed by Yeltsin, including tax breaks for key research
institutes and competitive funding for scientific research
grants, were hardly enough to offset the impact of the
country’s deepening economic problems. In both 1992 and
1993, roughly 3,000 Russian scientists went abroad for
extended periods, particularly to Germany, Israel, and the
United States. Physicists and mathematicians made up the
bulk of the outflow, and biologists and chemists accounted
for most of the rest. Fewer than half of the scientists who
moved to foreign countries during these years continued to
pursue scientific research, opting instead for more lucrative
alternatives. Although only a small proportion (around 8 to
10 percent) of the scientists who went abroad in the early
1990s intended to stay away permanently, the overseas
exodus from the civilian scientific institutes exacted a
significant toll. The problem was not so much the
magnitude of the external brain drain as the quality of those
who left. The emigrants included some of the most gifted
scientists, particularly those of the younger generation:
In purely quantitative terms, the scientists who moved
permanently abroad did not constitute a significant outflow.
But those who left included a disproportionate number of
talented, experienced, and highly trained young scientific
workers. . . . The emigration of scientists and talented young
researchers weakened the scientific potential of Russia and
threatened to result in the country’s loss of entire scientific
fields and schools, which were forced to “survive” with only a
narrow group of highly qualified scientific elites.

Even more worrisome from the Russian government’s
perspective was the internal brain drain. Thousands of
scientists moved into other sectors of the economy,
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especially private business. A recent study suggests that
the internal brain drain in 1992-1993 was at least five (and
perhaps ten) times greater than the external drain,
especially among younger scientists. A senior official in the
Russian Academy of Sciences, Aleksandr Andreev, claimed
in 1992 that 40 percent of Russia’s research physicists had
left the Academy’s institutes and research centers.
Although other sources indicate that Andreev’s figures are
too high, there is little doubt that a significant proportion of
the Russian physics community was depleted by the
internal and external brain drain.
Ominous though these trends were, they did gradually
abate. Some of the most talented Russian scientists, who
had received numerous offers from abroad, expressed their
determination to stay in Russia to uphold and strengthen
the country’s scientific traditions. A typical case was
Academician Aleksei Khokhlov, a distinguished physicist
specializing in nonlinear optics, who committed himself to
preserving the physics community in Russia:
On numerous occasions, [foreign universities] have proposed
that I move to the West. Although I value these offers, I realize
that I would not be able to live there. I want to develop science
here in Russia and to make a contribution to my own country.
This is where my roots are, and I cannot imagine myself living
outside Russia.

By the late 1990s, the external brain drain had sharply
diminished. Specialists in microbiology, genetics, and
computer science were still leaving the country, but far
fewer mathematicians, physicists, and chemists were
departing.
Recent data suggest that the annual number of Russian
scientists and engineers from civilian institutes who went
abroad for extended periods dropped from around 3,000 in
the early 1990s to roughly 1,000 in later years, a trend that
has been welcomed by the Russian government. In a
statement to the Russian Duma in November 1999, the
Russian minister of science and technology, Mikhail
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Kirpichnikov, hailed the decrease in annual emigration. He
stressed that only 1.6 percent of the scientists who had quit
or been dismissed from their jobs in Russia were abroad at
that time. Although the rate of departures to foreign
countries rose in 1999 to 1,400 compared to an average of
1,000 in 1994-1998, this was a one-time increase sparked
mainly by the financial crisis of August 1998. (Moreover,
even though the number of scientists who moved abroad in
1999 was greater than in 1998, the exodus was well below
the levels of emigration in the early 1990s.)
The internal brain drain also slowed markedly by the
late 1990s. Most of the scientists who decided to leave their
institutes for other pursuits did so in the early 1990s, and
the ones who stayed were much less inclined to look for work
outside the Academy. The gradual settlement of wage
arrears for Academy employees in 1999-2001, and the
increased funding for science programs from 1999 on,
further reduced the likelihood that Russian scientists would
consider giving up their institute positions. The number of
scientific researchers in Russia rose in 1999 for the first
time since the mid-1980s, and the trend continued upward
in 2000 and 2001. Moreover, the number of graduate
students enrolling in physics, mathematics, astronomy,
chemistry, geology, and biology at Russian universities rose
steadily in the 1990s, offering hope that an abundance of
younger scientists would be available to fill posts at
research institutes and universities in coming decades.
Reverberations within the WMD Complexes.
The upheavals of the late 1980s and 1990s took their
greatest toll on Russia’s civilian scientific institutes and
non-nuclear defense plants, but the WMD complexes were
not wholly immune either. During the Communist era, the
living standards of nuclear weapons scientists were much
higher than those of the average Soviet citizen. The
privileged status of the closed cities continued for a while
after the demise of the Soviet Union, but it gradually
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eroded. By mid-1994, the combined impact of ravaging
inflation and budgetary constraints was being felt
throughout the nuclear arms complex. In an interview in
September 1994, the director of the Avangard weapons
assembly facility in Sarov, Yurii Zavalishin, condemned the
Russian ministry of defense and ministry of finance for
“failing to turn over a huge amount of money they owe us.”
He said that his plant was “perhaps the only enterprise in
the [nuclear weapons] sector that is still able to pay wages
on a regular basis.” The highly publicized suicide of the
director of the VNIITF design center in Snezhinsk, Vladimir
Nechai, in October 1996 provided only the most vivid
confirmation of the hardships that arose at many weapons
facilities. In at least two cases, employees of the nuclear
weapons complex went on strike to demand the payment of
back wages. Scientists at CBW plants encountered similar
problems.
It is not surprising, then, that some of the WMD
specialists began to look for work outside their institutes or
even to think about moving overseas. Although very few
residents of the closed cities had any foreign contacts or
knew how to pursue opportunities abroad, surveys
conducted in mid-1992 revealed that 46 percent of the
scientists, engineers, and managers at nuclear weapons
facilities were interested in seeking positions outside
Russia. Among aerospace and missile experts, the level of
interest in working overseas was even greater, roughly 62
percent. Comparable surveys are not available for BW or
CW specialists, but it is safe to assume that they were at
least as interested as the nuclear weapons scientists in
going abroad. Although only a small number of the nuclear
weapons specialists (an average of 1 percent a year in the
1990s) actually ended up taking jobs abroad, the outflow of
these personnel in the first half of the 1990s provoked
anxiety in both Russia and the West.
Whether this anxiety was fully warranted is unclear. On
one hand, the surveys in 1992 revealed that the best and
most experienced nuclear weapons specialists were not
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interested in working abroad. Although the situation was
quite different in the aerospace and missile sector where
some of the most capable experts were interested in going
overseas, the lack of interest among leading nuclear
weapons scientists was conducive to nonproliferation
efforts. On the other hand, if even a few of the key Russian
weapons scientists had moved to high-risk countries like
North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, the impact on nonproliferation
goals would have been grave. Scattered reports in the
Russian press and some Western newspapers about the
supposed presence of former Soviet WMD scientists and
engineers in a variety of Third World states—Algeria,
Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Paraguay, South
Korea, Syria, and Venezuela—have never been verified by
any credible evidence. Although a report published by The
Russia Journal in April 1999 claimed that around 2,000
Russian weapons specialists were working in China, these
presumably were not WMD scientists but simply advisers
and technicians who were temporarily based in China to
facilitate Russia’s ongoing transfers of advanced
conventional armaments and military production
technology.
Even though reports about Russian weapons scientists
in Third World countries must be treated with great caution
and skepticism, one cannot entirely dismiss the possibility
that some departures to rogue states or the enlistment of
scientists by international terrorist organizations will
eventually occur. As discussed below, if projected
improvements in the working conditions for most scientists
in Russia are not sustained, the pool of scientific
researchers and technicians who are willing to emigrate
from the closed cities and other regions may grow. A
Russian expert on the brain drain estimated in 1997 that as
many as 8,000 scientists with experience in nuclear
technology and fissile materials were prepared to leave to
work abroad. This figure may not include any high-level
weapons scientists, but it is conceivable that at least a few of
these individuals possess expertise that would be helpful to
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a fledgling nuclear weapons program. Some countries of
great concern to the West have reportedly tendered offers to
Russian chemists and biologists as well as to nuclear
physicists. A front-page article in The New York Times in
December 1998 claimed that Iranian officials were
attempting to enlist Russian scientists for germ warfare
projects by offering salaries of up to $5,000 a month. Despite
persistent reports of such offers and despite the well-known
Russian-Iranian cooperation on the Bushehr nuclear power
plant, no hard evidence has yet emerged that any Russian
scientists have defected to Iran specifically to work on WMD
programs. Even so, the reported magnitude of these offers is
disconcerting in light of the fact that some scientists were
earning monthly salaries less than one-hundredth that
amount as late as 1996.
Nevertheless, the impact of the funding problems must
be kept in perspective. Since the late 1990s, many of the
problems have been rectified. The pay for nuclear weapons
scientists and engineers was sharply increased in both 1999
and 2000, as discussed below. Moreover, even when funding
shortfalls were especially severe in the mid-1990s, the rate
of emigration actually began falling, not increasing. The
importance of this trend was underscored by a survey of
hundreds of Russian nuclear weapons specialists and
ballistic missile scientists in 1999, which revealed that their
desire to emigrate had decreased sharply since the early
1990s. The results of the survey are presented in a study
published in 2001 by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. The study indicates that the rate of
emigration from the ten closed cities increased from 1991 to
1996 and then began steadily dropping. Although an
average of about 1 percent of the total pool of surveyed
experts went to work abroad each year in the 1990s, the
large majority of the departures occurred in the first half of
the decade. In 1992, 46 percent of those interviewed at
nuclear weapons facilities expressed a desire to work
abroad, whereas only 9 percent expressed the same interest
in 1999—a fivefold decline. The surveys revealed the same
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pattern at the ballistic missile facilities. Whereas 72
percent of respondents at ballistic missile plants in 1992
said they wanted to work abroad, only 25 percent expressed
that view in 1999.
The survey also showed that even among the weapons
experts who were still hoping to work abroad, very few were
actively taking steps toward that end. Only one-third of the
relatively small number of nuclear weapons specialists who
were willing to work abroad said they were actively looking
for foreign employment. Among missile experts who wanted
to work abroad, only one-fifth were searching for
employment. It is interesting to note, however, that some 21
percent of nuclear specialists and 42 percent of missile
specialists approved of or envied those who left Russia,
whereas only 16 percent of nuclear specialists and an equal
percentage of missile specialists held negative views of
emigrants. (About 60 percent of nuclear specialists and 42
percent of missile specialists claimed that their views were
neutral.) These statistics suggest that a considerable
minority of the researchers who have chosen to stay in
Russia’s closed cities might eventually think about seeking
work abroad. This would be likely especially if economic
conditions in the closed cities (and in Russia as a whole)
were once again to deteriorate. One of the key findings of the
survey is that 85 percent of respondents who wanted to
work abroad cited economic motivations. Only 15 percent of
the prospective emigrants indicated that they had purely
professional reasons for leaving.
One other key finding of the survey is that the actual
pattern of emigration by nuclear and missile specialists in
the 1990s was very similar to that of the larger scientific
community (as described above). Most of the weapons
specialists who applied for permanent residence when they
moved abroad went to Israel, Germany, or the United
States. For those who were still in Russia but were hoping to
work abroad, the most popular intended destination was
Western Europe (listed in 45 percent of definitive replies),
followed by North America (28 percent) and the Middle East
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(10 percent), principally Israel. Missile specialists who
wanted to go abroad were most interested in seeking work
in Western Europe (79 percent), North America (63
percent), and Israel (9 percent). The countries most
frequently rejected by nuclear weapons specialists as
potential destinations were Iraq (59 percent), Pakistan (42
percent), Libya (33 percent), Iran (24 percent), North Korea
(16 percent), Israel (16 percent), India (13 percent), and
China (11 percent). Missile specialists who wanted to work
abroad were much less inclined to rule out any countries as
potential destinations, but 18 percent did not want to work
in Israel, 17 percent rejected China, 16 percent rejected
Pakistan, and 11 percent ruled out Iran.
These data suggest that, if there were a resurgence of
interest in emigration among Russian weapons scientists,
Western countries would have little to fear from it. Even the
very small number of Russian experts who might be willing
to work for hostile Third World regimes could undoubtedly
be induced to move to the West instead.
LIMITED EFFORTS TO ADMIT RUSSIAN
SCIENTISTS INTO THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. Government’s primary emphasis has been on
keeping former Soviet WMD scientists gainfully employed
in their own countries, rather than encouraging them to
move permanently to the West. The United States did,
however, take in a substantial number of civilian scientists
and technicians from Russia in the 1990s, perhaps as many
as 7,000, most of whom emigrated shortly after the demise
of the Eastern bloc. Other countries also received sizable
numbers of Russian scientific experts. The three that
absorbed the most in the early 1990s were Israel, Germany,
and Greece. According to Schweitzer, roughly 2,000 of the
5,000 “scientific emigrants” from Russia to the West in
1991-1994 were “active researchers.” It is unclear, however,
how many of these emigrants were involved in WMD
research or other defense-related projects.
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Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical
Yearbook, Washington, DC, annual editions, 1991 to 1999. Official data
for FY2000 have not yet been tabulated.
na = not applicable.
* Figures are tabulated by country of birth.
** Of the five categories of employment-based preferences for
immigation to the United States, two are relevant to the topic of this
chapter. “Priority workers” fall into the first employment-based
category, known as EB-1 (first preference). EB-1 visas are for “persons
of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or
athletics, outstanding professors and researchers, and certain
multinational executives and managers.” NB: The figures reported here
for FY 1992 through FY 1996 are for the whole of the former Soviet
Union (SU), not just for Russia. Unfortunately, the INS did not start
reporting separate data for EB-1 emigrants from Russia and Ukraine
until FY 1997.
*** This rubric designates the second of the five categories of
employment-based preferences for immigration, a category known as
EB-2 (second preference). EB-2 visas are for “professionals holding
advanced degrees and persons of exceptional ability in the sciences,
arts, and business.” The INS must determine that the “exceptional
ability” of an EB-2 immigrant will “substantially benefit the national
economy, cultural, or educational interests or welfare of the United
States.” NB: The figures reported here for FY 1992 through FY 1996 are
for the whole of the former SU, not just for Russia. Unfortunately, the
INS did not start reporting separate data for EB-2 immigrants from
Russia and Ukraine until FY 1997.
§
Figures for FY 1991 were reported only for the SU as a whole.
§§
In FY 1991 there was only one employment-based preference for
immigrant admissions, a preference granted to “professionals and
highly skilled workers.” A total of 32 individuals from the SU were
admitted within this category in FY 1991. The five-tiered system of

Table 1. Immigrant Admissions to the United States
from Russia and the Ukraine, 1991-99.
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Source: Data for FY1991 to FY1999 are from U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook, Washington, DC, annual
editions, 1991 to 1999. Data for FY 2000 were provided by INS and U.S.
Justice Department officials.
na = not applicable.
* Only aggregate figures for all former Soviet nonimmigrants are
available for the period FY 1991-93. The subsequent figures for Russia
and Ukraine are tabulated by country of citizenship.
** O-1 visas are for temporary visits by aliens who have displayed
“extraordinary ability in the sciences, education, business, or athletics.”
Several criteria must be met before an O-1 visa is granted. The INS
requires, among other things, “a written advisory opinion from a peer
group [or] a person designated by the group with expertise in the alien’s
area of ability,” “a copy of any written contract between the employer
and the alien,” “evidence that the alien has received a major,
internationally-recognized award, such as a Nobel Prize,” and evidence
of other extraordinary ability, possibly including membership in a
professional organization based on outstanding achievement,
“published material in professional or major trade publications,
newspapers, or other major media about the alien and his work in the
field,” “original scientific, scholarly, or business-related contributions of
major significance in the field,” “authorship of scholarly articles in
professional journals or other major media in the field,” and a record of
compensation and employment responsibilities commensurate with
those of extremely gifted and accomplished individuals.
*** H-1B visas are given to “aliens coming temporarily to perform
services in a specialty occupation, or as a fashion model of distinguished
merit and ability.” H-1B visas are divided into three categories: H-1B1,
H-1B2, and H-1B3. The large majority of H-1B visas for individuals
from Russia and Ukraine are H-1B1 visas, which apply to “an alien
coming temporarily to perform services in a specialty occupation.” A
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“specialty occupation” is defined as one involving “the theoretical and
practical application of highly specialized knowledge requiring
completion of a specific course of higher education.” Only a relatively
small number of Russians and Ukrainians qualify for H-1B2 visas (for
aliens “coming temporarily to perform services of an exceptional nature
relating to a cooperative research and development project
administered by the Department of Defense”) and H-1B3 visas (for
fashion models of distinguished merit). H-1B holders are permitted to
work in the United States for an initial period of 3 years, which, at the
employer’s request, can be renewed for a further three years.
§
J-1 visas are used for “educational and cultural exchange
programs” in “the fields of education, arts, and sciences. Participants
include students at all academic levels; trainees obtaining on-the-job
training with firms, institutions, and agencies; teachers of primary,
secondary, and specialized schools; professors coming to teach or do
research at institutions of higher learning; research scholars;
professional trainees in the allied and medical fields; and international
visitors coming for training, sharing, or demonstrating specialized
knowledge or skills.”
§§
No figure for O-1 visas is given here for FY1991 because the
category did not begin until FY1992. The figure given here for H-1B
visas in FY1991 actually refers to H-1 visas. Figures for H1-B visas
begin with FY1992.
§§§
The INS Statistical Yearbook for 1997 reports that “no reliable
data are available for 1997” for nonimmigrant admissions (p. 111). The
INS website (http://www.ins.gov) erroneously presents FY 1996 data as
the figures for FY1997.

Table 2. Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United
States from Russia and Ukraine, 1991-2000.
The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
does not regularly provide disaggregated statistics on the
number of foreign scientists and engineers who move to the
United States, but several of the categories used by the INS
for immigrant and nonimmigrant admissions give an
indication of trends in the entry of scientists from Russia
and Ukraine. Tables 1 and 2 contain annual data for
immigrant and nonimmigrant admissions, respectively,
from both Russia and Ukraine. The trends for the two
countries are essentially identical. The number of
immigrants in relevant categories rose sharply each year
from 1991 to 1995, but declined just as precipitously from
1996 through 1999 (the most recent year for which data are
available). Assuming that scientists made up a relatively
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stable percentage of the numbers in each category, the trend
depicted here tallies very well with the data presented
above on the brain drain from the former Soviet Union.
When the brain drain was increasing, the number of
scientists admitted as immigrants into the United States
also increased; and when the exodus of scientists from
Russia and Ukraine diminished, the volume of immigrant
admissions declined.
Even when the brain drain from Russia and Ukraine
was at its height, the number of former Soviet scientists who
moved permanently to the United States was not especially
large. Data compiled unofficially by the U.S. National
Science Foundation (NSF) indicate that 426 Russian
scientists and engineers received immigrant visas to the
United States in FY1993, and another 512 received such
visas in FY1994, an increase of roughly 25 percent. The
number of Russian scientists and engineers who
immigrated to the United States rose again in FY1995 but
then declined sharply in FY1996, FY1997, and FY1998 (the
latest year for which data are available). The difference
between the early 1990s and the late 1990s was striking.
Whereas more than 450 scientists and engineers a year
were emigrating from Russia to the United States in
FY1994 and FY1995, the number emigrating from the
whole of the former Soviet Union fell to under 200 annually
by the late 1990s.
The INS data for nonimmigrant admissions, shown in
Table 2, reveal a pattern quite different from that of
immigrant admissions. The number of Russian and
Ukrainian citizens entering the United States in the late
1990s for temporary work and exchanges, including
science-related programs, remained considerably higher
than it was earlier in the decade. In the two most relevant
categories—O-1 and H-1B admissions—the trend after
1993 was steadily upward, with the one exception of O-1
visas in 1996. In a third, somewhat more diffuse visa
category—for J-1 admissions—the trend was sharply
upward in the early-to-mid 1990s and relatively stable
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thereafter. (Definitions of O-1, H-1B, and J-1 visas are
provided in the explanatory notes for Table 2.) The figures
for H-1B (temporary work) visas are especially useful in
highlighting the pattern of scientific entrants from the
former Soviet Union. Statistics compiled by the INS show
that roughly three-quarters of H-1Bs in 1998-2000 went to
scientists and engineers, predominantly those under 35
years of age. Computer experts, in particular, accounted for
55-60 percent of all H-1B recipients during this period.
Although Russia ranked far behind India and China—the
world’s two most populous countries—in the number of its
citizens who received H-1Bs, the surge of Russian visa
holders after 1993 elevated Russia to tenth place overall,
well ahead of countries like Brazil and Indonesia, whose
populations are of comparable size.
In short, the trends depicted in Tables 1 and 2 confirm
that even though only a relatively small and dwindling
number of scientists and engineers from the former Soviet
Union immigrated to the United States in the 1990s, a
substantial and growing number were admitted for
temporary research positions and scientific exchanges.
The U.S. emphasis on temporary rather than immigrant
admissions for former Soviet scientists has been driven
partly by the demand side, that is, the number of Russians
and Ukrainians applying for visas each year. As the number
seeking to immigrate to the United States has fallen, it is
not surprising that the quantity of immigrant visas
awarded has dropped. By the same token, as the number of
H-1B petitions for Russians and Ukrainians has risen, the
number (though not necessarily the proportion) of visas
approved has grown.
The U.S. emphasis on temporary admissions for Russian
scientists has been reinforced by changes in U.S.
immigration law in 1990, 1998, and 2000, which set stricter
limits and fewer exemptions for employment-based
immigrant admissions and which expanded the number of
H-1B nonimmigrant admissions. Under changes adopted in
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October 2000, scientists who are admitted on H-1B visas to
work for universities or nonprofit research centers are
exempted altogether from the newly increased ceilings for
H-1Bs.
The emphasis on temporary rather than permanent
admissions has also been partly due to the limited capacity
of prospective employers to absorb foreign specialists. By
the mid-1990s, many U.S. companies had reached a
saturation point, especially for mathematicians, physicists,
and chemists, some of whom had not been as rigorously
trained as their American counterparts. Only in a few select
fields, such as computer programming and biotechnology,
did the demand for foreign specialists persist, and even then
it was only for those who had been properly trained.
One final factor that shaped U.S. admissions policy
vis-à-vis Russian scientists (especially weapons scientists)
was the sensitivity of the issue for the Russian authorities.
The potential for bilateral friction on this matter was
evident as early as October 1992, when the U.S. Congress
approved the Soviet Scientists Immigration Act (SSIA), a
bill that enabled up to 750 former Soviet WMD scientists, as
well as their spouses and dependents, to qualify for
permanent residence in the United States under an
employment-based preference (EB-2), even if they had not
received an actual offer of employment. The SSIA triggered
a harsh response in Russia, where legislators and political
officials depicted it as an ominous “attempt by the United
States to open the floodgates for Russian defense
scientists.” Russian officials complained both publicly and
privately about the U.S. law and called for it to be rescinded.
Commentators in the Russian press voiced deep suspicion
and nationalist recriminations against “hostile foreign
powers . . . seeking to deprive our homeland of its secrets.”
They claimed that the United States was “exploiting our
country’s immense scientific resources for its own
mischievous ends.” The resulting backlash was precisely
the type of thing that U.S. officials had hoped to avoid.
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The irony of the Russian complaints is that they were
based on a misreading (or willful distortion) of the U.S.
legislation. The SSIA was never intended to be more than a
one-time measure. It was certainly not the start of a
systematic effort to induce many thousands of former Soviet
WMD scientists to resettle permanently in the United
States. No one in Congress or the executive branch ever
contemplated offering immigration visas to tens of
thousands of Russian weapons experts. On the contrary,
some members of Congress—particularly those from
districts in which the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories
were located—had argued in early 1992 (when the SSIA was
first proposed) that the entry of even a small number of
former Soviet weapons scientists to work in the United
States would be undesirable:
At a time when America’s nuclear scientists are being laid off
by defense cuts because of the declining Soviet threat, the
United States Department of Energy is luring Soviet
scientists to work on nuclear fusion and space missile defense.
. . . We are now displacing our best and brightest American
scientists. What do the hundreds of American scientists at Los
Alamos, Sandia, Oak Ridge, and our other national
laboratories facing possible layoffs think of this practice? They
have been toiling against the Soviet bear for years. Because of
these scientists we won the cold war. What is their reward?
They may be fired and replaced by Russian scientists.

In part because of these complaints, congressional
sponsors of the SSIA repeatedly emphasized its limited
nature. When the House of Representatives took up the
legislation in the fall of 1992, the chief sponsor, Romano
Mazzoli, underscored the modest scope of the bill:
[The SSIA] waives a legal requirement, which is in the 1990
[immigration] law now, but waives it for only a 4-year period,
not permanently, and only for a total of 750 scientists. . . . [The
bill] raises no quotas nor ceilings on foreign workers. It only
opens the door slightly and somewhat facilitates for a limited
period of time and for a limited number of former Soviet
scientists their entry into the United States.
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Supporters of the SSIA also stressed that it was
“narrowly targeted to address a specific and highly unique
situation” and would be implemented “without cost to the
American taxpayer and without displacing anyone who has
been waiting to immigrate to the United States.” The
committee hearings and brief floor discussion left no doubt
that the legislation was designed to cover only a very small
percentage of Russian WMD scientists.
In practice, moreover, the SSIA turned out to be even
more limited than the sponsors had envisaged. The original
text of the bill had to be supplemented by interim rules
prepared by the INS in 1993 and 1995. After a lengthy
review process, the INS adopted a final rule in February
1997 that incorporated the 1995 changes. These
modifications, based on comments solicited by the INS,
clarified which categories of scientists and technicians from
the former Soviet Union were eligible to apply for
immigration visas under the SSIA. The initial draft rule had
defined eligible applicants as “scientist[s] or engineers . . .
who have expertise in chemical, biological, or other high
technology fields,” a broad description not limited to
weapons personnel. But the amended 1995 interim rule had
explicitly mentioned expertise in “a high-technology field
which is clearly applicable to the design, development, or
production of ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological,
chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass
destruction” as a qualifying criterion. The INS
subsequently narrowed the scope of the rule to exclude
scientists and engineers who were not directly engaged in
strategic weapons projects. This revision left out all
nondefense scientists and technicians whose work was
potentially applicable to WMD programs. The INS
preserved these changes and others in the final 1997 rule,
but the impact of the guidelines was largely negated by the
agency’s failure to extend the cutoff date for petition
approvals beyond the original deadline of October 24, 1996.
Thus, contrary to the complaints voiced by Russian officials,
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the SSIA proved to have only a minuscule effect at best on
the Russian WMD complexes.
Even though Russian commentators had misconstrued
(or deliberately misrepresented) the SSIA, their adverse
response to the legislation was bound to cast a pall over any
further such efforts. Subsequent programs undertaken by
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other U.S.
Government agencies were aimed mainly at providing
employment for former Soviet weapons scientists and
engineers within their native countries, rather than
encouraging them to immigrate to the West. Although
roughly 60 Russian “technical specialists for nuclear
reactors” were “semi-permanently” relocated to New Mexico
in 1995 for work on the Topaz Project (a project to adapt
compact nuclear power plants for space vehicle propulsion),
the transfers were limited in number and did not spawn a
mass exodus of scientific and engineering talent from
Russia or the other former Soviet republics.
U.S. EFFORTS TO EMPLOY WEAPONS
SCIENTISTS IN RUSSIA
To minimize the likelihood that Russian WMD scientists
and engineers would be enticed by lucrative offers from a
hostile Third World country, the United States has
launched several initiatives to provide worthwhile
employment for highly-trained experts who stay in Russia.
This approach has been seen as a substitute for, not a
supplement to, the possible immigration of these scientists
to the West. After private U.S. organizations (the Carnegie
Corporation and the MacArthur Foundation) began
awarding research grants to former Soviet scientists in
1992-93, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy
embarked on a number of projects of their own. By 1995,
Russia had become the single largest beneficiary of U.S.
funding for programs encompassed by the International
Cooperation in Research and Development (ICRD) effort,
with particular emphasis on aeronautics and nuclear
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energy. The ICRD grants were separate from the money
appropriated for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program and for a number of DOE and
State Department projects designed specifically to reduce
the strategic proliferation threat posed by Russian weapons
experts.
Many of the activities funded by the CTR and DOE, such
as the dismantling of strategic missiles and the installation
of protective devices and surveillance equipment at key
storage facilities in the former Soviet republics, have been
exceptionally valuable in helping to safeguard nuclear
weapons and components. The focus here is not on CTR as a
whole or on all DOE activities, but on the three specific DOE
and State Department programs that were set up in the
1990s for the express purpose of keeping former Soviet
WMD scientists gainfully employed: (1) the Science Centers
program, (2) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention,
and (3) the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). These programs
were championed by the Clinton administration, but their
fate seemed to be in doubt when a new administration came
in under George W. Bush. Whatever uncertainty may have
existed, however, was dispelled in mid-December 2001
when President Bush declared that, far from eliminating
the programs, he would “expand efforts to provide peaceful
employment for scientists who formerly worked in Soviet
weapons facilities.” Although the administration
subsequently announced that it would merge the NCI with
the IPP, senior officials confirmed that the basic activities of
the two programs would be continuing and that funding for
the Science Centers would be increased.
The question addressed in the Appendix to this chapter
is whether these sorts of programs, taken together, can
provide permanent alternative sources of employment for
all or most of the Russian WMD experts within the next 10
to 15 years. Even if the answer is negative, the programs
may still be worth pursuing for other reasons (e.g., for
in tellig en ce-g a ther i ng or to f oster p r of essi onal
camaraderie). For the purposes of this chapter, however,
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the only relevant concern is whether the programs can
generate long-term alternative employment for Russian
WMD specialists. The answer provided in the Appendix is
unambiguously negative.
THE RUSSIAN PRIVATE SECTOR
Defense conversion and the transfer of displaced
scientific and technical personnel to new jobs pose
formidable challenges even for countries with highly
advanced market economies like the United States.
Although Silicon Valley and other private-sector
opportunities have absorbed large numbers of scientists
and technicians from U.S. Government weapons
laboratories, the process of downsizing the U.S. nuclear
weapons complex inevitably has been disruptive for many.
In Russia, the difficulty of finding opportunities for
displaced weapons scientists is incomparably greater. Yurii
Zavalishin, the director of the Avangard weapons assembly
plant, expressed dismay in 1994 that soon after his staff
“became actively involved in the state conversion program
and began working on a broad scale, the whole program
turned sour.” Although some of the former employees of the
Russian nuclear and missile complexes (mostly younger
people) successfully landed jobs in the fledgling private
sector or with foreign companies, the total number who
managed to do so was trivial compared to the number who
may be displaced over the next several years if much-needed
downsizing of the Russian WMD complexes proceeds as
forecast.
The lack of progress with defense conversion in Russia,
the poor business climate, and the many obstacles facing
aspiring entrepreneurs have stifled the emergence of a
private sector that could absorb thousands of WMD
scientists. Although one-third of Russian defense
enterprises had been “privatized” (i.e., turned over to
managers) by the mid-1990s, the rest were still owned
wholly or largely by the state. Even the nominally private
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defense firms were kept open mainly through state largesse.
Unlike in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic,
and other East-Central European countries where the rapid
growth of small business made up for the shortcomings of
large industry, no such engine of prosperity has been
available in Russia. Overweening government interference,
corruption, and criminality in Russia have thwarted
indigenous start-ups and deterred foreign investors from
entering. As a result, nothing remotely comparable to the
private-sector opportunities in the United States is likely to
exist in Russia for many years to come.
The scarcity of opportunities outside the weapons
complexes poses an onerous dilemma for Russian scientists
who face the prospect of unemployment. Most evidence
suggests that a greater number of the WMD personnel,
especially those under 45, would have been inclined to take
jobs in the private sector if the opportunities had been
available. According to recent data, some 70,000 scientists
working at Russian Academy of Sciences institutes—on
projects unrelated to WMD—left their positions for the
private sector after 1991. The bulk of this outflow, however,
occurred in the early 1990s, a pattern that was also evident
in the nuclear and missile complexes. The Carnegie
Endowment study indicates that a small but significant
number of weapons specialists began moving to the private
sector in 1992, but the outflow soon peaked—in 1993 for the
missile complex, and in 1996 for the nuclear weapons
industry—and then rapidly declined. Although some of the
scientists and engineers who left the defense complex for the
private sector fared well, others did not. By the end of the
1990s, as economic hardship and turmoil in Russia
remained acute (and showed no signs of abating in the near
future), the number of weapons scientists who were inclined
to venture into the private sector had greatly diminished.
It is unlikely that the situation will improve before the
projected cuts in the Russian WMD complexes are due to
ta k e effect. R u ssi an i nvestment i n tec hnol ogy
commercialization is less than $200 million a year, and
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foreign direct investment in science and technology in
Russia is still almost nil. The WMD specialists who are still
working in the Russian weapons complexes will therefore be
extremely reluctant to forsake their posts. The younger
scientists and engineers who were inclined to leave for
opportunities in the private sector have already done so,
and the remaining weapons personnel will find it especially
difficult to adapt to new lines of work.
OFFICIAL RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO FORESTALL A
NEW BRAIN DRAIN
Until very recently, the Russian government had sought
to forestall the emigration of key WMD scientists,
engineers, and technicians by imposing severe travel
restrictions on individuals who enjoyed access to “state
secrets.” This punitive approach is still in effect, but since
early 2000 the government has also increasingly tried to
offer a carrot (more attractive career opportunities) to go
with the stick. Although the stick will undoubtedly remain
crucial in preventing undesired emigration, the effort to
adopt a more nuanced, carrot-and-stick approach suggests a
recognition that the stick alone will not be effective over the
long run.
Proposals to Improve Russian Science
and the Weapons Complex.
Even before Vladimir Putin took over from Yeltsin as
Russian president at the end of 1999, he had displayed a
keen interest in bolstering Russia’s scientific research
capabilities, especially research on nuclear weapons and
other advanced military technologies. In late April 1999,
when Putin was Secretary of the Russian Security Council,
he played a crucial role in the Council’s adoption of a
classified directive authorizing sharp increases in the
salaries and benefits of nuclear weapons scientists and
engineers. At a news conference after the Council met,
Putin hailed the resolution as an “urgent measure” that
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would “ensure the stable functioning of the nuclear weapons
complex.” He expressed a similar view 4 months later,
shortly after he became prime minister. At a ceremony
marking the 50th anniversary of the first Soviet nuclear
bomb test, Putin declared that “Russia’s nuclear weapons
complex is the foundation of our country’s security,” and he
vowed that “the development and upkeep of the nuclear
weapons complex will remain the state’s highest priority.”
After gaining the presidency, Putin continued to
emphasize the need for major improvements in Russia’s
scientific prowess and weapons research. In a speech before
a group of scientific workers at the science research park in
Zelenograd in early February 2000, he called for “a
comprehensive reform of the scientific and technological
sphere,” attributing the problems in Russia’s scientific
establishment to past mismanagement and waste.
Although he lamented the earlier loss of highly trained
scientists and engineers, he declared that his policies would
prevent any further brain drain. A month later, Putin
abolished the Ministry of Science and Technology along
with several other federal agencies and replaced them with
a much larger Ministry of Industry, Science, and
Technology, which oversees a vast network of weapons
research and testing facilities. Putin’s choice of a
high-ranking official from the military-industrial complex,
Aleksandr Dondukov, to head the new ministry was a
further sign of the growing emphasis on weapons-related
research.
Putin highlighted this theme in two important speeches
in late March 2000 just before and just after he was formally
elected president on March 26. In the first speech, delivered
at the All-Russian Conference of Employees of the
Defense-Industrial Complex, he pledged that “defense
production, as a core part of the overall economy, will be the
driving force of industrial development.” In the second
speech before an enlarged session of the Minatom
Collegium in Snezhinsk, Putin promised to “strengthen
Russia’s nuclear weapons complex” and to ensure that “the
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significance of this complex, far from decreasing, will
increase exponentially.” He stressed that Snezhinsk and
the other nuclear weapons facilities would be at the heart of
his scientific research program:
We must make 100 percent use of the intellectual riches of [the
nuclear weapons] industry and must support its unique
collectives, laboratories, and scientific centers. They are the
source of innovative technologies for all of our industries, and
they are the resource for economic growth and for the
successful development of the country.

Putin returned to these points on numerous occasions in
both 2000 and 2001. In May 2000 he delivered a keynote
address before the general assembly of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, an annual event that Yeltsin had
always declined to attend. In his speech, Putin called for a
“comprehensive reform of the scientific-technical sphere”
that would enable Russia to “make maximum use of the
immense scientific and technical resources and
highly-trained personnel of the military-industrial
complex.” Three months later, he met with 20 senior
members of the Russian Academy of Sciences to discuss the
future of the Russian scientific establishment. Putin
decried the “brain drain that has eroded our state’s
potential in the world” and vowed to improve the conditions
for scientific research. In particular, he promised to devote
greater resources to areas vital for national security,
especially nuclear weapons and other high-technology
industries.
To reinforce this new approach, Putin’s ministers
provided more funding for science in 2000 than was actually
promised in the federal budget, a striking reversal of the
pattern in 1992-98, when outlays for science consistently
fell short of the projected level. The government also revised
the science budget for 2001, allocating an additional 820
million rubles toward salary increases for scientists, 800
million rubles to improve research facilities, 12.5 million
rubles to provide for scientists’ housing needs, and 80
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million rubles for other “retention efforts.” In addition,
Putin secured funding for a new state training plan for
scientific and engineering personnel, with particular
emphasis on the defense industry. As a further gesture of
support for the weapons complex, Putin pledged to confer
privileged tax and legal status on the “science cities”
(naukogrady), the 60 or so defense-oriented research
metropolises that had flourished during the Soviet era but
had fallen on hard times in the 1990s. Putin also proposed a
fourfold increase in grants for university science
departments engaged in weapons-related research and
30-40 percent increases in salaries for lecturers in those
departments. (Traditionally, Russian universities other
than Moscow State and Leningrad State had been much less
important than the Russian Academy of Sciences in
carrying out basic scientific research, but the research
activities of many of the universities were expanded
significantly beginning in 1997.)
Putin’s emphasis on the military applications of science
has caused anxiety among some Russian scientists, who
worry that the new policies are little more than a reversion
to the centralized, top-down system of the Soviet era. In
mid-2000, the St. Petersburg Association of Scientists
condemned the government’s alleged efforts to convert
science into a “branch of the military.” Even many of the
scientists who were more favorably disposed toward Putin’s
proposals were initially skeptical that the new rhetoric and
policies would be sustained over time. In the hope that a real
change was in the offing, they offered suggestions about how
to improve the situation in the near term. In public
interviews and discussions with senior officials, a number of
leading scientists complained that the government’s efforts
to provide housing and monetary incentives to retain
existing personnel and lure scientific researchers back to
Russia had been far too limited. They also stressed that the
recruitment of new scientific talent would depend on
ensuring career mobility as well as material inducements.
Although many scientists concurred with the government’s
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proposal to scale back the state’s role in civilian research
over time and to encourage large increases in private
investment, they warned that the scarcity of private capital
in Russia made it infeasible to proceed very quickly in this
direction.
These concerns were taken into account by the
government in its latest proposals for weapons-related
research and the compensation of nuclear scientists. In
August 2000, Putin issued a decree on “Urgent Measures of
Social Support for Specialists of the Nuclear Weapons
Complex of the Russian Federation.” The decree authorized
further increases in the salaries and pensions of all
scientists, engineers, and other personnel involved in the
“research, production, and disassembly of nuclear
weapons.” These new pay increases and the settlement of
earlier wage arrears ensured that nuclear weapons
scientists and engineers would be receiving salaries roughly
two to three times higher than average, along with generous
benefits. Two days after issuing this decree, Putin sent
Prime Minister Mikhail Kas’yanov on a highly publicized
visit to the VNIIEF nuclear weapons design center in Sarov.
During the trip, Kas’yanov pledged that the government
would upgrade the living standards and research conditions
of employees in the nuclear weapons complex. “The
development of science pertaining to nuclear weapons,”
Kas’yanov declared, “is one of the main objectives for
Russia.”
The government’s efforts to bolster the scientific prowess
of the weapons complex continued in 2001. As the year
began, the Sarov and Snezhinsk nuclear research centers
announced that they would be embarking on new
state-funded defense projects and providing additional pay
increases for essential personnel. Other key weapons
facilities made similar announcements, and the
government proposed extra funding for new military
research activities. In the spring of 2001, Putin established
a Science Council under his direct supervision to “choose the
priorities for scientific research” in Russia and to facilitate a
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“reversal of the brain drain” by encouraging the “best
scientific personnel to come back” to their homeland. When
the Science Council advises Putin how “the state should
support fundamental science and applied science,” it is
supposed to give particular weight to defense-related
programs in “cutting-edge areas on which the future of the
country depends.”
Putin’s emphasis on the link between scientific research
and military production was reinforced in October 2001
when he upgraded the ministry of industry, science, and
technology and tied it directly to the defense complex. In an
unexpected move, Putin replaced the existing minister of
industry, science, and technology, Aleksandr Dondukov,
with Ilya Klebanov, a deputy prime minister who had been
overseeing the roughly 2,000 military-industrial
enterprises in Russia. Although Klebanov was removed
from his post as deputy prime minister in February 2002
(largely because of political infighting), he was able to
combine the two posts long enough to ensure that the
ministry of industry, science, and technology (or, more
likely, a successor body controlled by the Russian Security
Council) would be responsible for overseeing a long-awaited
overhaul and upgrading of the weapons complex. A draft
program to this effect, released in March 2001, envisaged
the establishment of 36 conglomerated “corporations” as
conduits between the government and the large array of
defense plants. Many observers expected that this program,
like numerous others over the past decade, would come to
naught. But now that Klebanov’s position has been
strengthened and the science establishment has been
effectively subordinated to the defense complex, the
prospects for meaningful change may be greater, especially
if economic growth continues and the federal budget
remains in surplus.
Until the Russian economy is drastically reformed (a
process that is still in its early stages) and free-market
institutions are firmly in place, the conditions for scientific
research in Russia will remain precarious. But if Putin’s
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proposals to revive the country’s scientific and technological
capabilities can be converted from rhetoric into sustained
action, they will clearly benefit the defense complex.
Whether that will be good or bad from the West’s
perspective remains to be seen.
Recruitment and Retention of Younger Weapons
Scientists.
To ensure that the WMD complexes remain vigorous in
the future, Putin has sought to increase the number of
young, highly trained scientists and engineers who
undertake weapons work. The influx of younger scientists to
the weapons facilities had dropped significantly in the first
half of the 1990s, primarily because the collapse of the
Soviet Union led to the breakdown of the centrally planned
higher education system in Russia, which traditionally had
channeled many of the best young scientists from leading
universities (the Moscow Institute of Physics and
Engineering, the Moscow Institute of Physics and
Technology, Moscow State University, Leningrad State
University, etc.) to the WMD complexes. Similar problems
arose during this period with the recruitment of newly
trained engineers. In the past, most of the engineers
employed in the nuclear weapons complex had been
educated at the seven specialized universities (branches of
the Moscow Institute of Physics and Engineering) and 18
technical schools in the closed cities that were run by the
Soviet Ministry of Medium Machine-Building (and later by
Minatom). Funding shortfalls of nearly 75 percent at the
Minatom universities and technical schools from 1992 to
1997 deterred prospective students from enrolling. The
result was a further reduction in the flow of freshly trained
specialists to the WMD complexes. Initially, this trend did
not pose a serious problem for staffing levels within the
weapons complex—a survey by Minatom in early 1999
found that over 90 percent of key positions and areas of
expertise in the nuclear weapons industry were filled—and
indeed some cuts in the supply of new personnel were
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needed to facilitate the projected downsizing of the nuclear
complex. Nonetheless, a continued failure to attract
sufficient numbers of younger scientists and engineers
would pose grave long-term problems for the weapons
facilities. Hence, one of Minatom’s chief priorities since the
late 1990s has been to step up the recruitment of younger
scientists and engineers and to retain those who have
recently joined the nuclear weapons facilities.
The goal of encouraging younger scientists to enter the
defense complex has also been a constant theme of Putin’s
policies and statements. In May 2000, he called for a
“national program to draw young people to science,” an
allusion to the possible restoration of an educational system
that would allocate fresh scientific talent to military
research. In late November 2000, at Putin’s behest, the
government convened a special meeting to discuss how to
ensure that younger scientists would pursue research
careers within Russia, especially in the defense complex.
Several of the participants warned that unless sweeping
measures were taken, younger scientists would
increasingly seek to enter the commercial sector or, even
worse, to immigrate to the West. The reduced flow of young
scientists into the weapons complex, according to those
present, was posing a “threat to [Russia’s] security.” The
minister of education, Vladimir Filippov, expressed
particular concern that “the United States has set a target
to attract specialists in the field of science and the defense
industry, which includes a special quota for Russian
experts. If we do not take urgent steps, we will be working
for another country’s defense.” These concerns helped spur
P u tin ’s proposa ls to quad r up l e the f und i ng f or
defense-related research at universities and to improve
opportunities available to younger scientists.
Other steps to recruit young scientists and engineers
have been taken by Minatom itself, notably through its
sponsorship of events for groups of younger experts, its
allotment of greater funding to the specialized universities
and technical schools in the closed cities, and its success in
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obtaining draft exemptions for young specialists who make
their careers in the nuclear weapons complex. Beginning in
1999, the section for young people in Russia’s Nuclear
Society (a professional organization closely affiliated with
Minatom) sponsored and participated in periodic scientific
conferences and annual youth congresses for freshly
recruited experts working in the nuclear complex. In March
2000, a group of younger scientists and engineers employed
at VNIIEF formed a youth council, which is intended to
represent the interests of some 1,500 younger experts at the
nuclear center. With Minatom’s approval, similar councils
have been set up at other nuclear facilities.
The upgrading of the specialized universities has been
facilitated not only by increased funding for training and
laboratory equipment, but also by the establishment of
generous scholarships to attract bright students. Since the
late 1990s, several dozen scholarships have been awarded
each year to students at all seven universities. Another
important development has been the creation of special
departments and divisions in which courses are taught by
senior scientists and engineers from the local nuclear
weapons facilities. The degree program takes 6 years to
complete, but, beginning in the third year, students are
given the opportunity to pursue apprenticeships and to use
laboratory equipment at the weapons facilities. Further
training is available in 29 postgraduate science and
engineering programs, with an enrollment of around 450 a
year.
These improvements, and the increased enrollments
that have resulted, have been reinforced by Minatom’s
ability to secure draft exemptions for younger employees of
the nuclear weapons complex. Because severe hazing and
other abuses in the Russian army remain pervasive, many
young people in Russia have been eager to avoid
conscription. At Minatom’s urging, Putin issued a decree in
November 2000 granting exemptions from military service
to hundreds of young scientists and engineers at the Sarov,
Snezhinsk, Lesnoi, and Trekhnogornyi nuclear weapons
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facilities. The exemptions remain in effect as long as the
beneficiaries continue to work full-time in the weapons
complex. This privilege offers a major incentive for talented
young people to pursue careers either at weapons facilities
or, under a separate decree, at civilian nuclear plants.
All these developments have led to a significant increase
in the number of young specialists who are entering the
weapons complex. After reaching a low point in the
mid-1990s, the number of new employees recruited by
Minatom rose to 2,000 in 1998, dipped to 1,500 in 1999, and
then rose back above 2,100 in both 2000 and 2001. Although
certain problems persist at Minatom’s educational facilities
and many young people in the closed cities are still seeking
to move elsewhere, the dire predictions that some observers
(including some senior Minatom officials) made in the
mid-1990s about the growing dearth of fresh talent for the
nuclear weapons complex seem less relevant since the late
1990s. For the time being, a gap remains in the lower-level
staffing of the weapons facilities—a gap that resulted from
the greatly reduced inflow of younger scientists and
engineers in the first half of the 1990s—but there is ample
reason to believe that this gap can be overcome if
recruitment stays relatively buoyant and Minatom
proceeds with a restructuring of the nuclear complex.
Travel Restrictions and Curbs on Foreign Contacts.
Of all the factors that limited the brain drain from
Russian WMD facilities to foreign countries over the past
decade, perhaps the most important was the existence of
travel restrictions. The restrictions were first imposed
during the Soviet period and were reaffirmed in the 1990s
by Russian legislation, government directives, and
presidential decrees. Under these measures, the Russian
government is able to forbid individuals who have had
access to “state secrets” from leaving the country for a period
of 5 years after their last contact with such information. The
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government is also entitled, at its own discretion, to extend
the period for as long as deemed necessary.
Legal restrictions on the foreign travel of weapons
specialists had been in place from the moment the Soviet
WMD programs were set up, but the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in December 1991 raised the question of what
to do about those restrictions. For decades, foreign travel for
all Soviet citizens had been severely limited and controlled
by the state, but in May 1991 the Soviet parliament
approved a measure titled Law on the Order of Departure
from and Entry into the USSR of Citizens of the USSR,
which significantly liberalized the earlier travel regime.
Because the Russian Federation initially lacked its own law
governing the entry and exit of citizens, the Russian
government simply extended the Soviet law, which
remained in effect until the Russian parliament finally
passed a new law in mid-1996. A resolution adopted by the
Russian government in late January 1993 reaffirmed and
tightened the Soviet law’s restrictions on “individuals who
are privy to state secrets.” The resolution stipulated that
organizations intending to send employees abroad on
official business had to check first with the state security
apparatus to determine whether there were “grounds for
temporary restrictions on the [employees’] right to leave the
Russian Federation.” This provision applied to all
employees of the WMD complexes, and the coverage was
broadened through amendments to the resolution in 1993
and 1995, which explicitly empowered the head of the
Kurchatov Institute (a leading nuclear physics research
institute) and the director of Biopreparat (the BW
pharmaceutical firm, which had been converted into a
“joint-stock company”) to restrict the foreign travel of their
employees as well, in consultation with the state security
organs. No maximum duration was set for these
restrictions.
The limitations on foreign travel were tightened further
in July 1993, when the Russian parliament adopted a
long-awaited measure titled Law on State Secrets. The law
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replaced (or in some cases supplemented) Soviet-era
legislation that had been extended via a Russian
presidential decree in January 1992. Article 5 of the new
law and the more detailed provisions of a subsequent “List
of Items of Information Classified as State Secrets” make
clear that all technologies, components, and procedures
connected with “weapons of mass destruction, that is,
nuclear, chemical, biological, or other weapons of great
destructive force,” are state secrets “of special importance”
(osoboi vazhnosti), the highest level of classification. (A
three-tiered classification system is laid out in Article 8 of
the Law on State Secrets and in the more elaborate rules of
classification adopted by the Russian government in
October 1995. Under these rules, classified information is
deemed to be “secret,” “top secret,” or “of special
importance”—a division that is broadly similar to the
secrecy categories used during the Soviet era.) The
expansive definition of “secrets” in the law allows the
security organs to prevent vast numbers of people,
including all weapons scientists and engineers, from going
abroad.
The most severe restrictions on travel by WMD
specialists are laid out in Article 24 of the Law on State
Secrets, which requires anyone working with information
“of special importance” to forfeit “the right to go abroad until
after a period specified in the [employee’s] labor contract.”
Labor contracts for weapons specialists include detailed
provisions forbidding disclosure of classified information
and a special provision compelling each employee to “agree
to a partial, temporary restriction of my rights, including
the right to travel abroad for a period of _____ years,” with
the precise length of this period determined by the
employee’s rank and duties. The contracts stipulate that
even if the employees lose or relinquish their access to state
secrets, they must continue to abide by the obligations they
“voluntarily undertook,” including their acceptance of
restrictions on all foreign travel.
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In principle, the limitations apply only to travel outside
the country, but in practice the leeway for key WMD
specialists to move around within Russia is also still tightly
controlled. During the Soviet era, employees of the closed
cities were not permitted to travel anywhere (even to other
Soviet cities) unless they received official permission. After
1991, the ban on traveling and moving to other cities was
supposed to have been eased, but in practice it remains in
effect, as Vladislav Mokhov, a senior nuclear weapons
physicist at Sarov, emphasized in mid-1996:
I work on secret projects and am therefore restricted. . . . But if
I could choose my place of residence [within Russia], I would
never have stayed here [at Sarov]. Unfortunately they would
not let me leave. If given a choice, most of us theoreticians
would go to Moscow.

Enforcement of the travel restrictions is provided for in
Article 20 of the law, which authorizes the Russian
president to establish an Interdepartmental Commission
for the Protection of State Secrets, a body with
“extra-departmental powers” to coordinate all activities
needed to “protect state secrets.” Yeltsin issued a decree in
November 1995 that formally set up the Interdepartmental
Commission and another decree in January 1996 that
specified the organization and functions of the Commission,
including its role vis-à-vis foreign travel. The powers of the
Commission and other agencies to limit travel are laid out in
greater depth in the Federal Law on the Procedure for
Exiting and Entering the Russian Federation, which took
effect in August 1996. The law grants wide discretionary
authority to the state security organs and the Commission
to prevent individuals who have had access to state secrets
from leaving the Russian Federation. Under Article 15,
anyone who has had access to secrets “of special
importance” and has “signed a labor contract providing for
the temporary restriction of his right to exit from the
Russian Federation” can be denied the right to leave Russia,
no matter what the purpose of the intended trip. The law
thus further codified the basic restrictions described by
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Yurii Tumanov, the first deputy director of the Sarov
nuclear weapons center, in April 1995:
People involved in secret research must go through a rigorous
screening by the Federal Security Service [FSB] if they want to
travel abroad. The FSB determines the extent of their
knowledge of state secrets. Those who are most closely involved
in secret research are not permitted to take private trips abroad.
. . . Scientists who are privy to information of special importance
are not allowed to go abroad even as members of official
delegations unless they receive personal permission from the
minister of atomic energy.

The initial length of the restriction is 5 years from the
time of the employee’s most recent contact with classified
in forma tion “of sp ec i al i mp or tanc e,” and the
Interdepartmental Commission is permitted to extend the
term for at least another 5 years.
Some of the weapons scientists who have applied to leave
Russia either temporarily or permanently were granted
permission to do so, but those whose requests were denied
were informed by the “internal security organs”—under
Article 16 of the Law on the Procedure for Exiting and
Entering—of the date of the denial, the registration number
of the case, and the full name and legal address of the
organization principally responsible for the denial.
Unsuccessful applicants are given the right to appeal the
restrictions before an Interdepartmental Commission for
the Consideration of Appeals by Citizens of the Russian
Federation in Regard to the Limitation of Their Right to
Exit from the Russian Federation. This appeals commission
was set up via a government resolution in March 1997 as a
direct replacement for the Interdepartmental Commission
for the Consideration of Appeals by Citizens of the Russian
Federation Relating to the Denial of the Issuance of a
Foreign Passport and Temporary Restrictions on Travel
Abroad, which had been established by a government
directive in March 1993. The new commission is obliged to
respond to all appeals within 3 months.
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The regulations for the appeals commission stipulate
that it must supply the Interdepartmental Commission for
the Protection of State Secrets with an applicant’s pertinent
travel documents whenever there is “a need to extend the
period of restriction on a citizen’s right to exit from the
Russian Federation beyond 5 years as provided under [the
citizen’s] labor contract.” The Interdepartmental
Commission on State Secrets must then issue a ruling on
whether the information to which the applicant had access
was truly “of special importance.” If the appeal is turned
down, the individual can appeal it further in a court of law.
In the meantime, however, anyone who has been denied
permission to leave the country must immediately
relinquish his or her passport and all other travel
documents “for safe keeping to the state body that issued
the passport.”
This appeals procedure, cumbersome though it is, was
used surprisingly often in the mid-1990s by scientists who
were denied permission to leave the Russian Federation
because they had been privy to state secrets “of special
importance.” From June 1994 to June 1995, the appeals
commission (known informally as the Ivanov Commission
after its chair, Igor Ivanov, who was then a first deputy
foreign minister) heard appeals in 198 such cases. The
commission rejected 16 of the appeals and, in each case,
imposed an additional period of up to 4 years on the initial
travel restriction. The appeals procedure has been invoked
less frequently since the late 1990s, primarily because of the
sharp drop in the number of scientists seeking to leave the
country. The lower incidence of appeals is also partly due to
the increasing likelihood that appeals will be rejected. As
the appeals commission became more stringent in its
rulings, it deterred potential applicants from even trying.
Violations of the law on the right to leave the Russian
Federation are punishable by up to 10 years of
imprisonment, the same sentence that is meted out for
violations of the travel provisions in the law on state secrets.
Western legal scholars and government officials, as well as
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human rights groups in both Russia and the West, have
argued that the Russian laws are excessively broad and
open-ended, and that the severity of the restrictions
inevitably circumscribes the rights of scientists who pose no
threat of strategic proliferation. The potential for abuse was
underscored by a case in 1999 involving Raisa Isakova, a
former scientific researcher at a secret institute in Omsk
who had held a Grade 2 security clearance. Isakova had long
been active in the local Jewish community, and in March
1999 she applied for permission to travel to Israel. After
several weeks of delay, the Federal Security Service (FSB)
warned her that unless she signed a compromising
statement against the Jewish Agency in Russia (a
nongovernmental organization that promotes immigration
to Israel), her application for an exit visa would be turned
down. Isakova was the head of the local branch of the Jewish
Agency in Russia, and she refused to sign the statement.
Her application was then rejected, and she was informed
that she would not be able to receive a visa until at least
December 2005. She appealed the decision, pointing out
that numerous other researchers from her institute with the
same level of security clearance had been permitted to
travel abroad. In September 1999 the appeals commission
ruled that she could reapply for a visa in January 2003
(rather than December 2005), but it did not overturn the
denial of her application.
Isakova’s experience is one of several cases that reflect
the government’s increasing determination to curtail
foreign travel by individuals who have had access to state
secrets. (The Isakova case is also indicative of the
persistence of official anti-Semitism, but that is another
matter.) The potential for abuse by the Russian authorities
has sparked wide concern among scholars, human rights
advocates, and legal specialists in both Russia and the
West. Some have argued that the restrictions are not only
repressive, but counterproductive for the Russian
government itself. According to this view, the emigration of
certain individuals who were denied the right to leave could
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actually have proven beneficial to Russia by reducing the
potential for discord at home.
These sentiments, however, are not shared by senior
FSB officials who, in early 1996 when the law on the right to
exit the Russian Federation was being debated, claimed in
interviews with the Russian news media that restrictions
on emigration of Russian scientists are crucial to protect the
Russian state from foreign subversion. As one official put it,
“Anyone who has had access to state secrets . . . must forfeit
the right to travel abroad, except on official business. Such
measures are needed to ensure that hostile forces will not
compromise our security.”
This draconian view has been endorsed by high-ranking
officials in Russia’s military-industrial complex, who have
even complained that the current laws on state secrets and
emigration are too lax, a view that Putin himself expressed
at Zelenograd in February 2000. In November 2000, amid
controversy surrounding the arrest and trial of the retired
American intelligence officer Edmond Pope, several
prominent Russian weapons scientists sent an open letter to
the leaders of the Russian government and judiciary
alleging that measures to permit greater openness and
freedom of travel were endangering the country’s scientific
establishment and compromising state secrets. The
scientists echoed Putin’s call for more stringent laws that
would ward off “hostile encroachments” on Russian science.
They asserted that “the proper balance between secrecy and
openness” had shifted too far in favor of the latter and that
“court hearings [connected with appeals of travel
restrictions] are depriving the [Russian] state of the right to
defend itself against breaches of its security resulting from
the disclosure of state secrets.” The scientists stressed that
the increased freedom of travel both into and out of Russia
was allowing foreigners to take unfair advantage of Russian
scientists:
Russia has a lot of things in the military, technical, and
scientific areas to be proud of and a lot to protect against
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uninvited “guests.” These guests try to exploit our openness, our
economic difficulties, and the mercenary interests of certain
representatives of the military-industrial complex to obtain
Russian know-how and state-of-the-art technologies for next to
nothing.

The Pope case inspired many other officials to express
similar views. The deputy leader of Putin’s Unity faction in
the Russian Duma, Frants Klintsevich, condemned the
“devil-may-care attitude to the defense of state secrets” and
demanded that the freedom of travel—both within Russia
and outside it—be restricted. The chair of the Duma’s
subcommittee on security and disarmament, Vitalii
Sevastyanov, denounced the “imperfections and flaws in the
Russian laws on state secrets” and called for “tough
measures” to prevent the compromise of “technologies
developed by generations of Russian scientists and the
defense industry—technologies that are the national
treasures of Russia.” Although Sevastyanov’s remarks were
directed mainly against foreigners operating within Russia,
he stressed that the emigration of Russian weapons
scientists was posing an equally dire threat. The alleged
“danger” resulting from the emigration of Russian scientists
was emphasized even more explicitly in the Russian press,
which decried the FSB’s supposed failure to halt the brain
drain and the concomitant leakage of Russian military
technology. In a typical case, a commentator in the widely
circulated daily Moskovskii Komsomolets accused Western
nonprofit foundations—specifically naming Soros,
Carnegie, Fulbright, MacArthur, Friedrich Ebert, and
Eurasia—as well as the ISTC and the U.S. Agency for
International Development of being “sieves” that were
luring unemployed Russian scientists to the West.
Even before the Pope case erupted, there were ample
signs that the brief period of relatively free emigration in
the early 1990s had given way to much tighter restrictions.
Siegfried Hecker, who was instrumental in setting up the
Russian-American nuclear laboratory contacts in early
1992 when he was director of Los Alamos National
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Laboratory, recently noted that by the late 1990s “the
nuclear defense sector [in Russia had] experienced a
significant reversal of the openness we found in the early
1990s. The rise in the presence and power of the Russian
security services was felt by all nuclear installations.” As far
back as October 1995, a detailed set of instructions
approved by the Russian government on the procedures for
granting access to state secrets had required all Russian
citizens holding security clearances to undergo new
background checks if they got married, had a close relative
who moved abroad, or experienced other changes in their
lives. In subsequent years, the FSB tended to construe this
provision as expansively as possible. In 1998 Susan
Eisenhower wrote that her husband, the well-known
Russian planetary scientist Roald Sagdeev, had recently
been subjected to “an extensive and thorough background
check” after his passport expired. Sagdeev had formerly
held security clearances, but the reason he was forced to
undergo a background check was simply that he had been
traveling back and forth between Russia and the West.
Eisenhower noted that in recent months Sagdeev had found
“border control” in Russia to be “much tighter” than in the
early 1990s, and that he had heard from scientists working
in the nuclear weapons and missile complexes that they too
were “under far greater scrutiny” and were “restricted in
their travels” and deprived of “the right to keep a passport
for foreign travel in their possession.”
The increasing severity of the travel restrictions
inevitably took its toll. The Carnegie Endowment survey
revealed that, by 1999, nuclear weapons scientists were
citing “administrative restrictions” and a lack of money as
the two main obstacles to working abroad. Many of the
scientists argued that “the authorities do everything to
prevent a person from going abroad” by “imposing
conditions . . . and putting obstacles in the way.” The tighter
restrictions on foreign travel were by no means the only
factor that led to a sharp drop in the rate of emigration after
the early to mid-1990s, but they clearly played a crucial role.
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Because Russian weapons scientists knew they had to
overcome formidable barriers before they could leave the
country, they often sensed that it was better not to try. The
small number who did apply to travel abroad were often
turned down.
Moreover, the clampdown on scientists eventually
extended beyond the tightening of travel restrictions to
include limitations on all foreign contacts, even the most
innocuous ones. In May 2001, the presidium of the Russian
Academy of Sciences issued a directive outlining “Measures
to be Taken by the Russian Academy of Sciences to Prevent
Damage to the Russian Federation.” The directive required
the Academy’s “special departments” (osobye otdely) and
institute directors to “exercise constant control over trips
abroad by Academy of Sciences researchers who have access
to state secrets,” to “tighten control over the researchers’
submission of reports about their trips abroad,” and to
compel researchers to disclose any projects they were
pursuing with foreign scientists, any grants they might seek
from abroad, any articles they published in foreign journals,
any visits they might host by foreign scientists, and any
other contacts they might have with foreigners. The
information was to be collected and transferred periodically
to “appropriate officials” in the government.
Controls of this sort had been in effect during the Soviet
era, but most of them were lifted after the Soviet Union
disappeared. The rationale for restoring them, according to
the government and senior Academy officials, was to
“protect state secrets” and prevent any “leakage of scientific
information.” One of the vice presidents of the Academy,
Gennadii Mesyats, argued that “it is of immense importance
to preserve our know-how” in the defense sector. He claimed
that the “increased freedom of contacts with foreign
visitors” had posed serious risks:
Many Russian scientists [in the 1990s] went abroad to earn
money, and the directors of scientific research institutes, if only
reluctantly, began selling off the results of projects that were

164

not attracting investors within Russia. As a result, not only
was the [earlier policy of] total control over foreign contacts
lost. For a while these contacts were not subject to any control
at all. The leakage from the country of information about
promising scientific developments took on a catastrophic
nature in some places.

Mesyats and other senior Academy officials also insisted
that the revived controls were no different from those
supposedly in effect in the United States and other Western
countries. The Academy’s chief press representative, Igor
Milovidov, argued that “it is a universally customary
practice to report to your boss” about contacts with
foreigners, and Mesyats added that he had “frequently been
on official trips to the United States, and they have a very
tough secrecy regime. . . . I know that U.S. scientists also
inform their bosses about absolutely everything. There is
nothing underhanded here [in Russia]. No! This is normal.”
Although it is true that scientists at U.S. weapons
laboratories and other highly sensitive facilities are obliged
to keep their superiors informed of foreign contacts,
Mesyats is wide of the mark in suggesting that expansive
controls like those in Russia, applying to civilian and
weapons scientists alike, would or could be adopted in the
United States.
The crackdown on civilian scientists, combined with the
Russian government’s decision in September 2001 to
establish a new Agency for the Protection of State Secrets
that will “impose tighter limits on information security,”
suggests that the ever more stringent controls on weapons
scientists are unlikely to be eased anytime soon. The
increased salience of the FSB under Putin, and the Russian
news media’s and government’s growing obsession with
allegations of “foreign espionage” against Russia, imply
that the trend, if anything, is likely to be toward even
stricter, not looser, control over the travel and foreign
contacts of weapons scientists. Should this prove to be the
case, it may well derail any notion of encouraging these
scientists to immigrate to the West.
165

CONCLUSIONS
Several points that emerge from the analysis above have
a bearing on U.S. policy vis-à-vis Russian weapons
scientists.
First, compared to the sharp reductions in Russia’s
output of conventional weapons, Russian facilities for the
production of WMD have been only modestly scaled back.
Even now, more than a decade after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, most of the infrastructure for the Soviet
nuclear weapons and CBW complexes is still in place. A very
large group of highly trained weapons scientists and
engineers—numbering tens of thousands—are still
employed at Russian WMD facilities and are still engaged in
weapons-related work.
Second, the departure of Russian civilian scientists in
the early 1990s—either to foreign countries or to nonscience
jobs within Russia—took a toll on Russian scientific
prowess, but the brain drain did eventually subside. By the
late 1990s, far fewer scientists were seeking to emigrate.
Within the WMD complexes, the brain drain phenomenon
was much less acute, contrary to Western fears in 1991 that
the demise of the Soviet Union would spawn a mass exodus
of senior weapons scientists to Third World countries
pursuing WMD programs. In reality, only a minuscule
percentage of highly trained weapons experts actually left,
especially after the early 1990s. The best of the nuclear
weapons scientists were never interested in working
abroad, and recent surveys have shown that very few other
senior WMD specialists nowadays are inclined even to think
of moving overseas.
Third, the United States has accepted some civilian
scientists from the former Soviet Union as permanent
residents (mostly in the early 1990s), but has made no effort
to induce former Soviet weapons specialists to immigrate en
masse to the West. Instead, U.S. policy has been geared
mainly toward providing meaningful employment for
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Russian and Ukrainian WMD experts in their native
countries. The only modest exception came in 1992 with the
Soviet Scientists Immigration Act (SSIA), which was
intended to cover only about 1 percent of the WMD
scientists in Russia who were of greatest proliferation
concern. The SSIA was subsequently hindered by
administrative delays and was a source of tension with
Moscow. The problems that arose with the SSIA militated
against any larger-scale attempts to encourage the
immigration of former Soviet WMD scientists to the West.
Fourth, U.S. and other Western efforts to provide
alternative employment for the most highly trained WMD
scientists in the former Soviet Union have been
well-intentioned, but have not achieved the desired effect.
The scale of the problem is much too large for any of these
programs to have any meaningful impact. (This would be
the case even if the U.S. programs were well designed. The
DOE’s dubious judgments about certain matters greatly
compound the problem.) Only a relatively small percentage
of high-level Russian weapons scientists have actually
taken part in the Western-sponsored projects, and the
overwhelming majority of the participants have devoted
only a small percentage of their time to the projects. During
the rest of their time, the Russian scientists have continued
to perform weapons-related work. Once the outside projects
are over, the scientists have returned full-time to their
WMD work. The Western programs thus have not
provided—and cannot provide—a permanent alternative
source of employment for tens of thousands of highly trained
Russian WMD specialists. Indeed, there is even a risk that
the Western programs have inadvertently become a subsidy
for the Russian WMD complexes, helping to keep them
operating at a robust level.
Fifth, the private sector in Russia has absorbed some
former weapons scientists, but it is hardly a panacea. Even
in Western countries, defense conversion is extremely
difficult. In Russia, the problems are immeasurably greater
not only because the country was so highly militarized
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under the Soviet regime, but also because efforts to reform
the Russian economy have been so disappointing. Moreover,
even if the private sector in Russia were thriving (which is
not yet the case, especially outside Moscow and St.
Petersburg), it is unlikely that most of the highly trained
WMD scientists would be well-suited to enter it. The
younger scientists who could adapt more easily to the rigors
of a private labor market have already left, and the senior
specialists who are still working at WMD facilities would
have inordinate difficulty in adapting.
Sixth, the Russian government’s recent attempts to
upgrade Russia’s scientific capabilities, especially in the
defense sector, may mean that the long-anticipated
restructuring and downsizing of the Russian WMD
complexes will be delayed or reduced in scope. Despite
Minatom’s projections of sizable layoffs in the nuclear
weapons complex over the next several years, recent trends
suggest that a large number of the senior weapons scientists
can count on keeping their jobs for a substantial time to
come, especially if the Russian economy continues to grow
and the Russian federal budget remains in surplus. The
stepped-up recruitment of younger weapons scientists also
implies that WMD facilities will be operating at a robust
level well into the future.
Seventh, restrictions on the travel of Russian weapons
scientists have contributed to the sharp decline of interest
among scientists in the prospect of working abroad. The
laws on state secrets and on exit and entry, and the stern
implementation of those laws by the FSB, pose a
formidable—indeed almost insuperable—barrier for any
senior WMD scientist who might seek to emigrate.
Awareness of these obstacles would likely deter a would-be
emigrant from seriously pursuing the option. Illegal
emigration cannot be ruled out altogether, but there is no
reason to believe that it would occur on anything more than
a trivial scale, if that. Very few Russian weapons scientists
are inclined any longer to think about working abroad (even
legally, not to mention illegally), and they are certainly
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aware of the severe penalties for those convicted of violating
the laws on state secrets and on exit and entry.
Eighth, neither Yeltsin nor Putin displayed any
willingness to permit freer travel by WMD specialists. The
debate in Russia was settled early on in favor of those who
believe that a brain drain—especially one involving
weapons scientists—is inherently a negative phenomenon.
In the early 1990s, a small number of Russian officials,
notably the minister of science, technology, and higher
education, Boris Saltykov, were willing to countenance
scientific immigration to the West because they believed
that it ultimately would prove beneficial for Russia.
Saltykov claimed that leading scientists would go abroad
temporarily and would return to Russia having been
“enriched by the experience and skills of the best
laboratories in the world.” This line of argument, whatever
its merits, never attracted any appreciable support. The
dominant view among Russian officials, journalists, and
political commentators was that a further exodus of civilian
scientists—not to mention the departure of highly trained
weapons experts—would be detrimental to Russia’s
interests and should therefore, to the extent possible, be
prevented. Although a small number of WMD scientists
were sent abroad on temporary assignments (including
possibly to Iran), the Russian government gave no
indication that it would allow many thousands of highly
trained weapons specialists to move permanently overseas.
All of these considerations present a sobering outlook for
any prospective U.S. effort to encourage the immigration of
roughly 60,000 senior Russian WMD specialists to the
West. If judged in terms of desirability, the option of
promoting immigration to the West would clearly be the
route to go. Tens of thousands of key weapons scientists,
engineers, and technicians are still at their posts in Russia,
where they have been helping to sustain the Russian WMD
complexes through troubled times. To the extent that
Russia would be a lot better off—and would pose a much
smaller potential threat to U.S. interests—if it drastically
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scaled back its nuclear weapons complex and did away with
its CBW facilities, the continued presence of these tens of
thousands of highly trained weapons experts in Russia is
detrimental for the West. Up to now, the Russian
government has been unwilling to dismantle its WMD
infrastructure, and recent trends suggest that this aversion
is likely to persist. The only reliable way to ensure that
Russia would have to make drastic cuts in its WMD
facilities is by permanently removing the most important
researchers and engineers who work at those facilities—an
outcome that immigration to the United States would
achieve. The opportunities that the newly arrived
specialists would be given in the United States would, in
principle, eliminate any possible incentive they might have
to consider working for a country like Iran or Libya. Despite
the tightening of U.S. immigration procedures in the wake
of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the option of
bringing many thousands of former Soviet WMD experts to
the United States would be well worth pursuing if it seemed
likely to succeed.
But if judged in terms of practicality, the notion of
encouraging large-scale immigration to the West is dubious.
Six fundamental problems would hinder any such effort.
First, the decline of interest in emigration among
weapons scientists, as evidenced both in surveys and in the
sharp drop in emigration since the early 1990s, would be
difficult to reverse. Although a major change of policy by the
West might persuade some Russian weapons scientists that
they should seriously pursue the option of emigration, the
majority are unlikely to be convinced. It is even conceivable
that a conspicuous effort to foster a brain drain to the West
would spark a nationalist backlash among WMD scientists
and deter them from even considering the prospect of
working abroad or leaving their weapons posts.
Second, it is extremely unlikely that the Russian
government would go along with such an effort or would fail
to attempt to prevent it. Saltykov’s sentiments (cited above)
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did not win out. Even the limited provisions of the SSIA
sparked a good deal of acrimony in Moscow. The severe
travel restrictions and controls that have been adopted over
the past several years are indicative of the Russian
authorities’ desire to retain the country’s senior weapons
personnel. Putin’s recent statements merely underscore
that point. It is almost inconceivable that Western countries
could circumvent the administrative and legal barriers
posed by the Russian government. The situation facing the
Russian government today vis-à-vis its WMD experts is
fundamentally different from the position of Germany after
World War II. When Germany was under the control of
allied occupying forces in the mid-to-late 1940s, the
victorious powers enjoyed free rein to induce (or, in the
Soviet case, compel) Germany’s leading weapons scientists
to move abroad. Russia’s relationship with the outside
world today is in no way comparable. Western countries
have no direct say in Russia’s internal affairs, and the
Russian authorities can take whatever steps they want to
prevent highly trained WMD scientists from leaving.
Although such measures might not prove flawless, there is
little reason to believe that a massive outflow of senior
weapons experts could occur against the Russian
government’s will.
Third, if an effort to encourage large-scale emigration
proved only partly successful, the result might be decidedly
negative for U.S. interests. The brain drain issue has been
politically volatile in Russia and has been manipulated by
anti-reformist forces to discredit reform-minded,
pro-W estern offi c i al s . In the 1990s, numer ous
commentators in Moscow argued that Russian scientists
were being “exploited by the West” as “cheap labor” and
“sources of information about the latest research
developments” in Russia. These complaints would
undoubtedly increase and become more virulent if the U.S.
Government made a conspicuous effort to induce tens of
thousands of Russian WMD experts to immigrate to the
United States. The ensuing damage to U.S.-Russian
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relations might be grave enough to prompt the Russian
government to cease cooperating in key areas such as CTR,
the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program,
and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Russian
leaders not only would be disinclined to defer to U.S.
demands (e.g, on nuclear exports to Iran and Cuba), but
might even seek to put up an active challenge to the
West—possibly by offering assistance to North Korea or
Iraq. Were this to be the case, the net result from a
nonproliferation standpoint would be deleterious.
Fourth, in all likelihood an emigration drive that was
only partly successful would have a counterproductive effect
on the Russian WMD complexes. Presumably, the weapons
scientists and engineers who would move from Russia
would be those who had long been inclined to look favorably
upon the West. They would leave behind many of their
former colleagues who had always been deeply suspicious of
U.S. intentions. Surveys of nuclear weapons and aerospace
specialists have shown that a majority of those who want to
stay in Russia are hostile to the West or at least are
mistrustful. Such sentiments would undoubtedly intensify
if the United States began actively luring away a large
number of Russian weapons experts. The WMD scientists
who would remain in Russia would undoubtedly want to
expand (rather than downsize) the country’s weapons
facilities and to provide assistance to anti-Western clients
such as Iran. By the same token, these scientists would be
averse to the contacts and cooperative programs that
Russian weapons scientists pursued with their American
counterparts from 1992 on. Most likely, all such activities
would come to a halt.
Fifth, even if a large-scale emigration drive proceeded
and tens of thousands of Russian scientists flocked to the
West, Western governments could not be certain that the
people leaving were truly those of greatest proliferation
concern. The U.S. Government does not know precisely who
the most senior WMD specialists in Russia are. As the GAO
recently pointed out, U.S. efforts to promote alternative
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employment for key weapons personnel in Russia have had
to rely on the Russian government’s own judgments about
the people who should be targeted:
[T]he State Department cannot independently verify the
weapons experience of the senior scientists it has employed.
The State Department relies on the scientists’ national
governments to certify that the senior weapons scientists
listed as participants in a project proposal actually have
sufficient expertise to pose a proliferation threat.

Hypothetically, if large-scale immigration to the West
were occuring and U.S. intelligence officials and weapons
scientists were given a chance to debrief the immigrants,
they presumably could make a reasonably good judgment
over time about the qualifications of the people who were
being let in. Nonetheless, there would always be some
residual concern that many of the best weapons scientists
and engineers had secretly stayed in Russia.
Sixth, even if all these obstacles could be surmounted
and Russian WMD specialists and their families moved en
masse to the United States, serious questions would arise
about what to do with the new immigrants. Limited
numbers of foreign scientists and technicians could be
accommodated quickly either in the private sector or at
universities and research institutes, but an influx of tens of
thousands (many of whom would not know English) would
far exceed the capacity to absorb them, at least in the near
term. Language barriers alone would pose a major obstacle
to fruitful employment, as would the limited applicability
(or potential irrelevance) of their skills to functions
unconnected with the Soviet WMD complexes. Some of the
specialists might be willing to take jobs outside their areas
of expertise, but others would undoubtedly be averse to the
notion of abandoning their traditional fields of work. If
suitable posts for them were not soon available, they might
eventually seek to leave. Presumably, the U.S. Government
would need to establish a comprehensive monitoring system
that would give prompt notice if former Soviet WMD experts
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decided to move back to Russia or to a Third World country.
Such a system, even if practical, would be difficult to sustain
over time unless the movements of the scientists were
sharply circumscribed, a task that would itself be daunting.
Even in Germany during the early post-war years, when all
residents (not just weapons scientists) had to seek
permission from the allied occupation authorities to travel
abroad, the Western powers occasionally let down their
guard, enabling highly trained military scientists and
technicians to emigrate illegally from Germany to
Argentina. The challenge of enforcing a comparable system
for Russian WMD experts would be at least as formidable.
In all these respects, there seems to be little to no
prospect that large-scale immigration to the West by highly
trained Russian WMD scientists, engineers, and
technicians is at all feasible either now or over the next 10 to
15 years. The immigration of senior personnel to the
West—especially if it occurred with the Russian
government’s assistance—would be highly desirable, but in
practical terms, the whole notion seems fanciful. The
likelihood is that tens of thousands of key nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons experts will remain in
Russia indefinitely and will continue to pose a threat of
strategic proliferation, both horizontal and vertical.
*****
These conclusions may seem to offer little reason for
hope, but in fact there are certain steps that could markedly
improve the situation over the long term. In particular, a
greatly expanded program of student exchanges would be
far more practical and effective than anything that has been
done up to now (or is likely to be done) vis-à-vis Russian
WMD experts. Not only would a large-scale student
exchange program encourage democratization in Russia
and provide a sounder basis for Russia’s ties with the West,
it also could indirectly ameliorate the human dimension of
the strategic proliferation threat. Unfortunately, student
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exchanges thus far have played only an insignificant role in
U.S. policy, despite the hopes of Senator Bill Bradley in the
early 1990s when he put together the Freedom Support Act
(FSA), which provided democracy assistance to Russia. An
initial $20 million was allocated under the FSA to a
Secondary School Exchange Program (later known as the
Future Leaders Exchange Program, or FLEX). Although
the FSA also provided $30 million for exchanges of
undergraduates and graduate students, the high school
exchange program was deemed especially important
because it would involve adolescents, whose outlooks and
behavioral patterns would not yet be firmly congealed.
Bradley expected that some 15,000 to 20,000 Russian high
school students a year would attend school in the United
States and that many thousands of others would be enrolled
each year in Western Europe. Exchanges of that magnitude
over a decade or two would have exposed a large cohort of
young people in Russia to the values, mores, and
institutions of democratic capitalism.
But, as things worked out, only a tiny fraction of the
projected number of Russian high school students actually
came to the United States via FLEX and other programs.
From 1993 to 2001, a total of just 4,415 high school students
from Russia—and another 6,076 from the rest of the former
Soviet Union—attended American schools under the
auspices of FLEX. This means that, during the first 9 years
of FLEX, fewer than 500 Russian high school students a
year took part in the program. Worse still, the annual
number of Russian high school students involved in FLEX
was much lower by the late 1990s than it had been earlier in
the decade. From 621 students in 1993 and 744 in 1994, the
annual number fell to 305 by 1999—less than 1/50th of the
initial target. The number enrolled in West European
schools each year was even smaller.
The meager scale of the high school exchanges has been
due partly to linguistic barriers. Although a large and
growing number of Russian high school students know at
least some English (or German), the language requirement
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necessarily limits the applicant pool. In addition, many
Russian high school students have been deterred from
applying because their schools in Russia will not permit
them to receive academic credit for the work they do
overseas. FLEX has also been impeded by the difficulty of
informing prospective applicants about the exchanges, a
problem that is especially acute outside Moscow. The
number of Russian high school students in outlying regions
who enjoy regular (or even sporadic) access to the Internet is
woefully inadequate. Hence, many Russian students are
simply unaware of the opportunities available to them.
Serious though these problems may be, they
undoubtedly could be surmounted if the United States were
to devote increased resources to the effort. But a more
daunting obstacle is posed by the one-sided nature of the
high school exchanges. Very few American high school
students have been willing to enroll in Russian schools for
even a semester, not to mention a full year. Part of the
problem is that only a scant number of American high school
students can speak Russian. Although proficiency in
Russian is not mandatory for certain short-term high school
exchange programs, it obviously is required for participants
in the main long-term program for American high school
students—the Semester High School Exchange Program,
which brought a total of 55 American students to Russia
from 1993 through 2001 (an average of about six students a
year). Even if language barriers did not exist, many
American students would probably be hesitant about
applying for a semester-long (or year-long) exchange
program in Russia. Among other things, they (and their
parents) would likely be concerned that a prolonged stay in
Russia could pose risks for their health and well-being.
Although a sizable number of American undergraduates
and graduate students do pursue studies or field research in
Russia, the high school exchanges envisaged under the FSA
have been exchanges mostly in name. The absence of
genuine exchanges has clearly circumscribed the number of
Russian participants.
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This problem may not be amenable to a direct solution,
but potentially there is a way to get around it. If the student
exchange programs were redesigned so that American high
school, undergraduate, and graduate students were treated
as a single category, the pool of students who could be paired
with Russian high school students would be much larger.
The exchanges would not be strictly one for one, but they
would be far closer to genuine exchanges than in the 1990s.
The same principle could be adopted by Canada, Britain,
Australia, Germany, and other Western countries for their
own student exchanges with Russia. The aim would be to
expand the annual number of Russian high school
participants to the thousands originally envisaged.
If indeed some 15,000 to 20,000 Russian high school
students a year were to attend school in the United States
and thousands of others were enrolled in other Western
countries, the benefits would be immense. The Russian
students would receive a first-hand look at democratic
procedures, civic initiatives, and a market economy. Upon
returning to Russia, they could try to replicate in their own
society what they had seen and experienced abroad. They
also could encourage many of their fellow students to take
part in exchanges and to seek greater exposure to the West.
A massive expansion of the high school exchanges would be
particularly valuable over the longer term, as the number of
alumni of the program rose into the hundreds of thousands.
Such a trend would give a much-needed boost to
U.S.-Russian relations and would facilitate the introduction
of democratic norms and capitalist institutions in Russia,
providing an alternative for young people who might
otherwise have gone to work in Russia’s WMD facilities.
Although student exchanges are certainly not a panacea,
they seem to offer the best long-term option for coping with
the human dimension of the strategic proliferation threat in
Russia.
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CHAPTER 6

APPENDIX
EFFORTS BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS TO EMPLOY RUSSIAN WMD
SPECIALISTS

This appendix is a supplement to the fourth section of my
chapter. It explains why the programs established by
Western governments and organizations over the past
decade to employ Russian WMD experts in nonmilitary jobs
cannot provide long-term alternative employment for more
than a very small fraction of the total pool of WMD
specialists in Russia. A fully documented version of this
appendix is available from the author upon request.
Science Centers Program.
The International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC) was established in Moscow in November 1992 by the
United States, Japan, Russia, and the European Union
(EU), with an initial commitment of $75 million. A
Ukrainian counterpart of the ISTC, the Science and
Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), was set up by the
United States, Sweden, Canada, and Ukraine a year later.
The main purpose of the two centers is to employ WMD
scientists in “Science Projects” and “Partner” programs. The
Science Projects are solicited directly by the ISTC and
STCU, whereas the Partner projects are solicited by foreign
businesses, scientific institutes, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and government agencies, working
in coordination with the ISTC or STCU. Teams of scientists
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from research institutes in the former Soviet Union (FSU)
carry out the requisite work.
From 1992 through the end of 2000, a total of 590 science
center projects involving 431 research institutes in the FSU
received a total of $329 million. The large bulk (more than
85 percent) of this money was provided by the ISTC, which
approved another 141 projects in 2001 for an additional
$34.7 million. Roughly half of the funding for the two science
centers has come from the United States (initially via the
CTR program, and since 1995 mainly through the State
Department), and most of the rest has been provided by the
EU and Japan. The foreign businesses, laboratories,
governments, and NGOs that fund the science center
Partner projects are supposed to be able to send untaxed
monetary contributions and duty-free shipments of capital
equipment to researchers and their institutes in the FSU. In
Russia, however, the nontaxable provisions have been
difficult to enforce. Although the ISTC established
individual bank accounts for grant recipients to prevent
taxes from being assessed, the Russian government has
levied taxes on ISTC capital purchases.
The science centers may provide a temporary diversion
from WMD work, but their ability to create long-term
alternative employment for Russian weapons experts is
almost nil. The ISTC’s Annual Report for 2000 claimed that
21,275 “scientists and their technical team members” in the
FSU received payment for at least 1 day of work on ISTC
projects in 2000, but the report also noted that the average
number of days spent by team members on the projects was
only 59. This figure is put into even starker perspective by a
recent GAO report, which reveals that approximately half of
the former Soviet scientists taking part in science center
activities in 2000 spent a total of no more than a few days on
their projects. Only about 3 percent of the participants
devoted nearly all of their time to the projects, and even in
those cases, the outside work ceased once the projects
ended.
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There is little reason to believe that the ISTC will be
better able to secure permanent placements for Russian
scientific workers over the next 10 to 15 years. Very few of
the current ISTC projects appear sustainable over the
longer term. One of the leading American experts on the
program acknowledged in March 2001 that only five of the
current projects—on synthetic neural networks, water
q u ality mon itori ng, l eak d etec ti on moni tor i ng,
titanium-nickel alloys, and early warning sensors for
nuclear power plants—offer any hope of commercial success
in the future. Not a single one of these projects, however, has
yet been commercialized.
The ISTC program has been plagued by a number of
other serious problems, especially the persistent
indications that Russian scientists receiving ISTC support
are continuing to pursue weapons research. The ISTC
charter explicitly prohibits funding for defense-related
projects, but, as the GAO recently noted, “the project
agreements do not prohibit the scientists from continuing to
work on research for their institutes including, in Russia,
research related to nuclear weapons.” Even if the ISTC did
try to ban all weapons research (something the Russian
government would never accept), such a ban would be very
difficult to enforce. As the GAO pointed out, the science
centers “cannot track what the scientists are doing while
they are not working on the projects or after the projects
end. . . . [T]here is no formal way to monitor what other
research these scientists are performing or for whom they
are performing it.” In an earlier (1999) report, the GAO had
presented disturbing evidence that many of the ISTC
recipients were conducting weapons-related research when
they were not working on the funded projects. There is little
reason to believe that the situation has changed since then,
particularly because so many of the Russian scientists
spend so little time on the ISTC projects.
These considerations have spurred some analysts to
warn that the ISTC cannot prevent foreign governments or
terrorist groups from enlisting the aid of Russian weapons
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scientists. The ISTC, they argue, is unable to halt the
sharing of information over the Internet or “moonlighting
by modem.” Moreover, rogue states could try to set up front
businesses in Russia or Ukraine that would approach
weapons scientists working on ISTC projects. Other
concerns have been expressed about the misappropriation
of funds from collaborative projects and the development of
dual-use products under ISTC auspices that could later be
incorporated into weapons programs.
To the extent that the ISTC projects are allowing
Russian weapons scientists to spend only a limited amount
of time on ISTC work while devoting most of their time to
weapons research, the ISTC money can be seen, at least to
some extent, as a subsidy for the Russian WMD complexes.
There is even a risk, as the GAO acknowledges, that
“financing certain [ISTC] projects could help sustain a
weapons institute infrastructure in the former Soviet Union
by keeping institutes in operation that might [otherwise]
have curtailed their research functions for lack of funds.” If
indeed the ISTC is inadvertently keeping some of the
Russian WMD facilities in business, the negative
consequences of the ISTC may outweigh any of the center’s
gains.
Even if some of these problems can be remedied in the
future, enough obstacles have emerged to cast doubt on the
value of the ISTC in ensuring that former Soviet weapons
scientists will be able to take permanent jobs outside the
defense complex.
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP).
The IPP, a program launched in 1994 (under a different
name) by the U.S. Department of Energy, promotes
partnerships between research institutes in the FSU and
members of the U.S. Industry Coalition (USIC), an alliance
of private American companies. Beginning in 2002, the IPP
will be expanded to encompass the activities of the NCI,
which is being merged with the IPP. From 1994 to 2001, the
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IPP established a total of more than 400 projects at 171
research institutes in the FSU. Of these projects, roughly 85
percent were in Russia, though only about a quarter of them
were in the nuclear closed cities. When the IPP started, 70
percent of its funding was earmarked for the employment of
nuclear weapons scientists, and 30 percent was to be used
for CBW researchers. In practice, however, well over 70
percent of funded projects have involved nuclear-related
institutes, and most of these have been outside the ten
closed cities. (In 2000, for example, 26 of the 29 newly
approved projects involved nuclear-related facilities,
whereas only three involved biological institutes.) Because
the IPP recently changed its guidelines to stipulate that
“reasonable [FSU] institute openness and access are a
requirement of receiving funding,” it is unclear how feasible
it will be in the future to set up projects in the closed nuclear
cities or at the main CBW institutes.
For several years after 1994, the IPP was plagued by
egregious administrative deficiencies, most of which have
now been corrected. The deficiencies were highlighted in a
February 1999 GAO report, which disclosed that relatively
little of the money allocated to IPP projects had actually
reached scientists in the FSU. The remainder of the
funding—some 63 percent—had been spent in the United
States on oversight and implementation costs. The GAO
also discovered that the number of scientists receiving
funds was sometimes unknown, and that IPP officials could
not always confirm that the programs were targeting the
institutes and researchers for which they were intended. In
addition, the GAO found that a substantial number of
Russian participants were using their IPP projects to
pursue “dual-use technologies” that could be adapted later
on for military purposes, and it revealed that some of the
scientists at DOE laboratories who were responsible for
overseeing IPP projects were unaware of the amount of
funding their Russian counterparts had received. In at least
one case cited by the GAO, not a single Russian scientist or
engineer was employed at the institute that was being
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funded. In another case, the Russian institute had failed to
spend any of its IPP funding on scientists’ salaries and had
used the money instead for “overhead, travel, computers,
and Internet access.”
The public disclosure of these shortcomings (and the
controversy that ensued) prompted major reforms. The
head of the IPP was replaced, and important administrative
safeguards were adopted. Beginning in 2000, at least 60-65
percent of IPP funding was supposed to be allocated directly
to projects in Russia, rather than to administrative
expenses in the United States. In addition, the IPP
increased the stringency of the multi-stage review
conducted by the Inter-Laboratory Board (ILAB, a body
consisting of experts from ten DOE national laboratories
and DOE’s Kansas City plant) to ensure that new projects
conform to the program’s goals. In particular, the ILAB
adopted stricter criteria to guard against the dual-use
phenomenon. The IPP also established an accounting and
auditing system to ensure that funds are transferred to the
proper recipients and are used for the intended purposes.
The focus of the program has shifted as well. Whereas the
IPP originally envisioned a three-phase life cycle for most
projects—a start-up period supported by government
funding (Thrust 1), joint capital investment by government
and private sources (Thrust 2), and full privatization
(Thrust 3)—the program since 1999 has concentrated
primarily on phases two and three. The IPP thus has
implemented all of the recommendations proposed by the
GAO in its 1999 report.
Significant though these improvements have been, the
ability of the IPP to provide permanent nonmilitary
employment for large numbers of Russian WMD experts is
and will remain inadequate. As Siegfried Hecker, the
long-time director of Los Alamos National Laboratory,
recently observed, “The scale of the [IPP] has never been
commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.”
Although the IPP in recent years has sought to promote
commercialization efforts and cost-share partnerships with
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private corporations, this effort as of late 2001 had yielded
little by way of long-term employment opportunities—a
mere eight projects that support only 294 permanent jobs,
most of which are not filled by highly trained WMD experts.
None of these eight ventures involves spinoffs of the major
nuclear weapons institutes or CBW facilities. Although IPP
officials claim that a few other cost-shared projects also
“have good prospects of commercial success” in the years
ahead, there is in fact relatively little that can be
accomplished in the absence of sufficient capital investment
from Russia’s private sector. The net commercialization
results have been—and undoubtedly will continue to
be—minuscule compared to the enormous number of
Russian WMD experts who need to be absorbed.
The daunting scale of the problem would overshadow the
IPP’s achievements under the best of circumstances, but the
situation is made even worse by certain aspects of the
program. According to official data, a total of 10,874
scientists and engineers from the FSU have taken part in
IPP projects from 1994 through the start of 2002. However,
many of these participants have never actually been
involved with WMD programs. The IPP has no ironclad
way—even with the help of U.S. intelligence agencies—to
ensure that the right people are actually taking part in its
projects. Under recent IPP guidelines, “new project
proposals must list the [former Soviet] scientists and
engineers, along with the nature of their involvement in
weapons of mass destruction work during Soviet times.” But
IPP officials have no independent means of corroborating
this information. Although the IPP officially “expects that a
preponderance of [Russian and FSU] staff involved in
IPP-funded projects” will have worked at one time or
another on WMD programs, the phrasing of this guideline
contains two glaring loopholes: First, “expecting” something
is not the same as “requiring” it. Second, there is no way to
tell whether the IPP’s “expectation” has been met unless one
assumes that the information provided by the Russian
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institutes and Minatom is correct—an assumption that is
dubious at best.
As for the Russian IPP participants who have been
engaged in WMD work, the large majority have returned
full-time to weapons research after their IPP projects were
completed. Indeed, even when Russian WMD experts have
been working part-time on IPP projects, they have
continued to be actively involved with WMD programs. This
arrangement is explicitly permitted under the IPP’s
General Program Guidance:
Given that IPP projects may not always employ Russian
nuclear weapons scientists and engineers full time, it is
possible that these specialists may work on nuclear
weapons-related activities of the Russian Federation while
not engaged on IPP projects. . . . Scientists and engineers still
employed in Russian nuclear weapons facilities are not
precluded from working on IPP-funded projects.

Whether such activities are compatible with the
underlying purpose of the IPP is, however, far from clear.
Doubts about the matter were expressed in late 2001 by the
GAO, which, after noting that former Soviet weapons
experts who are employed part-time on IPP projects “often
continue to work at former Soviet WMD research
institutes,” warned that “aiding such scientists . . . could
create new risks for U.S. national security.” The GAO also
emphasized that efforts to “assess the impact of [U.S.] aid”
on the Russian WMD complexes have been stymied by
“Russia’s reluctance to provide U.S. officials with full access
to relevant sites and materials.” Thus, even if the
dimensions of the problem were not so overwhelming, the
IPP may inadvertently be making things worse by
subsidizing experts who continue to work on WMD
programs.
On balance, then, despite notable improvements in the
IPP since 1999, its role in countering the threat of strategic
proliferation is questionable. The IPP may prove more
effective than the Science Centers program (which is
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limited to grant-making), but there is no reason to believe
that the IPP can foster permanent alternative jobs for tens
of thousands of Russian WMD experts over the next 10 to 15
years. The magnitude of the problem is too vast, no matter
how well the IPP is run.
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI).
The NCI, another program run by DOE, was founded in
September 1998 as a Russian-American partnership.
Beginning in 2002, the NCI will be folded into the IPP. As
the name implies, the NCI was supposed to “assist the
Russian Federation in its announced intention of reducing
the size of its nuclear weapons complex” and to “promote
nonproliferation goals through redirecting the work of
nuclear weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians in
the Russian closed nuclear cities.” Together with officials
from Minatom, the NCI developed five strategies to achieve
these goals: the development of city-by-city plans for
downsizing; the development of local infrastructure; the
facilitation of the transition from weapons research to
commercial research; training and other community
resource development activities; and the leveraging of funds
and general encouragement of investment.
During the 4 years of its existence, the NCI established
sev era l proj ects eac h i n Sar ov, Snezhi ns k, and
Zheleznogorsk, the three closed nuclear cities that were
initially targeted. Two International Development Centers,
two Open Computing Centers, and two Nonproliferation
Centers were set up, and some very limited commercial
ventures were initiated or expanded. In total, however, only
100 new jobs were created for Russian scientists and
engineers, a result that even supporters of the NCI
described as “paltry.” Part of the problem was that only 30
percent of the $16 million allocated to the NCI during its
first few years was actually spent in Russia. The rest went
toward administrative and other costs in the United States.
Even if the funding had been several times greater and more
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of it had been spent in Russia, it is not at all clear that the
NCI would have fared any better. A number of
circumstances inherently limited the value of the initiative.
First, DOE and the U.S. nuclear laboratories were
not—and are not—well suited to promote commercial
development, particularly among Russian weapons
scientists who lack any tradition of entrepreneurialism. A
recent analysis of the IPP showed that U.S. Government
funding had not gone toward projects that respond to “the
technology innovation needs of Western industry.” DOE’s
handling of the NCI was even more dismal. A GAO report on
the program in mid-2001 highlighted DOE’s inability to
promote commercial activity in the closed cities, citing,
among other examples, the undue emphasis given to
community development:
DOE officials told us that community development activities
are needed to help make the cities more attractive to potential
Western investors. However, none of the [private] industry
officials whom we talked to during the course of our audit
indicated that they would be more likely to invest in the
nuclear cities because of municipal and social improvements.

The GAO report also noted that “the most successful
commercial effort we observed in the nuclear cities”
involving former weapons scientists was a computer
venture in Sarov that was “undertaken without U.S.
Government assistance.”
Second, the Russian government’s priorities for the NCI
were never really conducive to U.S. nonproliferation goals.
In particular, the Russian authorities prevented the NCI
from extending to facilities that were of genuine
proliferation concern. Siegfried Hecker, the former director
of Los Alamos, recently acknowledged that the NCI “was
handicapped from the beginning” because “the Russian
government insisted, and the U.S. Government agreed, to
restrict [the NCI’s] activities only to the “ ‘open’ parts of the
closed cities,” meaning the portions outside the fences of the
nuclear weapons institutes. Conflicts over this matter, and
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the two sides’ diverging views of the best projects to pursue,
spawned what Hecker described as “an atmosphere of
increasing hostility and mistrust between the Russian and
U.S. Governments” from 1998 on.
Third, even after the key WMD facilities were excluded
from the program at Moscow’s insistence, the Russian
government prevented NCI officials and potential foreign
investors from gaining adequate access to other parts of the
closed cities. The Russian authorities kept the number of
visits to a minimum, required long lead-times (at least 45
days and sometimes several months) for approval of visits,
limited the size of the visits to no more than a few people,
and prohibited any access to a large number of facilities.
Many requests for visits were simply turned down. The
result was that NCI personnel were unable to maintain
adequate supervision over projects, and prospective
investors were deterred from even considering most
ventures.
Fourth, even if the NCI projects had been impeccably
designed and structured, there were many barriers in the
closed nuclear cities—and in Russia as a whole—to
commercial success (beyond the uncertainty about access
just described). The geographic and economic remoteness of
most of the cities was itself a major obstacle to development.
To be viable over the longer term, the projects eventually
would have had to receive sizable loans from Russian banks
or direct foreign investment. Yet, even now, despite recent
improvements in the Russian economy, almost nothing has
been done in Russia to transform the banking sector into a
viable institution that will function as banking systems do
in the West. In the absence of key features of a market
economy—a sound financial infrastructure, solid
guarantees of property rights, and reliable means of
enforcing contracts—foreign investors would have been
extremely reluctant to commit funds to Russian-based
ventures, even if physical access to the sites could have been
assured. Hence, NCI projects were bound to encounter the
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same sorts of p r obl ems that
commercialization efforts of the IPP.

bed evi l ed

the

Thus, there is no reason to believe that the merger of the
NCI with the IPP will increase the IPP’s ability to provide
permanent alternative employment for many thousands of
Russian WMD scientists and engineers. At best, the NCI
amounted to what the GAO described as “a subsidy program
for Russia . . . rather than a stimulus for economic
development.” At worst, the NCI may actually have helped
keep the Russian nuclear weapons complex larger than it
should be. Russian officials acknowledged in 2001 that
“most of the scientists receiving [NCI] funds continue to
work on Russia’s weapons of mass destruction programs.”
Oles Lomacky, the executive director of the ISTC from 1995
until 1997, warned that it was a “fantasy” to believe that “if
you give Russian scientists enough money, they will stop
doing what they were doing before, which was designing
weapons. . . . [T]he same people who were designing bombs
in the Soviet era are still there.” Lomacky added that “our
objective ought not to be maintaining the nuclear cities”
through the NCI; instead, the United States should promote
“opportunities for these [bomb designers] to do other things
somewhere else.”
Although only some of the NCI’s activities will be
continued under the auspices of the IPP (the other activities
will simply be terminated), it is conceivable that the merger
will be a net detriment for the IPP. The risk of the NCI all
along, as a U.S. Congressional Budget official warned in
1999, was that it would simply “create expectations of
long-term assistance and thereby reduce any incentives for
[Russian nuclear scientists] to find work in the commercial
sector,” leaving the United States in the position of
supporting “Russian scientists and engineers who continue
to design and build nuclear weapons.” That is clearly
something that IPP officials will want to avoid.
Even if the merger can be handled smoothly, the only
question for the purposes of this chapter is whether the
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transfer of NCI activities to the IPP will significantly
increase the likelihood that the IPP can generate
permanent, non-military jobs for the 60,000 or so
highly-trained WMD scientists, engineers, and technicians
who are of greatest proliferation concern. There is no basis
for concluding that this will be the case.
Nongovernmental Efforts.
The Civilian Research and Development Foundation
(CRDF), a semi-private American venture set up by the U.S.
Government in 1995, is supposed to arrange collaborative
research projects between scientists in the United States
and the former Soviet Union. One of the major aims of the
CRDF is to fund civilian R&D projects that will help
weapons scientists in Russia’s closed cities leave the defense
sector and focus on civilian pursuits. To date, however, the
organization’s accomplishments have been negligible. The
CRDF Closed Cities Program funded 19 projects in Sarov
and Snezhinsk from 1996 to 2000, but the amount of
investment ($275,000) was too small to create any
permanent new jobs. Moreover, none of the ventures proved
commercially viable.
Most of the other U.S. and West European non-profit
foundations that have supported Russian science have dealt
exclusively with the civilian institutes. In the early 1990s,
foreign foundations provided an extremely important boost
to scientific research in Russia. The MacArthur
Foundation, the Fulbright program, and the Carnegie
Corporation launched pioneering efforts, and other
American foundations soon followed suit. In 1993 the
Russian Academy of Sciences received more funding from
the International Science Foundation (ISF, an organization
established in late 1992 by the American billionaire George
Soros) than from the Russian government. During the 4
years of the ISF’s existence, from 1993 through 1996, the
foundation provided roughly $130 million for scientific
research in the former Soviet Union. As late as 1995, up to
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one-third of all money for civilian science in Russia and
Ukraine was still coming from foreign organizations and
foundations, including the ISF. Professional scientific
societies in the United States, including the American
Astronomical Society, the American Physical Society, and
the American Mathematical Society, launched separate
fund-raising efforts in the early 1990s for their Russian
counterparts and transferred tens of thousands of scientific
periodicals and books free of charge to Russian scientists
and research institutes.
Similar efforts were made in Western Europe (especially
Germany) by professional organizations and non-profit
foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the
Volkswagen Stiftung, and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
In May 1993 the European Union established the
International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation
with Scientists from the New Independent States of the
Former Soviet Union (INTAS). With an initial annual
budget of $27 million and a mandate to “promote
cooperation with scientists” from the former Soviet Union
until at least the end of 2002, INTAS was able to support a
wide range of activities throughout the 1990s.
Since 1995, the level of foreign foundation support for
scientific activities in Russia has declined, but funding from
abroad (including money from Western private companies)
remains crucial for scientific research in Russia. As of 1999,
some 16.9 percent of gross expenditures on R&D in Russia
came from foreign sources, well above the level of just a few
years earlier. Although Western foundations have shifted
most of their emphasis from individual grants (which were
heavily funded in the early 1990s) to basic support for
research institutes and science education, a number of key
grant programs are still operating. Foreign funding is likely
to remain extremely important even though the future of
some activities (especially the International Soros Science
Education Project, a successor to the ISF) was temporarily
thrown into doubt in 2001 when the second part of Russia’s
n ew ta x code took ef f ec t. Und er the gui d el i nes
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accompanying the code, a 35.9 percent “social tax” was to be
imposed on individual grants. The Soros Foundation had to
go through a lengthy appeal process to secure an exemption
from the tax, which otherwise would have placed a crippling
burden on the science education project.
Even though important grant-making programs for
Russian scientists are likely to continue under foreign
auspices, and even though a number of closely related
activities have been set up, including a program launched
by the MacArthur Foundation in 1997 to fund basic
research and higher education in Russia (a program
subsequently funded as well by the Carnegie Corporation of
New York and overseen by the CRDF), these projects have
no direct bearing on scientists, engineers, and technicians
in the Russian defense complex. Indirectly, a few of the
programs may offer a fallback option—albeit only a limited
and transitory one—for some of the scientists and engineers
who might choose (or be forced) to leave the weapons
complex, but the total amount of funding available is much
too small to accommodate more than a handful of them over
the long term.
Initiatives by American aerospace corporations to
collaborate with Russian enterprises could provide an
alternative source of employment for a small number of
weapons scientists (though not necessarily those working
on WMD programs). The Boeing Corporation established a
research center in Moscow in 1993 and now employs 500
workers in seven Russian cities. The company recently
signed an agreement with the Russian Aerospace Agency to
collaborate on space research, rocket launch technologies,
and the development of a short-range jetliner. Lockheed
Martin has undertaken joint research and development
projects with other Russian enterprises such as the Vavilov
Institute, the Skobeltsin Nuclear Physics Institute, the Ioffe
Physics-and-Technology Institute, Khrunichev Industries,
and the Yakovlev Central Design Bureau. The collective
impact of private sector collaborations such as these on the
employment of former weapons scientists (exclusive of the
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activities of members of the U.S. Industry Coalition and
other corporate participants in U.S. Government programs)
is unclear, but at best their role in providing new jobs for
WMD experts will be minor.

194

CHAPTER 7

DEFENSE CONVERSION:
HOW FAR CAN RUSSIA EXPAND SMALL
AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES?

Matthew Partan

While numerous barriers have hampered the growth of
the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector in Russia,
this sector has the potential to help curb proliferation of
strategic weapons and technology from Russia. The
long-term development of a more significant SME sector in
Russia would help provide alternative employment
opportunities, reduce excess military-oriented research and
development (R&D) capacity, increase nonweapon export
revenues, and encourage broader economic reforms and
n on defen se en ter p r i se gr owth. Thes e p otenti al
contributions are particularly important, given the
continuing Russian government focus on large defense
enterprises, the weak record of new job creation in Russia,
and the failure of defense industry conversion efforts. This
chapter considers the major barriers to SME growth,
examines factors supporting such growth, and offers a
range of suggestions for how Western policies can help the
Russian SME sector develop so as to play a positive role in
reducing strategic weapons proliferation from Russia. In
the U.S. approach to such barriers, of course, care must be
taken to avoid dismantling those that, while discouraging
Russian SME growth, also discourage proliferation
activities.
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After a period of rapid growth in the early 1990s, the
Russian SME sector has stalled and is less than one-fifth
the size of comparable SME sectors in other advanced
economies. The most powerful barriers include:

• Institutional and administrative burdens (excessive
tax, bureaucratic corruption, regulatory burdens, lack of
effective government support or unemployment safety net);
•

Resource and demand constraints (inadequate access
to start-up capital or other financing, low investment,
barriers to market entry that favor large incumbent
businesses, depressed domestic demand, unequal market
competition);

•

Personal and societal views (negative views of
entrepreneurs, resentment, risk-averse technologists,
passivity, preference for large-scale/high-end projects, fear
of uncertainty);

• Managerial approaches (focus on old bureaucratic
methods, focus on state support, lack of effective new
ownership, low turnover, lack of skills to identify markets);
and,
•

Structure of defense R&D in Russia (labor-intensive,
lack of integration, state support and hidden subsidies for
large enterprises, lagging technology development, lack of
marketability).
Nevertheless, there are some positive factors that may
be exploited to promote SME sector growth, particularly in
market niches such as information technology, offshore
programming services, medical equipment, and consulting
where there is access to foreign markets and funding.
There are lessons from past cases and experiences in
other transition economies to help guide Western policies
and assistance programs in more effectively encouraging
the emergence of a larger Russian SME sector, thus helping
discourage proliferation:
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• Emphasize market-driven commercialization and
focused business services; recognize that many market
areas tend to be medium-tech instead of high-tech, and that
the early involvement of Western private sector partners
can be critical;
•

Establish clear program goals and evaluation
guidelines; avoid projects and enterprises that do not meet
initial viability criteria;

• Focus support on local and regional programs that
have proven most effective (a number of regions in Russia
have demonstrated effective SME growth using local
programs); and,
•

Reduce the emphasis on short-term assistance to
employees at incumbent or state enterprises (encouraging
personnel to leave those incumbent enterprises will be
critical in achieving long-term SME sector growth and
reducing excessive focus on continuing military work).
Introduction.
This chapter investigates how efforts to encourage
entrepreneurial activity in Russia’s defense scientific and
production sector could serve as part of a long-term strategy
to reduce the proliferation of strategic weapons and
technology from Russia. In particular, I look at the potential
for expanding the SME sector in Russia, and consider the
impacts this may have on Russian proliferation behavior.
While entrepreneurial activity is broader than the SME
sector, the growth and status of SMEs are critical indicators
of the activities of entrepreneurs in creating new jobs and
innovative technology in many transition and advanced
economies, and can serve as a good measure of the scale of
entrepreneurial activities in the Russian economy.
The proliferation of strategic weapons and technology
from Russia is driven by many factors that are not affected
by the SME sector, but growth in the SME sector can have
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significant impacts on both the capabilities and the
incentives for individuals and enterprises to proliferate
weapons and technology.1 Given the strong Russian
government focus on large enterprises as the core of
Russian defense industry, as well as the weak job creation
in the Russian economy and the failure of efforts to convert
or restructure Russia’s defense industry towards civilian
applications, it would appear that an expansion of the SME
sector may help reduce Russian proliferation by the
following means:2

• Providing alternative employment opportunities for
defense sector technical specialists and other personnel;
•

Reducing excess military-oriented industrial and
scientific capabilities;

• Increasing Russia’s ability to earn revenues through
activities other than exporting raw materials or military
capabilities;
•

Encouraging stronger economic reforms and
enterprise growth in areas not related to the military; and,

• Reducing the influence of the defense sector in
government policymaking.
However, it is important to recognize that some types of
expanded SME activities may dismantle existing barriers
to proliferation and brain drain, thus harming
nonproliferation efforts.
While the small business sector has been a significant
source of innovation and new job creation in many
successful transition and advanced economies, this sector
is simply too small to play a comparable role in Russia
unless major steps are taken to expand it. The Russian
SME sector remains much smaller than those in many
other transition economies or Western countries. For
example, the share of gross domestic product (GDP)
produced by the SME sector is 5-6 times larger in mature
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market economies than in Russia. 3 The successful
transition economies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic also have much more significant SME sectors than
Russia, with over one million SMEs in Poland, and 500-700
thousand in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The
relatively small size of the Russian SME sector is shown in
Table 1 (based on 1997 data). In addition to being
undersized, the Russian SME sector is very geographically
concentrated. About a third of all Russian SMEs are located
in just Moscow and St. Petersburg alone.
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Country

Number of
SMEs
(thousands)

Japan
EU
U.S.
Russia

6,450
15,770
19,300
844

Number of
SMEs per
1,000
Population
49.6
45
74.2
3.6 - 5.7

Employment
by SMEs
(millions)

Percentage
of Total
Employment

SME Share
of GDP
(Percentage)

39.5
68
70.2
8.3

78
72
54
13

52-55
63-67
50-52
10-11
4

Table 1. Relative Size of SME Sectors.

The SME sector did not exist at all in the Soviet period.
All enterprises were entirely state-owned, and the concept
of private business was not accepted until the economic and
legal reforms of the late 1980s.5 While the SME sector in
Russia grew rapidly after private enterprises were legalized
in 1990-91, growth of this sector stalled in Russia after
1994, with the decline in the number of people employed by
small firms reflecting a worsening climate for such firms.6
In fact, the number of small businesses in Russia that
specialize in R&D reportedly fell by 60 percent in the period
1994-97. The proportion of small businesses specializing in
R&D fell from 8.2 percent of all SME in 1994, to 5.1 percent
in 1997.7 While trade and service sectors in Russia have
seen the emergence of widespread SME activity, small
businesses have not played a significant role in the R&D,
technology-intensive, or defense-related areas.
8
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Number of
Firms
(thousands)
Number of
Full-time
Employees
(thousands)
Number of
Part-time
Employees
(thousands)

1991
268

1992
550

1993
875

1994
896

1995
877

1996
842

1997
861

1998
868

1999
890

8,480 8,995 6,269 6,515

6,208 6,292

6,677 4,926 2,352 2,124

1,194 970

8

Table 2. Russian SME Sector Employment, 1991-98.
BARRIERS TO ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY
IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR

An enormous number of barriers have limited the
growth of entrepreneurial activity and the SME sector in
Russia, and many of these limiting forces are particularly
strong in defense-related sectors. These factors have
contributed to the current situation where large businesses
and institutes continue to dominate the defense sector,
while the existing SME sector remains too small to play a
significant role in creating new jobs. In fact, many
conditions for SMEs worsened during the 1990s, and
continue to be problematic today.
Institutional and Administrative Constraints.
Factors such as excessive tax, bureaucratic corruption,
regulatory burdens, lack of government programs to
promote SMEs, lack of adequate intellectual property rights
(IPR) protection, and lack of an effective unemployment
safety net have severely hampered the development of
entrepreneurial activities and the SME sector in Russia.9
These factors have combined to distort the emerging
R u ssian mark et and hi nd er the emer genc e of
entrepreneurial small business. There are literally
hundreds of state bodies involved in oversight and
regulation of SMEs at all levels of the economy.10 For
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example, inadequate protection of IPRs has led to a
situation where an estimated 90 percent of the software
applications used in Russia are pirated (vs. under 30
percent in the United States), thereby significantly limiting
the ability of the new software industry to develop profitable
domestic markets in Russia.11 The fact that Russian state
institutions often have partial patent rights over the work of
their personnel further complicates the IPR situation for
prospective private enterprises.
The tax system disadvantages small firms due to the
onerous compliance burden (maintaining records,
declarations, dealing with multiple tax organizations) and
excessive rates. Administrative barriers include the
numerous registration, licensing, and reporting procedures
imposed on small businesses by multiple levels of
authorities and administrative bodies. The need to obtain
licenses and administrative permissions from numerous
bureaucratic offices provides fertile ground for corruption.
In addition, surveys report that 75-80 percent of SME
managers complain of being subjected to threats and
coercion from criminal groups. Many large enterprises
continue to play significant welfare support roles, meaning
that the large ministries, scientific research institutes, and
producers have an advantage over smaller enterprises in
providing social benefits such as housing, access to health
care facilities, etc.12
Russian government support programs and IPR
protections for SMEs are ineffective. While many Russian
and international studies have pointed to the problems
caused by the numerous administrative barriers to SMEs
and while many Russian government programs and
regulations have declared support for dismantling these
barriers, it appears that these problems have, in fact,
worsened during the past decade. There is a widespread
perception that while some tax incentives for SMEs were
instituted in 1990-95, the Russian central and regional
governments have not taken enough action to build a
support framework or provide funding sources for small
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businesses or R&D activities since the mid-1990s. As
happens all too often in Russia, the laws passed in support
of SMEs have not been implemented, and many government
initiatives have not been adequately funded.
In addition, Western assistance programs that seek to
address proliferation concerns have primarily focused on
large state organizations, thus encouraging scientists and
specialists to retain their ties with these organizations.
Many of the plans being developed to revive the Russian
R&D sector or overall economy itself still focus on the
largest enterprises and top-down approaches. The Russian
government and many industry analysts have discussed
converting the military-industrial complex into a
scientific-industrial complex, but they still focus on doing
this by reviving the largest enterprises and funding new
large conglomerates, not by focusing on the needs of
SMEs.13
Resource Constraints.
The inability to access sufficient financial resources to
support and expand new businesses has hampered the
Russian SME sector. These barriers include insufficient
banking and financing sources, low levels of investment,
and the practice of banks providing funds based on personal
connections or a preference for funding export operations.14
The poor investment climate in Russia has discouraged
foreign direct investment (FDI), which has been valued at
under 1 percent of Russian GDP, compared to over 7 percent
in Poland and even higher in other advancing economies.
Even Western programs to provide loans have not
focused on technology start-ups, and often disburse most of
their funds to businesses in the service and retail trading
sector. For example, U.S. funding provided to the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Russia Small
Business Fund (as part of the U.S. Nuclear Cities Initiative)
has been disbursed largely to the trading sector, where most
loan recipients do not have employees linked to scientists.15
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The domestic Russian banking sector is not well developed
and has been reluctant to invest in the military sector
outside the largest export-supported enterprises. Thus,
SMEs lack access to adequate start-up capital, and are often
forced instead to rely on personal resources, family, friends,
and criminal structures.
Demand Constraints.
Many Russian SMEs have a hard time finding markets
for their goods and services because they face dominating
state and large businesses, foreign competition in
higher-technology areas, and overall depressed domestic
demand.16 SMEs face significant barriers to entry in many
market areas due to hidden subsidies, administrative
measures, and distorted prices that all favor large existing
businesses. Russia still has far to go to develop a competitive
market economy, and there are distortions in much
economic activity that limit the ability of entrepreneurs and
SMEs to find domestic markets. In addition to the depressed
demand, the lack of information about market demand has
led to waves of excess competition as multiple enterprises
seek to produce similar products, ignorant of the others’
activities.17
Barriers to entry created by numerous hidden subsidies,
administrative measures, and distorted prices that still
support large state-owned, or former state enterprises,
make it difficult to start up new private firms even if they
are more productive than the existing firms.18 Market
distortions that stem from efforts to address social concerns,
corrupt practices, and the lack of information continue to
raise barriers to SME and prevent equal competition. A
1999 McKinsey report argues that the unequal market
competition conditions “tend to favor low productivity
incumbents, protecting them from takeovers and
productive new entrants.” 19
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Personal and Societal Views.
There are deep-seated personal views and beliefs
pervasive in Russian society that have limited the growth of
entrepreneurial activity and SME business activities,
particularly in the defense-related sector. At the personal
level, many scientists and defense technologists who could
start up SMEs tend to be risk-averse, older, and ill-adapted
as entrepreneurs.20 These potential entrepreneurs often
display such attributes as passivity, a reluctance to stand
out from the herd, fear of job instability in new small
companies, and a preference for more “interesting”
high-tech R&D instead of commercial projects. The history
of failure when individuals in the military-industrial or
R&D sector seek to start new enterprises without having
high-level connections has also added to personal
reluctance to leave the relative stability of large or
sta te-fu n ded organi zati ons to und er take new
entrepreneurial ventures. Even some entrepreneurs, who
have set up relatively well-paid teams of Russian computer
programmers to provide outsourcing support for U.S. and
other Western companies, report that they have difficulty
finding Russian programmers who want to work on these
projects because they view them as less interesting and less
challenging work than their military-related or scientific
work.21 In addition, many would-be entrepreneurs have a
pronounced preference for large projects, often seeking to
start with expensive large-scale projects instead of the
smaller, incremental approach favored in the West.22
At the societal level, public opinion polls reflect an
u n certa in a n d ambi val ent atti tud e towar d s
“entrepreneurs,” who are often seen as shady and dishonest,
and sometimes resented for their apparent wealth. Surveys
report common resentment of private wealth and private
business, and negative attitudes towards entrepreneurs
and spin-offs from state organizations.23
While the passivity of many Russians in terms of
accepting the conditions within which they live and not
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acting to take control to change those conditions may
hamper the development of entrepreneurial activities, such
passivity can also serve to restrict some types of
proliferation activity. For example, surveys of specialists
working in key Russian nuclear and missile facilities in
some of Russia’s closed cities have found that a basic
passivity has helped keep these specialists from acting to go
abroad or sell their skills to foreign customers.24
Managerial Approaches.
Many managers in the military-industrial sector have
been conditioned to be risk-averse, conservative, focused on
maintaining large payrolls, and wed to using old methods,
cronyism, and appeals for state support instead of
restructuring their enterprises or moving away from
reliance on government orders. Privatization of industry
has not led to effective control by new owners who would
promote market-oriented entrepreneurial approaches, and
the defense R&D sector is much less privatized than the
production sector.25 Instead, enterprise managers have
gained increased power to push for state support, but have
not become accountable to profit-driven imperatives or
outside owners. There has been low turnover in
management. By one estimate, as little as a 5 percent
change per year has occurred in enterprise management.26
Military-industry managers have been conditioned to be
risk-averse, conservative, and tolerant of bloated payrolls.
They are skilled at bureaucratic infighting, and most are
not inclined to be entrepreneurs. These traits persist today
for many managers.27 Their tendency has been to build
bigger groups (financial-industrial groups, holdings, etc.)
rather than to fully pursue independent spin-offs or SMEs.
The partial shift in ownership at many enterprises has not
led to effective new ownership control, and has allowed the
legacy directors to assume greater control in many cases.
This has contributed to their becoming less responsive to
the state, pursuing instead their own parochial interests. In
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addition, many managers continue to believe that state
defense orders will revive, so they hold out for the benefits
from that eventuality. Recent funding increases under the
Putin administration, increased funding from Minatom for
nuclear weapons enterprises, and the promises of more to
come have worsened this problem. Managers often see
commercial work as temporary, and seek short-term
projects to help tide them over until government funds
arrive.28
Most mangers lack the skills and ability to identify
market opportunities. For example, the RAN USA and
Canada Institute operated several programs with
Pepperdine University in the United States to provide
business training to over 100 managers from large Russian
military-industrial enterprises, but the business plans
those managers developed after receiving training were not
implemented because they did not identify viable areas of
demand in the Russian market.29
The defense sector managers are gradually being forced
to change their approaches as their environment changes.
By the late 1990s, it became apparent from periodic
observer visits to Russian military R&D and production
facilities that those organizations doing relatively well tend
to have the most dynamic and assertive directors, in
addition to having access to foreign markets for their
goods.30 The organizations whose directors or senior staff
are still focused on the Russian government for support and
guidance tend to be doing much poorer, but have still
managed to survive, often as shells to provide some basic
support for their personnel. Nevertheless, government
support policies through the mid-to-late 1990s, for example,
providing credits to help military-industrial enterprises in
the worst shape, encouraged a continuation of sluggish
managerial behavior. Whereas managerial behavior bent
upon exploiting the old system worked relatively well in the
early 1990s, it appears that the macroeconomic situation
and market then became “more rewarding to qualified
enterprise management” such that the quality of
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management has now become more important in
supporting enterprise success than it was earlier.31
Structure of Defense R&D Sector.
Despite hopes that the massive Soviet defense R&D
sector would serve as a powerful source of innovation and
technology capabilities to power a new high-tech industrial
sector in Russia, efforts to convert this sector have largely
failed. Overall, the Russian defense R&D sector has lost
much of its technological competitiveness, as the lack of
funding for R&D over the past decade, in addition to the
relative inactivity of high-tech companies and SMEs, has
taken its toll.
The R&D sector suffers from many of the same problems
as those afflicting overall military industry, and faces many
of the Soviet legacies such as excessive size, labor-intensive
approach to research, extreme centralization, and
geographic concentration.32 The defense R&D sector
accounted for 70-80 percent of all Scientific Research
Institute (NII) and R&D work, covering about one million
personnel working in the science-related area at the start of
the 1990s.33 The Soviet approach led to separation of
research, development, and production in separate
organizational entities (NII, Design Bureaus [KB],
Scientific Associations [NPO], Production Associations
[PO]), and the breakdown of strict centralized Soviet
controls has made this lack of integrated R&D chains
particularly troublesome. While production associations
and enterprises had a high degree of vertical integration in
terms of production inputs, the clear separation of research
facilities from the production sphere has hampered the
sector’s ability to move new innovations to the production
stage. Moreover, it is very difficult to get a good picture of
innovation in the defense R&D sector because official
statistics leave many issues untouched. Much of the
innovative activity has occurred in the unofficial areas of
the economy.34
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The Russian military-industrial sector continues to be
dominated by large enterprises, and small businesses have
played a negligible role in defense research, design,
development, and production. Indeed, the Russian
military -in du stri al s ec tor r etai ns many of the
characteristics that encouraged large enterprises, e.g., the
advantage of size in giving enterprises influence, pressure
for self-sufficiency in material inputs.35 The Soviet-era
orientation towards very large enterprises continues in the
military-related scientific-research community, the
production community, and others. A 1997 study found that
large defense sector enterprises employing over 5,000
people performed better and were more successful in
retaining their core capabilities than smaller firms.36 More
recent studies of the situation after the 1998 crisis found
that mid-sized companies (500 to 2,000 employees) did well,
but that small enterprises did worse in both surveys.37
Directors of R&D organizations found that their position in
the system was improved as their organizations grew solely
in terms of numbers of employees or size of budgets, while
profit margins were not even known, let alone considered.
The artificial pricing system used through the early 1990s
and the continuing system of hidden state subsidies have
hindered the ability of the military-industrial sector to
adjust in the transition to a market economy by making it
almost impossible to calculate market values for inputs or
products in much of the sector.
Many analysts argue that Russian fundamental
research is of high quality, but that Russian capabilities are
weak in applied R&D oriented towards creating civilian
products with commercial potential. Most Russian
technology is not internationally competitive, and Russia
has a history of conducting R&D with little attention to cost
or marketability considerations.
Russian technical experts do not have experience in
market-driven R&D. Indeed, the vast majority of R&D
personnel today still seek to sell technology-push
capabilities-driven projects, instead of market-pull projects.
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They market and propose what they know and have, but
these capabilities are usually not what the commercial
market wants. Almost any U.S. businessman today who
visits Russian R&D facilities will come back with huge
numbers of proposals regarding which scientists seek to
find funding for their pet projects, regardless of the fact that
no market demand conceivably exists.38 It still remains to be
seen how much commercial potential Russian defense
technologies have, so Western-supported programs that
focus on the commercialization of Russian lab technologies
are taking a partial, ultra-cautious approach. This is not
the path to a large-scale solution to the problem and is
bound to provide only limited results.
In addition, there is a clear Russian government
orientation towards large enterprises in the defense sector,
with the Russian government giving preference in domestic
arms contracts to large Russian firms that sell their
weapons systems abroad because it views this ability to sell
weapons on the global market as a key indicator of the firms’
economic viability.39 The Putin administration has placed
increased emphasis on expanding arms sales as a critical
source of revenues to fund military R&D programs, as well
as fill state coffers and fund military-industrial enterprises
themselves. 40 Current Russian government plans to
restructure the defense sector call for merging many
enterprises to create 30-40 even larger holding companies
that will further expand industrial conglomerates that
dominate defense industry.41
Security Restrictions.
Restrictive security regulations and pressures on
employees who have worked in secure military-industrial
facilities hinder the ability of these employees to create new
SMEs. Access to international donors, technical exchanges,
and travel abroad can all be restricted by the security
organs. These restrictions have become stronger in the
recent past, with a resurgence of FSB campaigns against
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interactions with foreigners—including accusations that
joint ventures are Western espionage efforts, and new
Russian Academy of Science instructions requiring
scientists with access to classified materials to report all
contacts with foreign colleagues to the security
departments. Even specialists who are no longer employed
at military-related facilities have reported being subject to
visits from security personnel who seek information and
even press for bribes in exchange for noninterference in
prospective new business ventures.42 As with many
administrative barriers in Russia, the existence of security
regulations often simply serves as a means for bureaucratic
officials to extort additional payments from those complying
with the regulation.
FACTORS PROMOTING ENTREPRENEURIAL
ACTIVITIES
While numerous powerful forces have limited SME and
entrepreneurial activities in Russia, the list of factors that
encourage such activity is much shorter.
Economic Need.
The basic failure of the government to provide for the
economic needs of most military-industrial enterprises has
encouraged specialists to look elsewhere for work, and has
begun to encourage the enterprises themselves to
restructure and undertake more entrepreneurial activities.
While a centralized large-scale approach to planning
economic programs still dominates in many organizations,
the absolute decline in conditions in much of the
military-industrial sector serves to promote new
approaches, if only out of desperation. It is estimated that
the number of employees in military-related R&D
organizations, e.g., NII, had fallen by 60-70 percent by the
end of the 1990s, and many specialized design teams had
fallen apart.43 In 1992-94 alone, during the first wave of
employee departures, overall employment in science fell
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over 20 percent. 44 Numerous Russian defense R&D
organizations have been hollowed out because many of the
most capable, younger, active employees have gone, leaving
behind the bureaucratic shells with too many managers and
older staff who are often the least entrepreneurial.45 The
average age of workers in the military-industrial sector has
risen from 47 years in 1996 to 58 years in 2000.46
The lack of government funding, investment, or market
profits for the defense sector can encourage new
approaches. Total R&D expenditures fell over tenfold in the
1990s, and the share of military R&D in official Russian
defense expenditures fell from 18.6 percent in 1990 to 3-4
percent in the late 1990s.47 This decline in R&D has
occurred in the context of the collapse in military output of
the Russian defense complex without any corresponding
increase in civilian output from the defense complex (see
Table 3).48

* - projected.

Table 3. Relative Military and Civilian Outputs of the
Russian Military-Industrial Sector (1991=100).
In part due to the lack of centralized funding and failure
of large-scale conversion efforts, many military-industrial
enterprises allowed for the creation of internal spin-offs,
and some of these have gone on to become viable SMEs
working in technology areas. While there was a lot of
activity in the early-to-mid 1990s, most enterprise efforts to
produce more technology-intensive industrial and
consumer goods were not successful—these markets were
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dominated by imported goods.49 The slight increases in
overall output of the military-industrial sector in 1999
(Table 3) came as the demand for domestic consumer
durables such as refrigerators, washing machines, and
televisions rose, and as the foreign competition was priced
out of the low-end market in the aftermath of the August
1998 crisis. 50
While insufficient central funding has encouraged many
military-industrial enterprises to seek new approaches, the
economic need has been sharpest in sectors of low
proliferation concern, such as those producing many basic
conventional weapons like tanks, rifles, etc. The industrial
sectors of most concern to the West in terms of proliferation
potential—the nuclear and missile industries—have been
relatively well funded, and are increasingly better funded
today.
Work Force Characteristics.
The Russian population is highly educated and
technologically innovative. Universities and institutes in
Russia have been producing highly skilled engineers,
scientists, and other R&D specialists for decades. The
numbers and percentages of young people enrolled in
technical education fields continue to be among the highest
in the world.51 The early boom in the expansion of the SME
sector showed the existence of an entrepreneurial spirit in
many Russians, despite the historical record of a statedominated society, as the flow of active, entreprenurialminded specialists out of the defense sector provided critical
skills to the new economy. Many of the initial SME
managers in the early 1990s were technical specialists from
the R&D sector, and they have paved the way for others to
potentially follow.
Nevertheless, younger specialists are not entering the
defense field, and admissions at most military-technical
institutes have fallen. Banking and trade have been two of
the leading sectors attracting talented young specialists
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away from their training at prestigious technical institutes.
Young people are not pursuing educational programs that
would lead them into the defense R&D or industrial sector.
By the mid-1990s, senior officials at prestigious
military-technical institutes, R&D associations, and
production facilities echoed the common refrain that the
“Nike effect” was draining their organizations as the
brightest youngsters left to seek their fortunes in the new
economy, buying and selling sneakers or other imported
consumer goods.52 Throughout the 1990s, increasing
numbers of students at some of the most prestigious
institutes, e.g., Bauman, either were leaving their studies
early to go work in other areas or were applying their skills
in commercial structures instead of for R&D purposes.53
Market Niches.
There are relevant market niches where SMEs have
begun to play increasingly significant roles, in such sectors
as software programming, medical equipment, consulting
services, etc. The ability of SMEs to respond flexibly to
changing market conditions and quickly enter new business
areas gives them certain advantages over the large
established enterprises that still dominate most existing
market sectors. The information technology (IT) and
computer programming sector are examples of a new
business area where SMEs have led the way in developing
new capabilities, enterprises, and markets. For example, it
is estimated that the offshore programming sector in Russia
may be able to expand at rates from 20-50 percent per year
to meet international demand for such services. This sector
currently generates under $100 million in revenues per year
in Russia, compared to over $6 billion in India, as part of a
global market that is anticipated to grow to over $1 trillion
per year by 2008. A 1999 McKinsey study found that
productivity in the Russian IT project services sector was 72
percent of the productivity of the comparable sector in the
United States, which was the highest productivity level in
any of the industry sectors evaluated in the study.54
213

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Russian
companies working in this area face many of the
characteristic barriers to SMEs in Russia, including the
reluctance of Russian defense-sector programmers to work
on more mundane commercial programming tasks even
though the pay is significantly better than for work on
military-industrial projects, the hindrances of working
within security restrictions, low domestic demand, lack of
skilled managers, administrative and regulatory
challenges, lack of experienced marketing support, and the
lack of Russian government support programs.55
There are some military-related technology and
industry sectors where Russian capabilities remain highly
competitive and where small business activities have
become visible. Russian technological capabilities perhaps
remain most competitive in areas such as aerospace,
materials science, computer science, optics, and sensor
technologies. Some of these industry sectors saw small
businesses emerge in the defense area during the 1990s to
compete on the basis of quality and price—examples can be
found in areas such as avionics, navigation, software, radio,
and personnel protection.56
Access to Foreign Markets and Funding.
A wide range of Western donor organizations, led by the
EU TACIS, USAID, and EBRD programs, but more recently
including the U.S. IPP, NCI, and other programs, have
provided significant assistance for SME development in
Russia. In many regions, these international donors have
provided more funding for SME support than have Russian
government programs. While hundreds of millions of
dollars have been provided in funding, technical assistance,
loan guarantees, etc., it is difficult to evaluate the impact
these programs have had on job creation.57 There are many
programs and support organizations active, but
international assistance programs too often are not based
on preliminary research or tailored to meet specific needs in
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the regions of Russia where they operate. There is
continuing uncertainty about the sustainability of many
programs started with international funding since most
SMEs lack the resources to pay for the training and
assistance provided by these programs. Nevertheless, broad
programs such as the Morozov Project, Russian Agency for
SME Support, Technopark Association, and others have
had significant impacts in helping to expand the Russian
SME sector. The expanded knowledge of foreign markets
and funding sources developed over the past decade has
encouraged the creation of SMEs that can obtain funding.
Indeed, access to foreign capital or markets is a major
indicator of the health of enterprises—regional and
national studies have found that most industry leaders
have links to international markets or finances.58 Foreign
funding has played a major role in supporting innovative
firms in the aerospace, nuclear, and software industries.59
Unfortunately, some of the international programs
aimed at nonproliferation have had the unintentioned
consequence of encouraging weapons scientists to remain
affiliated with the defense institutes in order to be eligible
for funding under those programs. In addition, as we have
noted, most of the scientists who receive funding under
programs such as ISTC or NCI continue to work on WMD
development programs at state defense facilities and
receive state salaries.60 For example, apparently almost
three-quarters of the Russian weapons scientists who
received funding from the ISTC in 2000 continued to work
at least 60 percent of full-time levels at their other jobs
while receiving ISTC support.61 While programs aimed at
providing research grants to weapons scientists may help
reduce potential short-term proliferation activities by
meeting scientists’ needs to earn a living, these programs
continue to support the further development of Russia’s
advanced military and WMD capabilities. This perpetuates
the long-term proliferation problem by helping Russian
military scientists retain their skills and retain
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employment at the large Russian defense sector R&D
enterprises.
As one researcher has noted, programs such as the ISTC
were originally intended as short-term measures to provide
employment for weapons scientists until the Russian
economy developed to provide alternative employment for
them.62 This initial expectation was ill-founded: a decade
has passed, and the expected job creation has not occurred.
The result has been that Western aid programs are helping
Russian weapons scientists retain their military skills, and
thus prolonging the potential proliferation situation. For
example, a study by Tikhonov reports that 97 percent of the
weapons scientists who moonlight to earn foreign stipends
say that this work helps them maintain their core job skills,
while only 16 percent of those scientists who moonlight for
Russian employers say this.63 Other programs such as the
NCI, which are aimed at new job creation, have met only
limited success in creating new jobs, and most of the
Russian scientists involved continue their Russian
state-funded WMD development work. Programs should be
restructured to encourage aid recipients to leave their
employment at state enterprises.
SUGGESTIONS FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
What can be done to encourage the development of the
SME sector in Russia and harness entrepreneurial activity
to reduce proliferation? Unfortunately, current trends are
troubling because the barriers to SMEs are strong and
growing, and the facilitating factors are weak. SMEs are
primarily active in lower-tech areas, and thus are not as
attractive to Russian technologists as military work. The
Russian government has demonstrated a strong orientation
on increasing the size of large industrial groups, both in
military industry and the general economy, and not on
supporting the SME sector.
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At the broadest level, the distorted regulatory
framework is one of the most significant barriers to the
development of a more robust SME sector, yet this is also
one of the most difficult problems to address. The
problematic investment climate has discouraged FDI or
even Russian domestic investment in capital projects.
Russia’s legislative framework regarding property rights,
taxation, and labor relations needs to be improved, and
enforcement must be improved across the board. While
providing targeted tax privileges for science and technolgy
SMEs has not been a standard practice in Western
programs, some analysts argue that this type of approach is
critical in Russia due to the large and complex tax burden
placed on SMEs. An improved economic situation with
reduced institutional, administrative, resource, and
demand constraints on SMEs would clearly help, but this is
a daunting task—systemic reform of the entire Russian
economic and regulatory system would be required to
address these problems. Nevertheless, at a more limited
level, there are a number of ways that Western assistance
programs can be modified to help improve the situation
somewhat.
Emphasize Market-Driven Commercialization
and Business Services.
One of the largest challenges facing many would-be
Russian entrepreneurs and scientists is to shift their focus
from a technology-push capabilities-driven approach to a
market-pull approach. Business and market training,
specific market-oriented business services, and the
participation of Western industry partners can help
prospective SMEs take this market-pull approach. Aid
programs also need to focus on market needs and
commercialization, and have clear exit strategies that
emphasize sustainability. Comparative experiences in
other transition economies such as Poland and the Czech
Republic have shown that initiatives that shift away from
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high-tech efforts and are reoriented towards medium- or
low-tech market demand can achieve significant success.64
A common thread in many success stories is the direct
and early involvement of U.S. or Western industry partners
who provide a clear market-oriented approach. Examples
include Boeing’s Moscow Design Center (which has grown
to employ about 650 engineers, scientists, and computer
specialists), a U.S. industry software venture in
partnership with VNIIEF nuclear weapons lab in Sarov
(which has grown to have about 100 former weapons
scientists under contract), Motorola and Intel software labs
in Russia, and offshore software development companies
such as VDI (which has 225 programmers working in its
Russian operations for U.S. customers).65 These are cases
where there was little or no involvement of governmentsponsored assistance programs. In fact, such governmentled programs can sometimes under-perform compared to
private-sector initiatives. For example, while the Sarov
Open Computing Center (OCC) created with funding from
the NCI program has had some success, most of the work
conducted to date has been for the OCC staff to build up
their skills or for LANL, yet LANL has reportedly not
directly benefited.66 This program is now actively seeking
industry partners and potential customers, and recognizes
that commercialization is the largest challenge facing the
NCI.
In contrast, many international assistance programs
have been slow to emphasize commercialization and
industry involvement. The U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) IPP program, which was criticized for insufficient
focus on commercialization, increasingly shifted to a model
focused on industry participation in the late 1990s with
promising results, and the ISTC has done the same with its
Partners Program begun in 1997.67 Similarly, the DOE
Nuclear Cities Initiative, European Nuclear Cities
Initiative, and RANSAC-initiated Nuclear Complex
Conversion Consortium are examples of recent steps in this
direction, but much more progress needs to be made
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towards commercialization and market-oriented programs.
Programs must be clearly focused on market demand,
avoiding the common approach of focusing on finding U.S.
partners for existing Russian products and technologies.
U.S. programs could work to focus on market areas where
Russian SME products would have a clear market demand.
Some examples include supporting the development of
Russian SMEs to produce nuclear materials protection,
control, and accounting (MPC&A) equipment or specialized
technologies for environmental clean-up at DOE
sites—these are areas with clear markets in Russia and the
United States, involving products that would satisfy U.S.
security interests.68
Successful policies to support SMEs have also focused on
reducing the barriers they face by linking education and
entrepreneurship, and by providing services and office
space to SMEs. While training programs, business centers,
and technoparks can help get SMEs started, the training is
often too general or theoretical to be of concrete assistance,
and most technoparks are more akin to display halls rather
than business incubators.69 Russian surveys have found
that generally the retraining programs offered by many
Western aid programs involving generic business skills or
direct application of Western approaches are seen as
ineffective in helping recipients work within the Russian
economic system.70 Focused programs involving specific
technical assistance and business consulting services are
much better received, and programs to enhance the
marketing skills of Russian defense technologists would be
most valuable.
Market forces have led most of the employees who have
left military industry to go to work in relatively low-tech
sectors such as services, trade, and simple consumer goods
production. Entrepreneurs looked to those sectors to make
money in the 1990s in Russia, not to technology sectors.
While some skilled workers and researchers have moved
into companies where they use mathematical and computer
skills in areas such as computer programming, banking,
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and finance, most new enterprises have not focused on these
areas. For example, while a study of the commercialization
of military R&D capabilities in Tomsk Oblast found a high
level of such activity by the mid-1990s, the most successful
new enterprises did not seek to apply or develop high-tech
products. 7 1 Instead, many of the most successful
experiences with the commercialization of militaryindustrial R&D capabilities in Tomsk Oblast were oriented
towards clear areas of domestic Russian market demand
(usually in consumer goods). One of the most successful new
enterprises that the Rubin Submarine Design Bureau
began in the 1990s, in addition to its work in support of
diesel submarine sales to India and elsewhere, was a
business center and the Hotel Neptune, where personnel
from the design bureau worked as clerks and service
personnel. Workers at the hotel report with satisfaction
that, despite initial hesitation about leaving the scientific
field, their wages are higher than those of the colleagues
they left behind at Rubin’s design facilities.72 Many oft-cited
successes, such as the Leninets joint venture with Gillette
to produce razors, are also examples of projects where
Russian organizations have moved into less-technically
advanced commercial areas instead of seeking to apply their
R&D capabilities.
Establish Clear Project Goals and Evaluation
Guidelines.
As GAO reports and others have suggested, foreign aid
programs should have clear project evaluation and approval
guidelines, requiring applicants to demonstrate such things
as commercial viability and the involvement of industry
partners.73 This is made difficult by the continuing poor
economic climate and distortions in market mechanisms,
which make it difficult to evaluate economic viability of
enterprises or identify niches of potential economic
growth.74 Donor programs should not over-reach in terms of
goals for developing sustainable business enterprises. That
may not be possible in some locations, such as Russia’s
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closed cities. Some U.S. programs such as NCI and DEF
have disbursed funds before establishing clear program
evaluation and approval guidelines tailored to Russian
conditions, and have failed to carefully select recipients of
assistance. Unfortunately, NCI programs serve as
examples of how the lack of clear project goals and criteria
can undermine the effectiveness of well-oriented
programs.75 In addition, program activities should be
tailored to take account of each enterprise’s economic
condition, skill sets, etc. Some enterprises are not viable
candidates for support. Their financial situation, physical
plant, lack of basic competencies, management problems, or
ties to military work may make them inappropriate
candidates to receive support, and no amount of Western
financial or consulting support would make them viable.
Focus on Regional and Local Level Programs.
Regional and local level programs have proven to be
most effective in meeting the needs of small businesses, and
encouraging the development of critical partnerships
between SMEs and local authorities.76 Local initiatives are
often the most cohesive and coherent, and do not overreach
or turn into enormous centrally-focused industry support
efforts. Some SME support programs at the regional level
have achieved significant success in developing positive
environments for SME expansion, including programs in
areas previously dominated by large military-industrial
enterprises. For example, local programs in Zhukovskiy
(centered on TsAGI), Tomsk, and Zelenograd are some of
the ones that have apparently been able to build coherent
support communities to encourage broader development of
SMEs.77 As thousands of personnel left TSAGI in the early
1990s, local employment services encouraged the creation of
over 2,000 SMEs that have helped to create over 60 percent
of the new jobs in the area. Similarly, an Entrepreneurship
Development Department in the Zelenograd region
promoted the creation of over 3,000 SMEs with business
incubator support, finance programs, and training
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programs. By 1997, about 25,000 people were employed in
these SMEs, absorbing some of the 40,000 workers whose
numbers in the local microelectronic industry were reduced
in the mid-1990s. Another local initiative in Tomsk, the
Tomsk Business Partnership, has built on the region’s
positive record of SME support to provide both specialized
training and consulting services for SMEs and increased
access to investment capital.
Reduced Focus on Short-Term Assistance to
Employees at Large or State Enterprises.
Western nonproliferation programs should shift their
focus to working with and promoting SMEs and small
business consortiums, instead of remaining tied to the large
defense sector R&D institutes and industrial enterprises.
Encouraging specialists to move to the private SME sector
can help reduce the capabilities base of the Russian defense
sector, thereby reducing its influence in Russian affairs and
reducing the excessive capabilities that seek markets. To
encourage this, international donor programs should shift
their focus to industry-focused or Russian domestic-style
orders, and move away from short-term grants. In addition,
major assistance and collaborative programs can better
reduce some proliferation concerns by focusing on working
with Russian SMEs rather than large enterprises.
Unfortunately, some programs such as that for
international space cooperation have served to provide
significant funding to Russia’s large state-run space R&D
enterprises, helping them increase salaries and attract
skilled young specialists, yet not being able to prevent the
proliferation of missile technologies from those enterprises
to countries such as Iran. The organizational health and
skill sets of specialists at some key Russian missile facilities
are better than that at many nuclear weapons enterprises,
in part due to the foreign funding provided through
international space cooperation projects.78 For example, in
contrast to the situation at most other defense sector
enterprises, wages are relatively high and the proportion of
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younger specialists is growing at the Energiya Corporation,
which has been heavily involved in the international space
station project. While numerous other international
assistance programs developed to promote the growth of
Russian SMEs have played a positive role by providing
short-term grants or free business support services, their
long-term sustainability is uncertain once foreign funding is
reduced.
Unfortunately, some productive short-term responses to
the immediate problems affecting Russia’s defense
scientists, such as the grant programs run by the ISTC and
others, have been continued beyond their initial scope due
to ongoing economic problems in Russia. In effect, these
types of programs encourage the recipient scientists to
retain their ties to state-run defense R&D institutes in
order to remain eligible for funding. At the same time, many
of the scientists continue working on defense-related
projects, such that the grants support the continued
maintenance of Russia’s military-related technical skills
and institutes. For example, while the U.S. programs to
engage Russian biological weapons scientists in
nonmilitary projects have discouraged these scientists from
proliferating their skills, these programs, by aiding
institutions and subsidizing equipment, may also have
served to sustain the scientists’ relevant military skills and
enhance a possible long-term reconstitution threat.79
Compared to other SMEs, those working in the scientific
area have the highest percentage of people who have
retained their full-time jobs with their previous employers
while taking a second job in a small business, with only 30
percent of those working in science-related SMEs doing so
on a full-time basis. 8 0 This issue raises serious
considerations for planning assistance programs because
short-term assistance to personnel likely to remain
employed at the state organizations may prolong or worsen
the longer-term proliferation problem. Programs focused on
research grants and finding support for Russian
capabilities generate only short-term benefits, rather than
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the longer-term benefits that can be obtained by
market-focused programs that encourage SME growth.
Improve SME Access to Finance Sources.
As noted, the lack of access to financial resources is one of
the key barriers continuing to hamper the development of
the SME sector in Russia. Many successful OECD SME
support programs have focused on providing finance
instruments such as specialized banks and loan guarantee
programs for SMEs. These programs need to be
application-driven, with merit-based evaluations leading to
provision of small seed capital to SMEs seeking to start new
enterprises or upgrade capabilities. For example, the Fund
for Small Enterprise Development Assistance in Science
and Technology has provided subsidized loans to many
SMEs, but it handles only about $4 million in loans a year.81
There is justifiable reluctance on the part of some donors to
provide finance programs until the macroeconomic policy
environment and governmental regulatory systems are
improved, but focused OECD and other programs provide
examples of how such programs can be successfully
implemented even without macroeconomic policy
improvements.
Beware of Dismantling SME Barriers that
Discourage Proliferation.
On a final cautionary note, it is important to recognize
that under some conditions, some of the factors that
discourage entrepreneurial activity also serve to discourage
some types of proliferation. For example, while security
restrictions, administrative barriers, lack of financing, and
the passivity of many Russians are all factors that hamper
the expansion of the SME sector in Russia’s closed cities,
these same factors also hamper potential access to these
cities by undesirable foreign actors and restrict the
movement of individual weapons specialists out of those
closed cities. Commercial trade activity by companies that
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have rented space in newly-accessible buildings associated
with Russian nuclear weapons facilities has increased the
degree of poorly-regulated trade in the immediate proximity
of facilities and materials of proliferation concern.
Programs to encourage the creation of consulting groups
and firms by weapons scientists can help them develop
business skills for commercial work, but also provide them
with mechanisms they could use for proliferation of their
military skills. Thus, those proposing programs to promote
the expansion of entrepreneurial activity and the SME
sector need to consider this duality when seeking to reduce
some of the barriers that SMEs face. This subject is
discussed further in the Appendix to this chapter.
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CHAPTER 7

APPENDIX
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SME EXPANSION
ON PROLIFERATION

At the most basic level, any supply-side strategy to
reduce the proliferation of strategic weapons and
technology from Russia can seek to eliminate Russian
capabilities of concern, or to discourage those in Russia who
possess those capabilities from proliferating them.
Demilitarization leading to the total elimination of
advanced Russian R&D or production capabilities in a
certain military-technical area would eliminate Russia’s
ability to proliferate in that area, but it is not clear that it is
possible or advisable to seek such a total degree of
demilitarization.1 While some military-related assets and
capabilities can be reduced or eliminated within a relatively
short time span, other assets are more durable or easily
reconstituted. For example, military-industrial and R&D
capabilities can decline rather quickly when core teams of
personnel break up, production equipment ages or is put to
other uses, or military scientists and technical personnel
begin working on civilian projects and begin to lose their
cutting-edge skills. 2 Nevertheless, some core WMD
knowledge can remain of proliferation concern for decades
even if the specialists are not actively developing or using
the related skills, and it is highly unlikely that Russia will
forfeit or lose its ability to produce advanced strategic
weapons.
Thus, we need to consider what types of activities,
conducted by whom, should be addressed in order to
discourage Russian proliferation of key capabilities or
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weapons systems abroad. For example, while the
proliferation of operational weapons systems requires that
the Russian government sell weapons from its stockpiles or
that enterprises produce these weapons, the proliferation of
scientific-engineering expertise simply requires individuals
who possess specialized knowledge and are willing to
provide it to foreign customers. While a full explication of all
the factors that can encourage proliferation behavior by
Russian state bodies, enterprises, groups, and individuals is
beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to identify
these domestic factors in order to consider how an
expansion of Russian entrepreneurial activities may affect
them.
At the central government level, Russian proliferation
activities are encouraged by such factors as the pursuit of
strategic national interests, hard currency earnings, and
alliance relations. At the ministry or enterprise level,
weapons proliferation may allow organizations to maintain
core production capabilities or skills, earn higher profit
margins than in alternative activities, avoid restructuring
or retooling, retain influence, pursue parochial interests,
and take advantage of existing marketing capabilities. At
the individual level, weapons proliferation can enable
military-industrial directors, staff, and scientists to
continue activities they know and like, earn money, avoid
the need to seek new employment, retain influence, and
follow belief systems. The motivating factors above are not
independent of each other—some are interrelated—but
they are distinct enough to be treated as separate drivers of
proliferation activity. Many of these powerful domestic
factors can act to encourage continued Russian proliferation
activities even in the face of international opposition,
control regimes, or significant demilitarization at home.
How could expanded entrepreneurial activity affect the
factors that encourage proliferation behavior by the
Russian government, enterprises, or scientists and other
individuals? A summary of these influences, with each
rated from minimal to significant, is shown in Table A-1. At
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the state level, Russia’s perception and pursuit of its
national interests or alliance relations are unlikely to be
affected by an expansion in SME entrepreneurial activities.
It is conceivable that a major expansion of the SME sector in
Russia could shift the sources of influence in the Russian
political system, give new actors a greater voice, and lead to
a revision in how the Russian government perceives its
national interest, thereby reducing the attractiveness of
weapons proliferation for Russian policymakers, but these
eventualities must be considered highly unlikely. Thus, an
expanded SME sector would have insignificant impact on
these factors that promote proliferation. Similarly, the
government’s incentive to export arms in order to earn hard
Level

Factors Encouraging Proliferation

Government

Leaders view arms sales as being in the
national interest and a tool to support
alliance relations
Leaders view arms sales as an effective
way to earn hard currency
Government seeks to put excess military
industrial and technical capacity to use
Organizations seek to maintain core
military-related production capabilities
and skills.
Traditional military-industrial views and
organizations are influential within the
government
Organizations view arms sales as a good
way to increase revenues and profits,
provide employment for personnel,
maintain influence, and avoid need to
convert or restructure.
Access to foreign arms markets is aided by
active and experienced marketing
organizations.
Workers have ideological beliefs about
supporting recipient governments or
nonstate groups
Workers enjoy and feel competent in
military work.
Workers view military work as best way to
earn money, remain employed, and retain
social position.

Ministry/
Enterprise

Individual

Potential Impacts of
Expanded SME
Sector
Minimal
Minimal
Moderate
Minimal
Moderate
Moderate

Moderate
Minimal
Moderate
Significant

Table A-1. Potential Impacts of SME Expansion.
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currency will not be directly affected by an expansion in
entrepreneurial activities, unless this expansion leads the
Russian government to be more concerned than it would be
otherwise about Western sanctions in response to Russian
proliferation activities. Potentially the largest impact that
expanded entrepreneurial activities might have on
proliferation drivers at the government level would be if the
expansion of SME activities reduced the need to find
alternative uses for excess military-industrial and
technological capacities. In this way, expanded SME
activities could moderately reduce incentives for the
Russian government to proliferate for this reason.
At the ministry or enterprise level, an expansion in
entrepreneurial activities can have somewhat greater
impacts because it would directly address some of the key
factors that encourage proliferation by actors at this level.
For example, a robust SME sector could reduce the
influence of the traditional military-industrial complex, and
thus reduce the ability of these ministries or enterprises to
successfully advocate foreign arms sales. Similarly,
expanded entrepreneurial activities could provide
alternative sources of employment and profits for
enterprises, but are likely to reduce the attractiveness of
arms sales in this regard only if the large organizations
believe they can remain influential and in control as SME
activities increase. An active SME sector could also develop
better access to critical foreign markets, thus providing
a ltern ativ e market ac c es s to that p r ovi d ed by
Rosoboroneksport. Nevertheless, it is hard to envision how
an expansion in SME activities would reduce the incentives
for industrial ministries or their production enterprises to
export weapons abroad in order to maintain core military
production capabilities and skills or to retain their
influence.
In terms of individual scientists and other personnel, an
expanded SME sector could have major impacts in reducing
the importance of proliferation drivers that act at this level.
A flourishing SME sector could provide alternative sources
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of employment, salaries, and social influence to reduce
individuals’ reliance on military-related work supported by
foreign arms sales revenues. While some job positions in the
SME sector can provide interesting and challenging work
for technical personnel, this may have only a moderate
impact on reducing the attractiveness of military-related
work because many SME positions in Russia are likely to be
in lower-tech sectors or involve work that individuals find
less intellectually interesting than their previous work in
defense R&D. Finally, at this level it is unlikely that SME
activities will reduce the role of ideological beliefs in
promoting arms sales, but this is probably a rather minor
driver of proliferation activity.
Thus, as indicated in this overview, it is likely that an
expansion in Russia’s SME sector can play a role in reducing
proliferation activity in Russia, but there are also
significant factors encouraging proliferation that would not
be affected by an expanded SME sector.
ENDNOTES - APPENDIX
1. Many Russian analysts and officials are concerned that Russia’s
military-technical capabilities are declining to such low levels that they
may fail to support Russia’s stability and basic national interests. For
example, Tikhonov, 2001a, argues that the lack of skilled technical
personnel and industrial capacity in the nuclear weapons and power
sector may threaten Russia’s ability to safely manage its nuclear
weapons stockpiles or nuclear power industry.
2. Personnel who shift to work on civilian projects often lose their
technical qualifications because the civilian work is less advanced than
the military work. For example, Russian military-industry directors
have noted in interviews that work to design, weld, and produce civilian
tankers is simpler and less demanding than the work involved in
producing submarines.
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CHAPTER 8

TURNING THE NEXT GENERATION
OF RUSSIAN WORKERS AWAY
FROM WEAPONS WORK

Thomas Riisager

Since the early 1990s, U.S.-Russian cooperative
nonproliferation programs have been bent upon reducing
the size of Russia’s nuclear complex by finding alternative
employment for tens of thousands of workers currently
employed as weapons specialists. These programs are
helping demilitarize Russia but will fail to achieve their
stated goal so long as future generations of scientifically
talented Russians are more attracted to working in the
defense complex than in the private sector. The forces that
push younger Russians towards state employment, after
all, are the same forces that make it practically impossible
for older generations—the focus of Nunn-Lugar
programs—to transition out of weapon work.
Certainly, channeling Russian youth away from
employment in these facilities is worth pursuing now.1 Over
a third of Russian university students recently surveyed
would consider working at a nuclear industry enterprise in
a closed city. More troubling still, over 60 percent of the best
students would actually prefer to work at a state
enterprise.2
In this chapter, I examine four principal obstacles to
attracting these younger workers to the private sector. The
first is the prevalence of corruption in Russia, which
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increases the costs of starting and maintaining businesses,
and discourages the foreign investment enterprises need.
The second is that Russians still lack an entrepreneurial
work ethic, which is caused in part by the third obstacle, an
overbearing management style prevalent in Russia.
Finally, Russia’s current laws and institutions hinder
attracting young workers to the private sector because,
instead of fostering economic growth, they have up until
recently been totally at war with private business.
Although serious, these problems can be overcome. In
fact, multinational corporations with business concerns in
Russia have developed several successful methods of
training their Russian employees to work within Western
business norms. These corporations discovered that their
younger local hires, when exposed to a Western work
culture, are less inclined to cheat or steal, eagerly seek out
responsibility, and have developed a more sophisticated
view of modern business. They found that Russians over 35
years of age, however, do not adapt as readily and require
special management. These corporations’ experience
suggests a number of specific recommendations for how to
reform future nonproliferation programs, including
increased emphasis on business and academic exchanges
with the United States and Europe, and legislative changes
the Russian government can make to ease the burden on
small and medium sized enterprises.
Corruption Cripples Russia’s Private Sector.
The prevalence of corruption is arguably the biggest
obstacle to entrepreneurial development in Russia. Paying
for Mafia protection and bribing corrupt officials greatly
increase the costs of starting and maintaining even the
smallest enterprise. On a larger scale, crime in Russian
business contributes to negative stereotypes about Russian
workers and discourages foreign investment needed to
expand the private sector.
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The propensity towards corruption has historically been
high in Russian culture and is generally an accepted part of
life. Its prevalence has been attributed to both the state’s
inability to enforce laws and the average Russian citizen’s
desperation for survival.3 Corruption in Russia can be
traced to the Czarist era when peasants were largely left to
police themselves through a form of lynch law known as
samosud, or self-judging. In samosud, actions that
threatened the security or the social order in the community
were punished very severely.4 On the other hand, crimes
against outsiders or the Crown, for example, tax dodging,
were accepted, as they had no immediate negative impact
on the community. The state disliked the idea of peasants
policing themselves, but it lacked the legitimacy and
resources to enforce laws across such a vast country.5
Meanwhile, within the state’s own organs, low-paid civil
servants were actually expected to supplement their
incomes by kormlenie, or feeding off of their jobs, whether by
accepting bribes, running private businesses on the side, or
appropriating state assets.6 Thus developed a culture of
acceptable criminality.
Instead of putting an end to this corruption, the
Revolution of 1917 only broadened its scope. The
Communist Party relied on criminal groups to bypass
bottlenecks and shortages in the hopes of meeting
production demands. Soviet citizens, too, were forced to
turn to crime in order to survive, whether by selling goods on
the black market or stealing goods from the state.7
Given Russia’s past, it is not surprising that what is
considered corrupt by Western standards is business as
usual in that country. For example, there is a nearly
universal practice in Russian businesses to maintain two
sets of financial books: the first set contains accurate
account records for in-house use only; the second set of
numbers reflects a much lower profit margin for the benefit
of tax reporting. The rationale is a throwback to samosud,
where evading taxes, though illegal, was not “wrong.”
Among Russian businessmen, this practice is not only
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acceptable, it is expected. Accountancy staff that process
these records are usually aware of the illegality, but seldom
question the morality of doctoring the books, much less the
long-term negative impact.
Corruption’s effect on business in Russia is very serious.
Daily business practices lack the required transparency to
attract investors. In the 21st century, a potential investor
expects a company’s financial records to present a fair and
accurate picture of the enterprise’s financial status and
market competitiveness. Since the decision to invest in a
company is largely based on these reports, opacity or lack of
confidence in their legitimacy will adversely affect that
decision.
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that Russia loses
about $10 billion in direct foreign investments a year due to
its high opacity index.8 Arthur Haigh, PricewaterhouseCooper’s managing partner, said in an interview with
Kommersant Daily that Russia’s integration into the world
economy and the attraction of much needed investment may
accelerate, but only if the management of Russian
companies begins to practice the principles of good
corporate governance.9
Corruption is prevalent at all levels of business. A recent
example at an international accountancy firm in Moscow
illustrates this point. To be certified, an accountant must
pass a series of rigorous exams. If an accountant fails, he or
she will most likely be dismissed from the firm. During a
recent exam, one of the examinees was found to be cheating
and was confronted with the evidence by his superiors.
Neither embarrassed nor disturbed by the accusation, he
admitted to the cheating, and expressed surprise only when
he learned that he was being fired as a result. The
employee’s reaction concerned the expatriate staff, which
promptly arranged interviews with the other trainee
accountants about the incident. The interviews showed that
the locally hired staff viewed cheating on tests as acceptable
behavior and felt that being fired for it was overly severe.10
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Getting caught cheating was simply a matter of not
cheating well enough.
Such stories are rampant among companies with
business concerns in Russia, further strengthening the
negative stereotype of Russians as untrustworthy
employees and business partners. Although this anecdotal
evidence seems to prove otherwise, the problem is not based
on an inherent lack of honesty or integrity by Russians, but
is simply a matter of differing cultural definitions of what is
acceptable. History and necessity have created a quite
different set of norms for Westerners as compared with
Russians, but until Russian work culture adopts the
business norms of the industrialized Western nations, this
stereotype will continue to pose an obstacle to Russia’s
proper integration into the world economy.11
The Russian Work Ethic’s Traditional Lack
of Entrepreneurialism.
The Russian work ethic evolved in a command economy,
not a developed free market system, and the Russian
worker has had little time to adapt to the end of
communism.12 The employee’s place in the Russian work
culture and the role of the employer, therefore, are viewed
differently than in the West. A reasonable employment
situation by Western standards, in terms of job security and
benefits, would not meet the expectations of a Russian
accustomed to the labor process of the Soviet planned
economy.
For over 70 years, the Soviet citizen could count on a
minimal, but secure, standard of living. Health care and
education were provided free of charge by the state, and
every citizen was guaranteed employment.13 According to
Soviet law, it was, in fact, a crime not to be employed.14 Full
employment in the Soviet system allowed the government
to pass social welfare responsibilities to individual
enterprises, which provided housing, food, daycare, and
other benefits. The monetary portion of income was far less
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important to the survival of the employees than these
subsidies, since low wages were offset by price controls that
made the necessities of life available to the majority of the
population at prices they could afford.15
In this system, after completing a state-sponsored
education, a citizen would be placed in a position chosen on
the basis of current labor needs and his or her skills. Once
employed, the citizen could count on having that job
indefinitely. If a worker found himself or herself
“unemployed,” his or her last employer (and not the state)
would be responsible for paying any unemployment benefit.
Changing enterprises was virtually a risk-free venture for
the worker; he or she would be able to move on to a different
company after completing the mandatory service term.
Separate enterprises were, after all, only different faces of
the same entity—the state.16
Although the socialist system collapsed in 1991, its effect
on the Russian work culture persists. Russian workers still
expect their employer to provide meals, transportation,
housing, and daycare. Despite the enormous costs involved,
many enterprises continue to do so. Under the Soviet
system, the employer was not an equal and independent
member in a negotiated labor contract, but an integral and
permanent part of the worker’s life. Employment itself was
more than just a right; it was one’s obligation and umbilical
cord to the state.
All Russian citizens felt the impact of the Soviet system’s
collapse. However, for the tens of thousands of weapon
specialists in closed cities around Russia, the system has
actually changed very little. Their employer is still the
state, and the most important part of their remuneration is
not the wage, but the social benefits, most notably housing.
Underpaid and underemployed as a result of Soviet-like
labor hoarding by the institutes, these individuals lead lives
not radically different from those experienced during the
Soviet years.
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This minimal but secure standard of living must be oddly
comforting to those who know no other economic system.
Confined to the defense industrial complex, the weapon
specialists are still guaranteed housing and a stable income.
Furthermore, many believe that in time there will be future
contracts that will reinvigorate the institutes. Moonlighting
in an evening job or accepting grants from Western
nonproliferation programs serves as an additional financial
cushion that further discourages them from leaving the
defense sector.17 If a weapon specialist leaves the institutes,
he loses not only his housing and financial security, but also
his professional identity.
Under these circumstances, employment in the defense
sector is considered more stable and secure than in the
private sector. Unless Russian work attitudes and
behaviors adjust to a market economy and there is a clear
incentive, Russians, old and young alike, will not view
employment in the private sector as a desirable alternative.
Top-Heavy Russian Management Style.
The typical management structure in Russia is
top-heavy, inflexible, and inefficient. Not only does this
adversely affect the profitability of the enterprise, it creates
an environment unconducive to the development of
employees’ entrepreneurial skills. Enterprises in Russia
tend to be centered on a dominant individual instead of a
board of directors or an abstract concept such as a mission
statement. A general manager tends to be highly involved in
every aspect of the enterprise’s activity. Authority and
responsibility are rarely delegated to the members of the
management team, who have little opportunity to exercise
or develop leadership or decisionmaking skills. Nor do they
seek out extra responsibility. Because the general manager
micromanages all daily operations, he has little time to
strategize or develop other business opportunities.18
According to Andrew Cranston, a partner at KPMG
Moscow,19
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The lack of responsibility and autonomous management
structure creates a very inefficient situation; workers are afraid
to take decisions and a general manager’s time is wasted on
details. It is the rule rather than the exception to see queues of
workers, including mid-level and higher-level managers,
waiting hours in front of the executive director’s door to ask even
the most trivial questions.

Management consultants report that the majority of
their Russian clients suffer from gross inefficiency due to a
weak mid-level management structure, and often advise
their clients to adopt the Western model of organizational
management.
The top-down directive style carefully spells out the
employee’s duties and leaves little room for individual
initiative. Lack of a mission statement or clear concept of
what the company is trying to achieve often leaves the
worker without direction or incentive to make additional
efforts. Even with this direction, the average Russian
employee could not count on any additional rewards for his
efforts. In such a system, there is little reason for workers to
assume ownership of their job or any initiative at all.20
The belief that one can better one’s situation through
dedication and hard work, and that the reward received will
be proportional to the amount of effort expended, is deeply
ingrained in the Western work ethic. Workers in
industrialized countries, in this sense, are basically
entrepreneurs who sell their skills and services by contract
to the highest bidder and constantly look to move up either
within their current enterprise or with another employer.
The concept that one can better one’s position through hard
work and dedication is stunted in Russian enterprises by
the top-heavy management style along with a lack of basic
entrepreneurial skills, initiative, self-motivation, and the
ability to see the broader picture.
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Russia’s Past Laws at War with Private Business.
Until recently with passage of new laws, Russia’s
outdated labor code discouraged enterprises in Russia from
creating more jobs and preserved rigidity in the labor
market by imposing on the employer Soviet-era obligations
that dramatically increased labor costs.21 For example,
Russian workers were ensured a minimum of 4 weeks of
annual paid leave in addition to the ten national holidays,
plus unlimited paid sick leave at a rate of 60-100 percent of
salary. 22 Heavy compensation for overtime was also
stipulated by the code.23 Maternity leave in Russia was very
liberal compared to that in most Western countries,
providing as long as 3 years per child. These statutory
requirements often crippled small- and medium-sized
businesses.
The dismissal process favored the employee to the
detriment of the enterprise. Under the old labor code,
terminating employment was a very difficult and complex
process for the employer.24 Most companies found it
necessary to seek costly legal consultation before
undertaking action due to the detailed requirements.
Further contributing to the risk faced by employers in the
hiring process, trial periods could not exceed 3 months and
in some cases were forbidden completely.25 An enterprise in
Russia was therefore reluctant to create new jobs due to the
possible costs and difficulties in dismissing non-performers.
The Russian tax rules were also complex and confusing,
laying a heavy burden on small- and medium-sized
enterprises. As a result, these enterprises either evaded
paying taxes or delayed paying as long as possible.26 Tax
collection, already inadequate, was further degraded by
opacity in the private sector, as discussed previously. This
reduced revenue in turn adversely affected the Russian
government’s ability to develop adequate social safety nets,
sinces the system was funded by the payroll tax.
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Throughout 2001, President Vladimir Putin and the
Duma addressed many of these problems through
significant economic reforms, including changes to Russia’s
social security and tax regulations.27 In addition, on
December 31, 200l, Putin signed a new, improved labor code
into law.
The extent to which these reforms will be implemented
and enforced remains to be seen. Employers may take
advantage of eased restrictions on dismissing staff, but will
they be eager to report all their earnings to the tax
collectors? More important, the Russian worker, as we have
seen, is not used to a labor market in which an employee’s
value is based on performance. Will the workers accept the
new conditions, or will they seek out organizations that still
prov ide Sov iet- er a p r i vi l eges —f or i ns tanc e,
state-sponsored military and nuclear industries?
A final concern is Russia’s continued lack of consistent
and fair enforcement of the legal protections. This
deficiency affects every aspect of Russian society and
creates considerable problems for business. Many potential
investors have an understandable lack of confidence in the
Russian judiciary system’s ability protect their interests.
Also, the laws that would protect property rights are either
nonexistent or very complex, and in any case unfavorable to
foreign ownership.
Practical Experience Points to Elements
of a Solution.
When looking for ways to overcome the obstacles caused
by Russian nonentrepreneurial work culture, one will find
the experience of multinational corporations useful. These
organizations have been doing business in Russia and
employing Russians since well before the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Competitive modern corporations cannot
afford the inefficiency and inflexibility inherent in Russian
enterprises, nor are they willing to tolerate corruption. At
the same time, they rely heavily on locally hired staff. As a
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result, they have devised several methods of addressing
these concerns.
Multinational corporations have acknowledged that, in
addition to the cultural differences, there are also
generational differences among Russian workers, so that
management style must be adapted to each generation
accordingly. The first generation of Russian workers is
composed of individuals over the age of 35, commonly
referred to as the “Soviet generation,” i.e., those
acculturated to Soviet labor process. The Soviet generation
shows great difficulty in adapting to the new working
environment. Accustomed to a top-heavy management
style, they require strong leadership and close supervision.
But with clear-cut direction and explanation of what is
expected of them, they have proven to be very hard workers
within the scope of their duty description. Initiative, too,
never seems to develop to a significant degree in this age
group. Multinational corporations have found that this
g en era tion n ev er tr ul y f eel s c omf or tabl e wi th
decisionmaking and tends to defer all but the most trivial
decisions to management. 28 Unlike most indigenous
Russian enterprises, multinational corporations with
prestigious names and high salaries can attract top
candidates and usually pass over members of the Soviet
generation in favor of younger Russians.29
Younger Russian workers are generally much more
adaptable than their “Soviet” counterparts, although their
cultural background still plays an important role in the way
they work.30 Multinational corporations maintain a high
percentage of expatriate staff to act as mentors to the local
staff. These Western mentors not only help their Russian
colleagues to learn their trade, but also expose them to the
standards of a different work ethic. Often-times, this
exposure is all that is required for the local hire to adapt
successfully. The local hires remain uniquely Russian in
regards to work culture, but learn to adopt critical elements
of the Western culture that increase their entrepreneurial
skills.
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A similar approach is to send the Russian employee on
assignment to a branch of the company in a Western
country for periods of up to a year. Besides immersion in the
Western work culture, this tactic has the added benefit of
increasing the employee’s foreign language skills.
These simple approaches have been successful in
producing employees who see the big picture and
demonstrate initiative and decisionmaking skills.
Multinational corporations found that once these cultural
issues have been addressed, the positive aspects of the
Russian work culture can be put to use to a greater extent.
These aspects, coupled with their excellent tradition of
education, can make Russians valuable employees.31
Where Do We Go from Here?
Although the U.S. Government can immediately
improve the effectiveness of its cooperative threat reduction
programs by focusing on younger Russians, in the long run
the best way to assure Russian demilitarization and
nonproliferation is for the Russians themselves to get
serious about creating a strong globally integrated market
economy. To do this, the Russian government must finish
creating a coherent legal framework in which business can
prosper and ensure that future generations of Russians are
adequately prepared to do business—Western style.
Specifically,

• U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs must
focus less on the existing cohort of weapons
specialists and more on prospective weapons
workers. Towards this end, more research needs to be
conducted to answer several questions. Who is most likely to
consider work in the military and nuclear complexes more
attractive than in the private sector? How large are future
cohorts of weapons specialists likely to be? What factors do
individuals consider when deciding which career field is
more attractive? What alternatives exist that fulfill their
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expectations? What kind of programs would encourage
them to choose careers in the private sector?

•

Business and academic mentorship program
opportunities involving training in Western
countries need to be offered to Russian scientists and
engineers under the age of 35. In these programs,
specific Russians should be matched to individuals from the
West on the basis of academic or business compatibilities.
The Westerners would act as mentors whose advice could be
sought at any time, not just during a series of visits lasting 6
months to a year. The mentors themselves would need to be
from the private sector. The program would have two
phases—calibrated to the age and professional development
of the Russian enrolled, as follows:
 Ac a d emic Ph ase . Rus si an sc i enc e and
engineering university students should train for a year in
the country of their mentor. It is important to the success of
this project that the hosting university accepts only a small
number of Russians involved in the program at any one
time. These students would be encouraged to work
part-time to begin exposure to the Western work ethic.
 Business Phase. Russians under 35 and those
who have already completed their studies should be
matched up with professionals of similar background
currently working with private Western companies. The
program would start with either a 6-month or year-long
paid working placement with the mentor’s company. The
placement would not only expose Russians to the Western
work ethic, but also allow them to see firsthand how their
own skills can be applied to the commercial market. Several
short visits would be scheduled on a regular basis to
maintain the contacts and maximize exposure.

• The Russian government must create a
business-friendly environment. Current legislation
must be simplified and reflect the requirements of a market
economy. Property ownership laws must be clear and
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defended equally under Russian law. The tax system must
be simplified, and the burden on small and medium sized
enterprises lightened. Finally, the new labor code must be
enforced to ensure that rules of dismissal are made more
lenient for the employer.
The Potential for Change.
Taking these steps will not be easy for Russia, but there
are historical precedents indicating that cultural exchanges
with the West can have a tremendously beneficial impact.
In the 17th century, Russia was isolated from Western
Europe and struggling through a period of stagnation. Peter
the Great realized that, for Russians to pull themselves into
the modern world, they needed to orient towards the West.
Military and business practices were drawn on from
Sweden, Prussia, and the Netherlands. Russians were sent
out to learn Western skills, which they did without
abandoning their own traditions or customs. The process of
Westernization not only pulled Russia out of obscurity, but
also ushered in Russia’s Golden Age. 3 2 Through
reexamining current U.S.-Russian nonproliferation efforts
and maximizing cross-cultural exchanges, over the next 2
decades there is good reason to hope that the following
improvements can be achieved:

•

A greater percentage of younger Russians, now armed
with the skills to succeed, will chose to work in private
business over the public sector.

•

Of the existing cohort, 75 percent will have left
Russia’s military and nuclear complex though natural
attrition, and their numbers will not be replaced.

• The anti-American sentiment in Russia will decrease,
which will help avoid or resolve future conflicts.
•

There will be an increased cause for foreign
investment, which will strengthen the Russian economy
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without the state becoming more of a threat to global
security.
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